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Résumé
Intégrer les problématiques de sécurité au cycle de développement logiciel représente encore un
défi à l’heure actuelle, notamment dans les logiciels distribués. La sécurité informatique requiert
des connaissances et un savoir-faire particulier, ce qui implique une collaboration étroite entre
les experts en sécurité et les autres acteurs impliqués. La programmation à objets ou à base
de composants est communément employée pour permettre de telles collaborations et améliorer
la mise à l’échelle et la maintenance de briques logicielles. Malheureusement, ces styles de
programmation s’appliquent mal à la sécurité, qui est un problème transverse brisant la modu-
larité des objets ou des composants. Nous présentons dans cette thèse plusieurs techniques de
modularisation pour résoudre ce problème. Nous proposons tout d’abord l’utilisation de la pro-
grammation par aspect pour appliquer de manière automatique et systématique des techniques
de programmation sécurisée et ainsi réduire le nombre de vulnérabilités d’une application. Notre
approche se focalise sur l’introduction de vérifications de sécurité dans le code pour se protéger
d’attaques comme les manipulations de données en entrée. Nous nous intéressons ensuite à
l’automatisation de la mise en application de politiques de sécurité par des techniques de pro-
grammation. Nous avons par exemple automatisé l’application de règles de contrôle d’accès
fines et distribuées dans des web services par l’instrumentation des mécanismes d’orchestration
de la plate-forme. Nous avons aussi proposé des mécanismes permettant l’introduction d’un
filtrage des données à caractère privée par le tissage d’aspects assisté par un expert en sécurité.
Pour terminer, nous proposons un nouveau type de point d’insertion d’aspects (pointcut) centré
sur le flot d’information dans un logiciel distribué et permettant d’unifier l’implantation de nos
techniques de modularisation de la sécurité.
Introduction
La thèse apporte un point de vue industriel à la modularisation des propriétés de sécurité au
niveau de la programmation d’applications. La sécurité est omniprésente et implique des mesures
rigoureuses tout au long du cycle de développement d’un logiciel. Il s’agit de spécifier cor-
rectement et mettre en œuvre des propriétés de sécurité de manière cohérente. La sécurité est
généralement considérée comme une préoccupation non fonctionnelle et transversale, indépen-
dante des préoccupations métiers de l’application. Mais la sécurité revêt différentes facettes et
peut avoir des ramifications fortes avec l’application, ce qui rend difficile la modularisation.
L’évolution rapide des applications d’entreprise apporte une nouvelle dimension à la sécu-
rité. Au cours de la dernière décennie, les applications d’entreprise ont évolué vers plus de
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connectivité. Par conséquent, elles exposent leurs données à travers plusieurs canaux de com-
munications tels que des applications web, des applications orientées services, des applications
mobiles, ainsi que des applications dites dans les nuages (cloud computing). Cette connectiv-
ité permet une plus grande flexibilité pour créer de nouveaux marchés, de nouveaux produits,
et pour favoriser la collaboration inter-partenaire. Et ce, malgré la complexité toujours plus
poussée des systèmes d’informations. Mais cette connectivité apporte aussi une exposition sup-
plémentaire aux données d’entreprise, ce qui rend encore plus complexe la gestion de la sécurité.
Des évènements récents présentent des attaques à fort impact. Les attaques surviennent dans
tout type d’environnement: grandes entreprises, organisations, particulier, mais aussi et de plus
en plus fréquemment des institutions et des pays pour les attaques les plus sophistiquées. Les
attaques ont tendance à provenir de groupes organisés. Les groupes ont à leur disposition de
nombreux outils pour pénétrer un système et obtenir les informations ou les ressources recher-
chées. Ces techniques, comme de l’ingénierie sociale, de l’exploitation de failles informatiques,
mais aussi le vol de matériel ou de ressource numérique forment des attaques contre lesquelles
il est difficile de se prémunir. Les entreprises ont besoin d’audits et de suivis réguliers dans la
gestion de leurs ressources pour détecter dès que possible des intrusions afin de réagir correcte-
ment.
Dans cette thèse, nous couvrons un type d’attaque parmi celles énoncées. Nous nous intéres-
sons aux attaques qui utilisent les manquements au moment de la programmation. Ces attaques,
bien que moins structurées, n’en demeurent pas moins complexes et omniprésente. Il existe des
outils pour automatiser un certain nombre d’attaques qui peuvent ainsi être contrôlées par des
individus ou des groupes qui sont à la recherche de gloire, de récompenses, ou simplement de
connaissances. Les menaces peuvent généralement être atténuées par le respect de politiques de
sécurité ainsi que par l’application de bonnes pratiques de programmation. Le problème dans
ce cas est de proposer un ensemble d’outils et de méthodes pour assurer l’application correcte
des politiques et d’appliquer les bonnes pratiques de programmation lors du développement
des applications. Ces pratiques sont fortement dépendantes de l’environnement utilisé. Ainsi,
en fonction du langage de programmation choisi, du système d’exploitation utilisé, du serveur
d’application retenu, ainsi que des différents protocoles de communication adoptés, les bonnes
pratiques de programmation auront des spécificités. Chacun de ces éléments doit être pris en
considération pour garantir l’absence de vulnérabilités et la bonne mise en œuvre des propriétés
de sécurité.
Nous avons commencé avec le constat que les applications sont de plus en plus omniprésente
dans notre environnement, allant de périphériques embarqués à des applications distribuées.
Les différents types de logiciels, quels que soient leur environnement, doivent respecter des
contraintes de qualité. L’industrie se concentre d’abord sur la production d’application offrant de
la valeur ajoutée dans un domaine fonctionnel spécifique. Il peut s’agir d’applications pour aider
à la décision, faciliter la gestion de ressources, mais il peut aussi s’agir de produits pour faciliter
le développement de nouvelles applications. Chacun de ces produits possède des spécifications
pour décrire les besoins fonctionnels qui sont le cœur de métier de ces logiciels. En plus de ces
besoins fonctionnels, les éditeurs de logiciels doivent respecter plusieurs contraintes lorsqu’ils
architecturent et développent ces solutions: les politiques internes, le droit juridique, les besoins
non fonctionnels, etc. Ces besoins non fonctionnels sont des spécifications qui ne portent pas
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sur les besoins directs de l’application. Ils sont présents pour assurer la bonne exécution de
l’application dans son environnement. En général, les besoins non fonctionnels sont tels que
l’utilisabilité, l’intégrité, la fiabilité, la performance, etc. Une autre préoccupation qui revient
souvent dans la littérature comme un besoin non fonctionnel est la sécurité dont nous allons
traiter dans cette dissertation.
Nous allons voir dans les chapitres suivants que la sécurité a plusieurs facettes. Elle est
généralement considérée comme une préoccupation non fonctionnelle qui est entrecroisé dans
l’application. Plusieurs outils peuvent aider à introduire de la sécurité dans l’application (tels que
des bibliothèques tierces, le support par l’environnement d’exécution de primitives, une protec-
tion en provenance du système d’exploitation, des filtres applicatifs, etc.). En réalité, la sécurité
a des ramifications plus profondes. Les propriétés de sécurités devant être introduite au sein de
l’application couvrent des besoins fonctionnels, mais aussi des besoins non fonctionnels. Les
entreprises doivent développer des produits avec toutes les exigences de sécurités correctement
implémentées et orchestrées tout en respectant les différentes contraintes mentionnées ci-dessus.
Problème traité
Le problème du développement d’applications sécurisé a évolué au fil des années. Le problème
est connu et un certain nombre de solutions ont émergé, mais on observe toujours des vulnéra-
bilités introduites par les développeurs au sein des applications. Nous abordons le problème de
l’intégration non invasive et systématique de la sécurité au sein des applications lors de la phase
de développement, tout en respectant les contraintes de temps induit par les contraintes indus-
trielles lors de l’élaboration des logiciels. Les exigences de sécurité proviennent des politiques
de sécurité en place pour respecter les normes de qualité des logiciels, mais aussi de différentes
réglementations. Les propriétés de sécurité de ces systèmes affectent différentes couches qui
sont fortement interconnectés. La sécurité d’un système est affectée par plusieurs décisions au
cours du développement des logiciels. Il commence à partir de la définition des besoins de
sécurité. En supposant que les exigences sont correctement posées et décrites, les développeurs
reçoivent une liste de spécification à respecter, tout en développant. Ils doivent maintenir une
qualité lors de l’introduction des mécanismes de sécurité répondant aux exigences de sécurité.
Malgré la littérature apportée par la discipline sur la manière d’intégrer au mieux les mécanismes
de sécurité, les développeurs introduisent encore des vulnérabilités qui affectent les systèmes.
L’introduction de failles de sécurité par le développeur dépend de plusieurs facteurs: le
manque de connaissances sur les mécanismes de sécurité, la mauvaise interprétation des spé-
cifications ou de l’architecture du logiciel, la mauvaise configuration des frameworks et des
bibliothèques, ou même quelques défauts de refactorisation non détecté avant la mise en pro-
duction. Il existe la possibilité d’avoir un développeur qui introduit délibérément des portes
dérobées ou des défauts dans l’application, même si cela reste rare. Il est important de noter que
le coût pour corriger une vulnérabilité de sécurité, s’il est pris comme un défaut de logiciel, croît
de manière exponentielle au fur et à mesure de l’avancement de l’application (développement,
tests, production, etc.). L’exposition des vulnérabilités logicielles devient effective lorsqu’un
défaut est mis en production, et que ce défaut peut entraîner une exploitation de l’application à
l’insu de ce qui a été spécifié. En d’autre termes, il s’agit de faiblesses qui restent présentent
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alors que l’application est censée répondre à tous les besoins qui ont été spécifiés.
Afin de limiter le nombre de défaut introduit involontairement, nous proposons d’accompagner
les développeurs en leur donnant des méthodes et des outils. Nous avons défini un ensemble de
besoins de sécurité, provenant d’un sous-ensemble de politiques internes que l’on peut retrouver
en entreprise, mais également provenant d’exigences que nous avons observés dans les bonnes
pratiques de programmation. Les exigences visent principalement les vulnérabilités des appli-
cations web, bien que l’on puisse généraliser le problème à tous les défauts que l’on rencontre
dans le cadre de systèmes distribués. Dans la première partie de la thèse, nous limitons la
liste des exigences aux défauts qui sont introduits lors du développement du code applicatif.
Nous sommes intéressés par la détection et la prévention de toutes les manipulations d’entrée:
cross-site scripting, injection SQL, manipulation de chemin d’accès, injection de commandes,
pollution de paramètre HTTP, et tout type d’injection qui en découle. Dans la deuxième partie,
nous proposons de simplifier l’ajout de propriétés de sécurités que nous appelons “construc-
tive”. Ainsi, nous fournissions des outils pour que les développeurs utilisent de mécanismes de
sécurités, au niveau de l’environnement d’exécution ou au niveau de la plateforme. Les contri-
butions gèrent des propriétés telles que la responsabilité, ce qui implique l’ordonnancement de
plusieurs mécanismes différents, ainsi que de la gestion de la protection de la vie privée et de la
communication dans les systèmes distribués.
La modularisation permet aux entreprises de proposer des logiciels qui sont conformes aux
différentes régulations en vigueur dans les pays où sont commercialisés ces logiciels, en appli-
quant les contraintes de sécurité de manière tardive. Par exemple, la gestion de la confidential-
ité des données personnelles est différente d’un pays à l’autre. Bien que la solution que nous
développons dans ce qui suit puisse être appliquée dans plusieurs contextes, nous les avons mis
en œuvre dans un contexte de systèmes distribués. Nous ciblons plus particulièrement les sys-
tèmes interconnectés dans un style architectural qui est souvent désigné comme une architecture
orientée services (SOA). Nous apportons aussi des solutions pour des plateformes de cloud com-
puting, ce qui implique que nous devons non seulement cibler les applications, mais aussi les
infrastructures et la plateforme.
La thèse discute donc du développement de logiciels sécurisés dans les environnements dis-
tribués. Nous avons développé des techniques pour améliorer la flexibilité dans la gestion des
propriétés de sécurité au moment du développement applicatif. Nous appliquons le concept de
préoccupation transversale, principalement promue par le paradigme de développement à partir
d’aspect (AOP). Ce paradigme permet d’améliorer la flexibilité à la fois dans la définition des
propriétés de sécurité, mais aussi dans son exécution. Nous différons la mise en œuvre con-
crète des propriétés de sécurité dans l’application. Nous commençons par collecter les points
impactant au niveau du code source de l’application, puis nous injectons les comportement de
sécurité pour obtenir des logiciels qui respectent à la fois les bonnes pratiques de programma-
tion sécurisés, mais aussi les différents besoins fonctionnels de sécurités qui peuvent survenir
(gestion de l’authentification et des autorisations, gestion de la vie privée, gestion de la confi-
dentialité et de l’intégrité des données, etc.).
Dans la suite du résumé, nous décrivons plus en détail les différentes contributions qui sont
exposées dans la thèse, afin de répondre à la modularisation des propriétés de sécurité en milieu
industriel: modularisation des techniques pour de la sécurité constructive, et modularisation des
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techniques pour de la sécurité défensive. Nous introduisons une séparation dans les catégories de
sécurité afin de distinguer la sécurité qui répond aux besoins fonctionnels tels que la vie privée,
la confidentialité, etc. de la sécurité qui limite l’exploitation de vulnérabilités logicielles. Les
contributions proposent de faciliter la gestion des propriétés de sécurité tout au long du cycle
de vie de sécurité avec un accent tout particulier sur la phase de développement. La prochaine
section présente deux contributions relatives à la modularisation de la sécurité défensive. Ces
deux contributions ont la même finalité, c’est à dire modulariser du code de sécurité qui limite
la possibilité d’exploiter une application, mais dont la méthode de protection diffère. Ensuite,
la section suivante présente deux autres contributions relatives à la modularisation de la sécurité
constructive. Ce sont deux approches différentes, qui présentent deux types de propriétés dans
des environnements différents que l’on peut modulariser pour en simplifier l’intégration par les
développeurs. Enfin, une dernière section présente les conclusions que l’on retire de cette thèse,
qui ouvre sur une perspective d’unification des approches présentées.
Modularisation de la sécurité défensive
La modularisation de la sécurité défensive peut être simplifiée à l’analyse et l’application des
bonnes pratiques de sécurité au niveau du code applicatif. Les bonnes pratiques de sécurité
sont un ensemble de méthodes, de règles, de processus, de concepts et théories qui doivent être
bien partagés entre les différents acteurs évoluant autour du développement du logiciel. Les
personnes impliquées dans la définition et la mise en œuvre d’un tel système doivent partager
la même vision globale en termes de sécurité, et aussi se former afin de détecter et réagir aux
nouvelles menaces. Il existe plusieurs sources pour partager ces connaissances, avec des portées
différentes. Les gouvernements et institutions publient des recommandations pour maintenir une
sécurité des systèmes d’information. Ils éditent aussi les lignes directrices en matière de sécu-
rité informatique. Par exemple, le gouvernement français a une structure dédiée qui propose
des documents, des analyses et des informations autour de la sécurité de l’information. Le gou-
vernement allemand pour sa part propose une structure similaire en qualité d’Office fédéral de
la sécurité de l’information. L’Europe dispose aussi d’une agence afin d’améliorer la transmis-
sion d’information sur cette problématique entre les différentes nations. L’agence publie aussi
des guides pour sensibiliser le grand public aux problématiques de sécurité, à destination des
citoyens, des entreprises, ou encore du secteur public, etc.. Un institut renommé est le “National
Institute of Standards and Technology” (NIST). Il fournit des conseils dans plusieurs domaines
de l’ingénierie de la sécurité de l’information. Des institutions indépendantes existent aussi qui
élaborent des guides de bonnes pratiques.
En plus de toutes ces institutions, il y a des consortiums qui se structurent avec un objec-
tif commun pour partager des connaissances. Ils centralisent les meilleures pratiques dans des
domaines spécifiques. Dans le domaine de la sécurité, il y a des groupes tels que le CERT qui
décrit des approches pour une meilleure sécurité du système de l’information: des outils et des
techniques pour évaluer et mesurer les vulnérabilités. Le CERT a d’abord été une équipe de
l’Université Carnegie Mellon, et forme maintenant une équipe dédiée à la réponse des menaces
sur internet et dans le monde de l’informatique. OWASP est un projet open-source pour la sécu-
rité des applications web. C’est une communauté pour les sociétés, les chercheurs, et les partic-
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uliers ayant plusieurs événements régionaux pour partager les connaissances et comprendre les
dernières avancées en termes de menaces. Son champ d’application se limite à des applications
web et à service. Une autre organisation diffuse les bonnes pratiques dans l’environnement du
cloud computing. Ainsi, ils publient des documents spécifiques à la sécurité de l’informatique
dans les nuages par exemple.
Bien que de nombreuses organisations éditent des guides pour la gestion de la sécurité de
l’information, les failles de sécurité sont encore répandues dans les applications, et en particulier
les applications web et dans les nuages. Ces types d’applications sont spécialement exposés à
un public plus large avec une forte médiatisation des attaques. Elles interagissent avec les util-
isateurs et recueillent un vaste ensemble de données liés à la vie privée. Développer ce type
d’applications nécessite une attention particulière lors de l’édition des spécifications. Ensuite, il
faut implémenter de manière rigoureuse les besoins de l’application. Il est nécessaire d’éliminer
au maximum les vulnérabilités qui pourraient être introduite lors du développement avant la mise
en production de l’application. Il existe plusieurs stratégies pour s’assurer que des applications
fonctionnent correctement et sont sécurisées. L’environnement informatique est hétérogène et
donne aux développeurs de nombreuses possibilités: frameworks, bibliothèques, langages de
programmation, serveurs d’applications, etc. Ces éléments permettent de fournir de la flexi-
bilité, performance et sécurité, bien qu’il soit parfois nécessaire de faire un compromis. Une
application web devra par exemple vérifier les données en entrée, qui aura un impact sur la per-
formance de l’application. La modularisation de la sécurité permet de savoir à quels endroits les
vérifications sont effectuées, et ainsi avoir une meilleure vision des points de contrôle. Dans ce
qui suit, nous présentons un premier travail où nous utilisons l’environnement de développement
de l’utilisateur afin de détecter et de protéger les vulnérabilités communément rencontrées dans
les applications web. Ensuite, nous proposons une autre approche qui généralise et rend plus
souple l’automatisation de la validation d’entrée dans des applications web.
Contribution 1
Les failles de sécurité sont fréquemment rencontrées dans les applications en dépit de l’existence
de méthodes pour les éviter depuis plusieurs années. Afin de détecter les failles de sécurité ou-
bliées par les développeurs, des solutions complexes sont entreprises comme l’analyse statique
de code source, souvent après la phase de développement. Le problème de ce type de solution
une fois que le développement est terminé réside dans la décorrelation entre le contexte appli-
catif et le rapport d’état indiquant la localisation des problèmes dans le code: les personnes en
charge de la correction ont toutes les difficultés pour comprendre l’architecture et les raisons qui
ont mené à un code source en particulier. Ensuite, des vulnérabilités peuvent être trouvées, sans
pour autant qu’une protection systématique soit appliquée.
Dans la discussion de la thèse, cette contribution introduit un plugin intégré à l’environnement
de développement de l’utilisateur (dans ce cas, Eclipse) pour aider les développeurs à détecter et
corriger des vulnérabilités au niveau applicatif à l’aide de la programmation orientée aspect, et
ceci, le plus tôt possible dans le cycle de vie de développement du logiciel. La solution est une
combinaison d’analyse statique au cours de la phase de développement suivi de la génération
de code de protection. Nous utilisons l’interaction des développeurs avec l’outil intégré pour
obtenir plus de connaissances sur l’état de l’application à un endroit donné. Ceci nous permet
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de modulariser le code de sécurité et ainsi avoir une meilleure vue d’ensemble sur les différents
aspects de sécurité appliqués. Le résultat permet d’obtenir des logiciels plus robustes avant leur
livraison en production, et surtout une flexibilité accrue par l’application d’aspects le plus tard
possible au sein de l’application.
La manière de corriger plusieurs vulnérabilités de sécurité en utilisant une combinaison en-
tre un analyseur statique qui aide les développeurs à détecter les vulnérabilités et une correction
semi-automatique de ces résultats avec AOP présente plusieurs avantages. Il permet à plusieurs
acteurs de respecter des contraintes complexes à mettre en œuvre en temps normal. Première-
ment, les experts en sécurité sont en mesure de propager des mises à jour du code de protection
aux équipes de développement. Les développeurs peuvent ainsi plus facilement détecter et cor-
riger des bugs de sécurité. Les acteurs peuvent interagir étroitement pour décider des meilleures
solutions à implémenter pour une situation donnée. Les développeurs bénéficient de cette ap-
proche en ayant un outil opérationnel déjà configuré pour leur environnement de développe-
ment. Ils peuvent se concentrer sur l’écriture de leur code fonctionnel et, de temps en temps,
vérifier le respect des bonnes pratiques de programmation ainsi que l’absence de vulnérabilité
dans leur code applicatif. Les codes de protection de sécurité sont souvent parsemés et surtout
entremêlés au sein du code applicatif, ce qui tend à avoir des contrôles de sécurité répartis dans
toute l’application. L’utilisation d’une solution unifiée dans la gestion de l’application des codes
de protection permet d’avoir une vue d’ensemble. Ceci est plus efficace et permet une plus
grande productivité des développeurs. L’automatisation de la détection et de l’application de
code de protection permet une application plus large et cohérente de la sécurité dans toutes les
applications. L’utilisation d’AOP facilite le déploiement et le changement de code de protection
de sécurité. Enfin, le fait que le processus se fasse au cours de la phase de développement permet
de détecter au plus tôt d’éventuels problèmes.
Le plugin Eclipse que nous avons développé lors de cette contribution permet, sous un an-
gle de vue éducatif, une meilleure prise de conscience des problèmes de sécurité d’un point de
vue du développeur. Il est important de noter que la correction apportée par le plugin ne cou-
vre pas forcément toutes les problématiques liées aux besoins de sécurité. L’application peut
se retrouver avec quelques vulnérabilités non corrigeable par notre approche. Notre approche
permet de limiter les bugs de sécurité introduit au moment de l’écriture du code. Les éléments
qui ne peuvent pas être vérifiés par notre solution se trouvent être des besoins de sécurité dont
nous discutons plus loin dans la thèse: authentification, autorisations, etc.. En outre, nous en-
courageons les développeurs à creuser les rapports de vulnérabilités que nous fournissons: la
correction automatique proposé est un premier pas, qu’il est possible d’améliorer. Nous voulons
que les développeurs apprennent les bonnes pratiques pour avoir de nouveaux réflexes lors de
l’écriture de futures applications.
Cette contribution propose une approche de la programmation pour modulariser de la sécu-
rité. Nous commençons à partir du code source d’une application et essayons d’injecter du
code de protection à des endroits appropriés. Cet outil intégré a plusieurs avantages mentionnés
ci-dessus, mais il souffre de limitations dues à des décisions que nous avons prises. Par exem-
ple, quand nous développons un outil comme le plug-in Eclipse, nous visons une plate-forme
et un langage de programmation, ce qui limite volontairement le champ d’application. L’outil
lui-même est un prototype que nous avons validé sur des projets en interne à SAP et que nous
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avons comparé par rapport aux logiciels commerciaux. Dans plusieurs cas, l’approche agile
qui consiste à faire des vérifications régulières sur le code, puis d’appliquer les corrections des
vulnérabilités conduit à une réduction des faux positifs et l’absence de faux négatifs. Ceci est
permis car le moteur de détection de vulnérabilité est affiné au fur et à mesure des analyses. En
outre, fournir une assistance intégrée pour corriger les vulnérabilités est novatrice et nous nous
concentrons maintenant sur l’amélioration du code de protection ainsi que de l’interaction qu’il
peut y avoir entre plusieurs aspects de sécurités.
Contribution 2
Dans cette seconde contribution, nous nous intéressons au problème de validation d’entrée sys-
tématique pour application web, afin d’apporter des contre-mesures efficaces à plusieurs types
d’attaque par injection. La solution s’appuie sur des annotations java qui fournissent des méta-
données concernant les paramètres d’entrée de l’application. Cette information est ensuite util-
isée pour injecter automatiquement du code de validation dans l’application cible, en utilisant
une approche orientée aspect. La solution permet de réduire les risques d’oubli et de maintenir
la logique de sécurité indépendamment de la logique applicative. La différence avec le précé-
dent chapitre repose principalement sur la méthode pour recueillir les points où injecter le code
de sécurité. Alors que dans la solution précédente, nous avons utilisé un analyseur statique,
nous utilisons maintenant des annotations dans le code source de l’application pour donner plus
d’information sur le contexte.
Beaucoup d’applications web et de services web sont sujets à des vulnérabilités sur la vali-
dation des entrées. Des exemples bien connus de cette classe de vulnérabilités comprennent les
XSS (Cross-Site Scripting), SQL injection, injection de commandes, etc.. Bien que les vulnéra-
bilités sur la validation des entrées sont bien connues et ont été étudiées, les vulnérabilités sont
parmi les plus répandues dans les classements. Plusieurs institutions listent ces problématiques,
comme OWASP qui édite chaque année le classement des dix failles les plus critiques sur les
applications web. Les vulnérabilités sur la validation des entrées ont une origine commune: une
vérification incorrecte des données d’entrée fournis par les clients de l’application qui résulte en
un mauvais état. Les attaques par injection, qui exploitent ces vulnérabilités, sont des attaques
dans lesquelles un attaquant crée un jeu de donnée en entrée qui permet de contrôler à distance
le comportement de l’application web pour ainsi exécuter du code non voulu, ou contrôler des
pans de l’application. Ces attaques peuvent avoir des conséquences dévastatrices, allant de la
fuite d’informations à une escalade de privilège dans laquelle l’attaquant peut prendre le contrôle
complet du système attaqué.
Prévenir les attaques est une tâche complexe. Malgré la présence d’outils pour détecter les
vulnérabilités, les failles sont encore très répandues dans les applications web et le nombre de
vulnérabilités signalées continue de croître. En outre, la complexité de la majorité des attaques
exploitant cette classe de vulnérabilités n’a pas réellement augmenté, ce qui indique que même
les protections les plus basiques et donc largement documentées ne sont pas prises en compte.
Afin d’éviter ces vulnérabilités, chaque entrée lue par le programme doit subir un processus
de validation et de nettoyage. Nous nous concentrons sur la validation d’entrée qui est essen-
tiellement, le processus d’ajouter du sens à la donnée qui entre. Il faut s’assurer que les entrées
respectent un ensemble de contraintes afin d’obtenir une entrée bien formé. Selon le type de
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données, des contrôles supplémentaires peuvent être nécessaires: ne contenir que des caractères
autorisés, vérifier la longueur d’une chaîne de caractères afin qu’elle reste dans certaines limites,
ou encore de valider qu’un nombre soit compris dans une fourchette prévue par les spécifica-
tions.
Une des raisons qui fait que la présence de nombreuses vulnérabilités de validation des
entrées est toujours hautement critique est le fait que les techniques pour remédier à ces vul-
nérabilités reposent sur la bonne écriture du code de vérification par le développeur. Bien que
de nombreux frameworks encadrent l’écriture du code pour limiter ces types de vulnérabilités
et fournissent des bibliothèques contenant des fonctions de validation et désinfection, ceux-ci
doivent encore être appelés explicitement à partir de la logique applicative afin de valider ou
désinfecter les données en entrée. Cela a deux inconvénients: d’abord, les développeurs sont
susceptible d’oublier d’écrire ces vérifications (ou ils ignorent le problème). Ensuite, il est diffi-
cile de maintenir, mettre à jour et faire évoluer la logique applicative indépendamment des codes
de vérifications: l’appel aux fonctions de validation serait disséminé dans de nombreux modules
de code, et complètement entremêlé avec le code métier. En outre, les fonctionnalités de vali-
dation intégrées dans les frameworks n’ont pas le degré de granularité nécessaire pour gérer la
validation d’un grand nombre de types de données différents qu’une application est susceptible
de gérer.
Nous présentons dans cette seconde contribution une méthode innovante et des outils pour
limiter la principale cause de vulnérabilités. La première phase requiert que le développeur ap-
plicatif annote dans le code les différentes entrées du programme afin d’ajouter des informations
plus précises sur son typage. Cette approche est légère et permet d’enrichir les informations de
type concernant les entrées de l’application. Ensuite, des experts de sécurité peuvent écrire du
code modulaire qui vérifie les données à partir du typage indiqué. Ainsi, les fonctions de valida-
tion sont modulaires et sont intégrés dans le code existant à l’aide de la programmation orientée
aspect. Les principaux avantages de notre solution sont l’utilisation de ce type de programma-
tion pour injecter le code sans que les développeurs applicatifs aient à apprendre un nouveau
paradigme de programmation. Ensuite, nous obtenons un haut degré d’automatisation et perme-
ttront d’ajouter des vérifications de sécurité avec un effort mineur. Le développeur applicatif n’a
pas non plus besoin d’écrire du code de sécurité et peut se concentrer sur son code métier. La
solution est extensible: les développeurs applicatifs peuvent définir de nouveaux types de don-
nées spécifiques à leur environnement. Les aspects de validation peuvent être écrits par eux ou
par des experts en sécurité. Enfin, l’application considère la sécurité et la validation des entrées
dès la phase d’architecture, ce qui permet d’avoir plus de souplesse pour gérer le tout.
Modularisation de la sécurité constructive
La modularisation de la sécurité constructive peut être simplifiée à la modularisation des préoc-
cupations de sécurité de l’entreprise. Ce sont des préoccupations qui sont spécifiés comme des
besoins fonctionnels. Elles permettent à l’application de fonctionner correctement dans son en-
vironnement tout en respectant tous les besoins en sécurité. En général, les préoccupations à
introduire au sein de l’application sont complexes, ce qui peut entraîner un développeur mal-
informé à introduire des bugs qui peuvent ensuite se transformer en vulnérabilité exploitable
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par des personnes extérieures. Les concepts autour de la sécurité informatique sont nombreux.
Ainsi, il y a plusieurs types de sécurité qui peuvent être affectés. Les développeurs, afin de re-
specter les spécifications, doivent donc utiliser plusieurs mécanismes de sécurité qui doivent être
correctement injectés dans l’application. Les propriétés sont de l’ordre de l’authentification et
l’autorisation au sein de l’application. Cela va aussi plus loin comme la gestion de la vie privée,
la confidentialité des données, l’intégrité des messages, etc. Ce sont des préoccupations qui sont
souvent exposées à travers des politiques de sécurité.
Dans ce qui suit, nous présentons deux nouvelles contributions qui montrent une modular-
isation de ces préoccupations de sécurité en deux couches différentes de l’infrastructure util-
isée dans les applications distribuées. La première contribution présente une modularisation
au niveau d’une plateforme qui fournit des services informatiques. Elle permet de simplifier
l’utilisation de politiques de sécurité en rendant les règles agnostiques à la technologie sous-
jacente. Dans un environnement à service, enclin à l’utilisation de services basé sur SOAP ou
basé sur le paradigme REST, il est ainsi possible de définir des règles de haut niveau qui sont
ensuite vérifiées et exécutées lors de l’exécution. Nous introduisons un protocole de sécurité
pour la sécurité des messages REST pour l’occasion, afin de fournir un équivalent à des briques
de sécurité pour les messages qui existent déjà pour les services basé sur SOAP. Ainsi, nous
fournissons au niveau de la plateforme de services de nouveaux mécanismes tels que le chiffre-
ment et la signature afin de pouvoir transmettre des jetons en toute sécurité, rendre confidentiel
et intègre les données qui transitent. La deuxième contribution présente une architecture pour
simplifier la gestion des données liées à la vie privée sur une plateforme qui fournit des appli-
cations dans les nuages. Nous permettons aux clients qui développent des applications pour
cette plateforme d’utiliser de nouveaux mécanismes qui permettent de modulariser des spécifi-
cations souvent soumises à régulations. Ces deux approches se basent dans le cadre de systèmes
distribués, où les systèmes d’exécutions communiquent à travers plusieurs canaux, et où intervi-
ennent généralement plusieurs domaines administratifs qui nécessite une entente entre tous les
acteurs.
Contribution 3
La modularisation de la sécurité informatique peut être obtenue en modifiant la façon dont la
sécurité est injectée dans l’application. Au lieu de figer l’implémentation de la sécurité au cœur
d’une application, nous pouvons obtenir une sécurité plus flexible et modulaire en laissant la
plate-forme injecter de la sécurité à des endroits définis. Cette notion est désignée comme
l’inversion de contrôle et permet de gérer l’orchestration des problématiques transversales au
niveau du conteneur de l’application. Il est alors possible de définir la sécurité en tant que com-
posant et de différer son application au sein du code au moment où l’on en a besoin, et compte
tenu du contexte spécifique de l’application.
Dans cette contribution, nous proposons d’introduire un nouveau modèle de sécurité des
messages de services de type REST, afin de transporter tout en protégeant les ressources. Cette
contribution est issue d’une réflexion globale pour pouvoir appliquer de la sécurité de manière
transparente dans un système où plusieurs domaines collaborent. Il manquait une couche de
sécurité pour les services REST équivalente à la couche de sécurité définie pour les services
basé sur SOAP. Ces types de services sont utilisés pour échanger les informations, et nous
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avions besoin de décrire des mécanismes de haut niveau qui peuvent avoir des implications
sur les services. Les propriétés de sécurité apportées par cette approche peuvent être facilement
introduites par des politiques de sécurité. Pour améliorer la flexibilité des transformations néces-
saire à l’ajout des propriétés de sécurité, nous proposons un module accessible au niveau de la
couche d’infrastructure de service web, ou au niveau d’un moniteur de référence.
La sécurité et la fiabilité des applications distribuées nécessitent une forte confiance dans le
protocole de communication utilisé pour accéder aux ressources. Les plus grands fournisseurs
de services et acteurs du web se tournent vers les services basés sur REST au détriment de ceux
basés sur SOAP. REST propose une facilité de consommation des ressources sans encapsulation
spécifique, mais manque d’une description des métadonnées comme pour une description de
la sécurité associée au service. Actuellement, la sécurité des services REST repose sur une
implémentation au cas par cas (dont la mise en œuvre est sujette à erreur) ou sur la sécurité de
la couche de transport (offrant une faible flexibilité dans l’application de plusieurs propriétés
à grain fin). Nous introduisons des mécanismes pour sécuriser la communication de service
REST en permettant d’appliquer des propriétés de sécurité de manière flexible et à grain fin sur
les ressources qui sont contenues dans les messages HTTP.
Nous présentons dans cette contribution une approche pour fournir une sécurité des services
REST qui puisse être équivalente à celle décrite par les spécifications de WS-Security. Notre
solution respecte la philosophie REST tout en minimisant la charge de traitement pour les con-
sommateurs de ces services, et sans interférer dans l’orchestration des services déjà en place.
Nous fournissons des mécanismes qui permettent de préserver la confidentialité des messages et
de les signer avec une granularité fine. Le traitement effectué sur les messages est une alterna-
tive valide aux approches similaires, qui considèrent seulement l’encapsulation dans des canaux
sécurisés (encapsulation SSL par exemple) et donc au niveau de la couche de transport pour les
services REST. L’avantage de notre approche est de déporter la complexité pour les consom-
mateurs de services à l’environnement d’exécution qui est alors capable de traiter et vérifier les
propriétés de confidentialité et les signatures, sans pour autant changer le contenu des messages
quand ce n’est pas nécessaire.
En outre, la solution que nous proposons permet de construire de nouvelles collaborations
entre les différents systèmes. Nous présentons deux cas dans lesquels REST-security montre
une meilleure flexibilité: fournir des moyens pour transmettre des jetons en toute sécurité, et
une application facile des propriétés dans un flux de messages qui transitent par des moniteurs
de référence pour valider et appliquer des politiques de sécurité. Ceci est rendu possible car nous
modifions une sous-partie des messages, sans impacter le reste de la ressource. Les propriétés
de sécurité sont propagées avec la ressource, ce qui nous permet d’obtenir une sécurité de bout
à bout et non pas d’un point à un autre. Nous fournissons également une évaluation de la per-
formance compte tenu de plusieurs cas d’utilisation afin d’analyser l’impact de la protection des
messages sur la performance des services web. L’analyse comprend des scénarios hétérogènes
et compare différents mécanismes de sécurité entre eux. Les résultats montrent que les perfor-
mances avec et sans sécurité des services REST sont plus efficaces de n’importe quel point de
vue, mais qui s’explique aussi par la nature de ce service: les services REST sont beaucoup
moins coûteux en terme de ressource utilisée et consommé au détriment d’une description un
peu moins poussée. Enfin, les services REST sont destinés à exposer des ressources, alors que
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les services basés sur SOAP exécutent des appels distants à des méthodes. Le protocole que
nous proposons est auto-descriptif, donc toutes les informations de sécurité sur les messages
sont exprimées, et le destinataire peut ainsi effectuer les vérifications et transformations sur le
message.
Lamodularisation des propriétés de sécurité peut être introduit soit sur la couche d’application
ou sur des moniteurs de références entre différents domaines distribués. Bien que nous n’utilisons
pas les aspects pour injecter les préoccupations de sécurité, nous nous appuyons sur des points
extérieurs à une application pour détecter l’état de la sécurité en place, et de réagir en con-
séquence.
Contribution 4
Dans cette contribution, nous proposons la modularisation d’une des propriétés de sécurité que
nous avons vue dans d’autres chapitres: le respect des données liées à la vie privée. La modular-
isation est appliquée au niveau de la plateforme sur un serveur d’application dans le cloud. Les
plateformes sur le cloud sont nombreuses, et elles proposent une flexibilité plus grande par rap-
port à des solutions déployées et gérées par des clients: les plateformes dans le cloud proposent
des solutions à la demande et flexibles pour de nombreuses situations. Elles permettent à leurs
utilisateurs de gérer la complexité de la configuration, l’installation, et surtout mise à l’échelle
du trafic. En échange de la flexibilité, les clients acceptent de déléguer le contrôle de données
avec la plateforme. La sécurité du fournisseur de la plateforme est un facteur de différenciation
dans le choix d’une plateforme appropriée pour héberger leurs applications. Le rôle du four-
nisseur de plateforme est alors de fournir des moyens fiables et efficaces pour aider leurs clients
à gérer la sécurité de leurs applications. Fournir une solution modulaire et complète pour à la
fois la plateforme et les utilisateurs est difficile. Nous définissons au niveau de la plateforme de
nouvelles API et des outils pour appliquer les besoins de l’application en termes de respect de la
vie privée.
Le respect de la vie privée dans le cloud computing est une préoccupation importante pour
les différents acteurs qui utilisent les services, mais aussi qui fournissent les services. Dans ce
contexte, la conformité avec les politiques de sécurité en vigueur sur la protection des données
personnelles est essentielle, mais difficile à réaliser. Par exemple, la mise en œuvre des contrôles
de confidentialité est sujette à divers types d’erreurs.
Dans ce chapitre, nous présentons comment l’application de la politique de confidentialité
peut être facilitée par une plateforme. Les développeurs d’applications qui doivent être déployés
sur cette plateforme dans le cloud ont à leur disposition des annotations java qui enrichissent
le modèle de données. Les annotations indiquent dans le code les données personnelles, ce
qui permet à un système s’appuyant sur la programmation orientée aspect (AOP) de facilement
détecter ces endroits. L’évaluation des préférences définies par l’utilisateur sur la gestion de
ses données par l’application est réalisée par des composants de confiance fournis par la plate-
forme. Cela permet aux développeurs d’éviter la charge de la conception et de l’implémentation
de mécanismes pour gérer les contraintes liées à la vie privée.
Dans cette contribution, nous présentons une solution pour simplifier la gestion des données
liées à la vie privée dans les applications web déployées sur une plateforme dans le cloud. Nous
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donnons plus de contexte au niveau de l’application via des annotations et les traitements ap-
pliquées par la plateforme pour respecter la gestion des données liées à la vie privée est presque
transparente d’un point de vue du développeur (la principale tâche est de placer les annotations
dans le code applicatif). Ensuite, nous injectons du code au niveau de l’application pour inter-
cepter les requêtes vers la base de données et ainsi filtrer les ressources contenant des données
sensibles. Les applications qui sont déployées indiquent comment et où des informations per-
sonnelles sont manipulées. Les composants de la plateforme permettent de gérer correctement
la manipulation des données sensibles.
Les avantages de notre approche sont que les détails d’implémentation sont cachés au développeur
qui n’a qu’à se concentrer sur le développement de son code applicatif. Il est possible d’utiliser
notre approche avec des applications existantes en ajoutant des annotations, mais sans plus de
modifications. Les applications sont compatibles pour plusieurs plateformes du moment que les
composants fournissant la gestion des données liées à la vie privée soient présent.
Conclusion
Dans le cadre de la thèse, j’ai développé plusieurs contributions liées au développement sécurisé
d’applications. Initialement, les solutions ciblaient les applications orientées services, mais
nous avons observé que les techniques et concepts s’appliquaient à une catégorie plus vaste
d’applications. L’encapsulation correcte du comportement suivi de l’application des probléma-
tiques transversales dans les applications, composants, plates-formes, ainsi que tous les éléments
d’un système d’information est le résultat de nombreuses années de recherche. Les solutions ap-
portées par la recherche et l’industrie sont de plus en plus matures au fil du temps. Elles perme-
ttent de bien séparer les différentes problématiques des logiciels: code métier, code technique,
code transversal; ainsi, le comportement du programme s’adapte plus facilement à plusieurs
environnements. La thèse s’inscrit dans un contexte industriel, où la sécurité est une problé-
matique majeure. Les développeurs doivent respecter plusieurs types de besoins: ils doivent
mettre en œuvre des comportements métier, c’est à dire respectant les besoins fonctionnels,
mais aussi s’occuper de besoins non fonctionnels qui sont tout aussi important pour la qualité
du logiciel. Ces besoins se trouvent être généralement transverse à l’application, entremêlé et
dispersé au sein du code. Nous utilisons des technologies existantes liées à l’ingénierie logicielle
et à la modularisation de propriétés transversales afin de les adapter à des besoins de sécurité.
La sécurité est un domaine complexe, et nous nous concentrons sur l’automatisation de bonnes
pratiques de programmation, mais aussi à la modularisation de propriétés de sécurité nécessaire
aux applications d’entreprise.
Les contributions peuvent être séparées en deux catégories: les contributions qui abor-
dent la programmation sécurisée, et les contributions qui introduisent des propriétés de sécu-
rité qui sont généralement indiquées dans les spécifications de l’application. Nous aidons les
développeurs dans le développement de logiciels sécurisés avec le minimum d’effort dans la
première approche. Nous fournissons des outils directement intégrés dans l’environnement des
développeurs afin de minimiser les erreurs manuelles et éviter les pièges les plus courants. Les
contributions sont une application directe des bonnes pratiques de programmation sécurisée
dans lesquelles nous offrons des contrôles au niveau de l’application des comportements au
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sein de l’application. Dans le second type de contribution, nous proposons d’introduire des
propriétés de sécurité. Ainsi, nous proposons des méthodes au niveau de la plateforme utilisée
par l’application. L’environnement d’exécution fournit de nouveaux mécanismes de sécurité qui
peuvent être utilisés de manière modulaire par les développeurs. La problématique diffère d’une
analyse où il faut combiner plusieurs outils pour recueillir les exigences de sécurité, les faire
respecter dans l’application, et vérifier leur correcte application lors de l’exécution. Nous avons
développé un langage de politique de sécurité agnostique de la technologie utilisée sous-jacente,
pour laquelle nous avons développé des extensions sécurisées pour des services REST. Cela sig-
nifie que les politiques de sécurité permettent de définir un niveau de sécurité dans un système.
Il est possible d’orchestrer les différents composants du système et d’exécuter des mécanismes
afin d’accroître la sécurité sans la nécessité de connaître les solutions utilisées. La spécialisation
est déportée à l’exécution pour offrir une plus grande souplesse dans l’application de la sécurité.
Enfin, dans une dernière contribution, nous avons également montré la nécessité de fournir des
composants au niveau de la plateforme pour permettre de mieux gérer les contraintes de gestion
de la vie privée. Ces composants sont souhaitables pour offrir une approche cohérente au lieu
de laisser les développeurs implémenter une nouvelle solution, sujette à erreur.
Les différentes contributions montrent la diversité des approches de la modularisation des
propriétés de sécurité. A partir de ces travaux, nous avons observé les pièges courants pour
lesquels nous proposons de nouvelles directions. Nous distinguons deux types de sécurité, que
nous exprimons en tant que “sécurité défensive” et “sécurité constructive”. Les deux types de
sécurité sont complètement différents. Généralement les deux se retrouvent entremêlés et dis-
séminés au sein de l’application, mais les approches pour intégrer ces deux types de sécurité sont
différentes. L’approche orientée aspect est traditionnellement un cas d’utilisation indiqué dans
la littérature pour introduire de la sécurité au sein de l’application. En fait, il existe plusieurs
degrés de représentation, en fonction des propriétés. La programmation orientée aspect est par-
ticulièrement indiquée quand on peut facilement détecter des points de tissage. Les applications
que nous avons analysées ont des points fixes et faciles à détecter, tels les entrées d’applications
web. Mais quand il s’agit d’analyse et de suivi de flot d’information, la détection de ces points
devient plus difficile avec les langages d’aspects, et les décisions ne peuvent être prises que
lors de l’exécution. Dans ce cas, nous devons fournir des solutions sur mesure, et généralement
à un niveau d’abstraction plus haut pour respecter la sémantique du programme et fournir la
meilleure solution pour le problème donné. La gestion des propriétés de sécurité au niveau du
programme seul peut mener à des incohérences. Les programmes sont interconnectés et évolu-
ent dans des environnements complexes qui diffèrent: configuration, politiques de sécurités,
plateformes, etc. L’encapsulation de comportements de sécurité doit être adaptée à la nature des
programmes. Afin de remédier à ces inconvénients, nous décrivons dans la suite un point de vue
que nous souhaiterions adopter dans des travaux futurs.
Les langages d’aspect ont évolué au fil des avancées pour faciliter leur intégration au sein
de l’application. De nouvelles primitives ont été définies dans ces langages pour permettre
aux développeurs d’aspect d’écrire des cas d’utilisation complexes. Par exemple, les langages
d’aspects qui couvrent le langage Java ont intégré les nouvelles spécifications du langage Java
pour pouvoir décrire des comportements lorsque des annotations sont utilisées. Les langages
d’aspects courant sont pour la plupart confinés à leur environnement d’exécution locale. Le
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problème est que les préoccupations transversales couvrent différentes couches administratives,
mais aussi différentes couches techniques qui peuvent être distribués sur plusieurs systèmes. Il
est difficile de proposer en une solution qui permette une interaction souple entre les différents
acteurs et qui assurent la définition et l’application des propriétés de sécurité à travers toutes les
couches. Nous présentons dans la suite les spécifications nécessaire à l’élaboration d’un sys-
tème que nous souhaiterions réaliser: une application cohérente et systématique des propriétés
transversales de sécurité à travers les différentes couches et différents domaines. Nous cher-
chons de nouvelles primitives pour les langages d’aspect afin de fournir de nouvelles extensions
à ce qui existe. Cela signifie que nous devons fournir des outils pour le système d’aspect. Le
but recherché est de pouvoir augmenter l’information liée aux ressources qui rentrent et sortent
de l’application. Ce langage aurait pu nous aider s’il avait été disponible lors de l’élaboration de
nos précédentes contributions.
L’approche se place dans un environnement distribué, qui est composé de composants dis-
tribués dans plusieurs domaines. Chacun de ces domaines a un environnement d’exécution qui
lui est propre. L’application (en cours d’exécution sur un environnement d’exécution locale)
échange des messages avec les autres composants externes, qui ont tous une configuration de
sécurité particulière. Afin de renforcer la confiance dans les données qui transitent entre ces
intermédiaires, et afin de faciliter la vérification et la transformation des propriétés de sécurité,
nous définissons de nouveaux outils et moyens pour intercepter les données à l’aide d’aspects.
Nous extrayons les informations de sécurité liées aux ressources afin de les proposer via les prim-
itives que nous définissons aux développeurs d’aspect. Cela permet aux développeurs d’aspect
de réagir sur des évènements survenant au sein de l’application (données chiffrées en local sur le
point de sortir par exemple), mais cela permet aussi d’ajouter de manière transparente des méta-
informations de sécurité aux ressources. Notre solution propose d’extraire les informations sur
la couche de communication et de les rendre disponible à la couche applicative. A l’inverse
la solution permet, lorsque des ressources sortent du champ applicatif à destination d’un do-
maine distant d’extraire le contexte de sécurité de la ressource sortante et de la propager sur la
couche de communication. Cette approche ouvre de nouvelles possibilité de collaboration entre
les différents acteurs, et ce de manière automatisée dans un bon nombre de cas qu’il n’était pas
possible de réaliser précédemment.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
The thesis brings an industrial point of view to the modularization of security concerns in en-
terprise applications. Security is pervasive in our environment and implies rigorous steps in
the development lifecycle to correctly specify and implement security properties in a consistent
manner. Security is usually referred to as a non-functional and cross-cutting concern that is in-
dependent from application core concerns, bringing overhead all along the development. But
security has different facets and might have deep relationship with the application, making it
hard to properly modularize it in all situations.
The fast evolution of enterprise applications brings a new dimension to security. In the course
of the past decade, enterprise applications have evolved towards more connectivity. Hence, they
expose their data through several means such as web applications, service oriented applications,
cloud applications, mobile applications, etc.. This interconnection provides greater flexibil-
ity to create new businesses, to collaborate with partners, and to integrate their solution in the
ever-complex enterprise landscape. But it also brings additional exposure to their business data
through heterogeneous technological stacks, making it even more complex to consistently cover
security. Recent events present security breaches with high impact. Attacks have been directed
towards major companies, large organizations, but also institutions and countries. The attacks
tends to originate from organized groups. The attacks get successful although complexity dif-
fers. They can be extremely complex, in which attackers use several means to penetrate a system
and obtain what they want, such as social engineering, zero-day exploit, stealing of cryptogra-
phy keys, robbery, etc.. In such case, it is hardly possible to protect sensitive resources, and
companies need to perform regular audits on their processes to detect as soon as possible some
intrusion to properly react. There is also another kind of attack that we are covering in this the-
sis, that are some attacks directed towards technical stacks of heterogeneous IT systems. They
are less structured, in the sense that they necessitate less organization in time and in means. It
exists several tools and frameworks to perform this kind of attacks, that can be controlled by
individuals or groups that are looking for fame, rewards, knowledge, etc.. These attacks can
generally be mitigated by respecting security policies and applying best practices. The problem
in this case, is to propose a set of tools and methods to ensure the correct enforcement of security
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policies and best practices at several layers of the computing stack. For instance, an application
will be running on an execution platform, coded in a specific programming language, using
some frameworks and using various communication protocols. Each of these elements has to
be considered to ensure the absence of vulnerabilities and the proper implementation of security
properties.
We have started with the idea that applications are increasingly pervasive in our environment,
ranging from embedded devices to large-scale distributed applications supporting economical
exchange across countries. The different types of software, no matter their environment, need to
respect quality constraints. The industry first focuses on delivering high quality products, pro-
viding added-value in a specific functional area. It can be products to support business process,
to sell solutions and services, to ease exchange between individuals, or even products to facil-
itate development of new applications. Each of these products have specifications to describe
the functional concerns that are the core business of the software owners. In addition to the
functional concerns, the industry has to respect several guidelines when architecting and devel-
oping solutions: internal policies, law, regulations, non-functional specifications, etc.. These are
concerns that address specifications for undirect business need. They are present to ensure the
correct execution of the application in its environment. We often referred to these concerns as
non-functional concerns. In general, the non-functional concerns are such as usability, integrity,
reliability, performance, etc. [CPL09]. Last, but not least, a concern that often comes in literature
as a non-functional concern is security.
We are going to see in the next chapters that security has several faces. It is generally con-
sidered as a non-functional concern that crosscut the application, that one can address straight-
forwardly, and that has several tools or frameworks that perform security (such as third-party li-
braries, execution environment support, operating system protection, application gateway, etc.).
In reality, security conceals a large range of requirements from functional concerns to non-
functional concerns. Companies have to develop products with all these concerns correctly
orchestrated.
1.2 Overview
The thesis discusses how to develop secure software in distributed environments. For this pur-
pose, we have developed techniques to enhance flexibility in operational development of secu-
rity. We apply the concept of cross-cutting concern, mainly promoted by the Aspect-Oriented
software development [KLM+97] paradigm to enhance flexibility in the definition of security
properties. We defer the concrete enforcement of security properties in the application to first
collect the location impacts in the source code of a program, then to later react at the application
level scope to adapt the security enforcement code to the final execution environment.
We propose with the support of several contributions to address the modularization of secu-
rity properties in industrial environment, that address both techniques for constructive security,
and techniques for defensive security. We introduce a separation in security categories as we
differentiate security that addresses business needs such as privacy, confidentiality, authenticity,
and sometimes safety, from security that addresses protection against the exploitation of soft-
wares’ vulnerabilities by malicious users. The contributions propose to ease the management of
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security properties along the security lifecycle, with a focus on development. With this respect,
we propose contributions to protect application from vulnerabilities, and contributions to ease
the integration of security properties in applications.
1.3 Problem Statement
The problem of secure development has evolved over the years. It is now at a mature stage,
but we observe that vulnerabilities introduced by developers are still prevalent. We tackle the
problem of achieving a non-invasive and systematic application of security, while respecting the
time constraints of the industrial environment when developing software. The security require-
ments are coming from security policies in place to respect software quality standards, but also
from external regulations. The security properties of such systems affect different layers that
are heavily interconnected. The security of a system is impacted by several decisions along the
software development. It starts from the definition of security requirements. Assuming that the
requirements are correctly elicited and specified, the developers are given a list of rules to respect
while developing. They have to maintain a certain quality of coding when introducing the se-
curity mechanisms fulfilling the security requirements. Despite the numerous resources brought
by the secure development discipline to correctly implement security mechanisms, developers
still introduce vulnerabilities that affect systems.
The introduction of security vulnerabilities by the developer depends on several factors: the
lack of knowledge about security mechanisms, the misinterpretation of the specifications or of
the software’s architecture, the misconfiguration of the frameworks and libraries, or even some
refactoring defects when going from testing and development to production [KYL09]. There
also exists the possibility of having an internal developer who deliberately introduces backdoors
or defects in the application. It is important to notice that the cost to correct a security vulner-
ability, if taken as a software defect [oST] will exponentially grow while software development
progresses. The exposure of software vulnerabilities becomes effective when the application is
released to the production stage, in other words, when the application is supposed to fulfill all
the goals it has been developed for, and the application is exposed to the intended audience.
In order to mitigate the unintentional defects, we first propose to accompany the developer
with methods and tools. To clarify the situation, we have defined an internal set of security
requirements, coming from a subset of internal policies in place at SAP, but also general re-
quirements we have observed in best practices [OWA, Roo07, CM07]. The requirements target
primarily the web application vulnerabilities, but also all defects one encounters when dealing
with distributed systems. In this first part, we have restricted the list to requirements impact-
ing the development. We are interested in detecting and preventing all input manipulations:
cross-site scripting, SQL injection, path manipulation, remote shell injection, HTTP parameter
pollution, and any kind of protocol injection. In the second part, we propose to cover secu-
rity properties related to constructive security, and to present several security mechanisms. The
contributions cover properties such as accountability, which imply the correct enforcement of
several mechanisms, as well as privacy and communication protection within distributed sys-
tems.
The correct modularization allows companies to propose software products that are compli-
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ant in the many regions the applications are commercialized in, by applying late binding to the
properties. For instance, the privacy of personal data will differ from one country to another,
with potentially different cryptographic restrictions to protect resources. Although the solution
we develop in the following can be applied in several contexts, we have developed them in
a context of distributed systems. We are targeting inter-connected systems in an architectural
style that is often referred to as Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA). We are also bringing so-
lutions to the growing deployment of cloud computing systems, that not only target applications
but also infrastructure and platform.
1.4 Contributions
The contributions of this thesis are manifold. They can be summarized as follows:
• Review and identification of security problems for distributed systems with Aspect-Oriented
Programming
• Detection of security vulnerabilities with corrective patch applied in AOP, to help the
development of secure web applications. It lead to publications [GEKS11, SGEKSDO12,
SSO13]
• Modularization of security concerns like privacy for distributed platforms. It lead to pub-
lications [YSSSdO12, DSI+12b, SSdOMR12]
• Proposition of a cross-layer aspect system
1.5 Organization of the thesis
The thesis is organized to present the aforementioned contributions in the area of secure software
engineering for distributed applications. The next chapter introduces the different concepts we
are referring to throughout the thesis. We have divided the thesis into two parts. The first part
presents modularization of defensive security which is the introduction of programming aspects
for security. It covers contributions related to secure programming with the assistance of Aspect-
Oriented paradigm. The second part presents the modularization of constructive security which
can be simplified to the modularization of business security concerns to propose more flexibility
in the application of security properties. In the conclusion part, we present the definition of a
cross-layer and parametric aspect system, which would be our next step towards modularization
of security properties across layers.
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Chapter 2
Modularization of cross-cutting
concerns
This dissertation describes a contribution to the secure engineering discipline, that promotes the
separation of concerns in application development of security modules. It allows to better archi-
tect solutions, but also to bring flexibility in the application of security policies. In the following,
we briefly introduce the origin and goals of separation of concerns, through the presentation of
the Aspect-Oriented programming discipline. Then, we present the security processes that are
generally defined within the application development to produce secure applications.
2.1 Software Engineering
The software engineering discipline is vast and promotes concepts to properly manage software
development from its early existence. The field has developed over time several techniques and
methodologies to produce software with a focus on delivery time and quality. It gives guidelines
to manage specifications, to gather and elicit requirements, to define an architecture with design
of components and interfaces, to provide procedure for testing, to maintain software, to manage
configuration, to review processes around management, to define security and safety, etc..
The primarily goal is to translate real-world concerns to software, letting customers express-
ing needs that are then translated to applications that runs on computers. The whole process
is complex and involving heterogeneous actors. It is also still evolving, with new methods to
better manage systems. The definition of software is made in terms of a set of requirements,
that represent the business goal of the application. The translation of these business needs in
software is realized using a programming language. A set of concepts also govern programming
engineering.
At the beginning, the programs were defined as structured instructions executed sequentially.
The Figure 2.1 shows an evolution of programming paradigms these past decades, that diverged
in two main dimensions. The first dimension represents an advanced conceptualization of com-
ponents through the programming language. For instance, programming languages started to
conceptually define separation of concerns to virtually manage piece of software independently.
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The major evolution that raised in the eighties was the evolution from structured programming to
object-oriented programming. The object-oriented programming is a paradigm that has several
objects which encapsulate common behaviors. It promotes flexibility and reuse of concerns. The
data is accessed through interfaces defined by the objects. In short, good object-oriented design
might be achieved by applying five main principles. These principles have been compiled by
Robert Cecil Martin [Mar99] :
Single responsibility principle promotes the encapsulation of one concern ine one class. The
reason is to clearly define responsibilities, to have independent classes and avoid the in-
troduction of side-effects when modifying a class dealing with more than one concern.
Open-closed principle indicates that classes should be open for extension, but closed for mod-
ifications. It means that the design of a class should be complete. New features would not
modify directly the source code, but rather pass through the creation of a new class. In
such situation, code reuse could be achieved through inheritance.
Liskov substitution principle comes from Barbara Liskov [Lis88] and defines a notion of sub-
stitutability for types. It is also called behavioral subtyping and provides standard require-
ments in the definition of method signature for the sub-class hierarchy. For instance, it
states that "objects in a program should be replaceable with instances of their subtypes
without altering the correctness of that program". It lays the foundation for design by
contract.
Interface segregation principle promotes the smallest dependency possible by splitting large
interface in smaller and more specific ones. It allows to decouple concerns and thus ease
code refactoring.
Dependency inversion principles states that high and low level modules should depend upon
abstractions. Abstractions should not depend upon details, but details should depend upon
abstraction. It promotes the separation of layers by specifying abstract notions from which
the code will depend at a certain level. It allows then to abstract notions and decouple any
relation to concrete/technical low-level code.
Although the separation is clearly defined, the object-oriented paradigm has some limita-
tions. First, the paradigm works well for local systems, but suffers from a certain scalabil-
ity when addressing distributed systems. Distributed applications rely on additional layers to
manage and moke object communications. Second, the encapsulation provides protection and
control to the internal data of an object, but software development requires additional code to
manage cross-cutting concerns. These concerns can not be encapsulated like in an object, as it
represent a concern that is highly tied to the code. We say that it is scattered and tangled to the
application. It is generally technical code, such as code to manage transactions, caching, and in
some cases security. All of the tangled code breaks the principle of having classes responsible
of one concern, dealing with abstractions rather than low levels.
In the separation of structure and behavior, Gregor Kiczales and the Xerox Team [KLM+97]
introduced the Aspect-Oriented programming paradigm in late nineties, with the goal to untangle
the code into cross-cutting, loosely coupled aspects. We further discuss this paradigm in next
section.
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Figure 2.1: Programming paradigms categorization presented in [USB09]
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2.2 Aspect-Oriented Software Development
Aspect-Oriented Software Development (AOSD) is a whole discipline around the concept of
aspect. It describes approaches to software modularization and composition, and gather tech-
niques and methodologies to incorporate the aspect concepts. The set of software development
techniques include requirement engineering, analysis and design, architecture, testing, and pro-
gramming. The last point is the core of AOSD, but requires support of the aforementioned
techniques with either tools, or methodologies. The preliminary steps elicit requirements that
represent cross-cutting concerns. In software, there are several concerns that can be either func-
tional or non-functional. It means that some concerns are business related, while other are related
to the correct execution of the program and are generally implied by some technical choices: en-
vironment, programming language, framework, platform, etc. These concerns are sometimes
translated in programming pieces that are scattered and tangled over the code. Such concerns
are good candidate to be implemented with aspects.
There are several use cases that are discussed. For instance, the benefit of adopting Aspect-
Oriented Software Development in Business Application Engineering [PCG+08] for large com-
panies lies in overcoming several challenges in the context of specific products. AOSD is not
bound to a particular language, and needs several tools and methods for the particular environ-
ment of the company: debugging tools, processes that respect existing business process, exten-
sion to languages, flexible mechanisms, etc. Also, AOSD does not necessarely fits all projects,
and needs to be introduced slowly. For instance, Robinson and al. [LSM05] present the rela-
tion between AOSD and security in the area of application security management, in which the
application handle security policy and needs to enforce specific behavior. they differentiate the
business logic from the security management logic, the security enforcement logic and the com-
munication logic. They show that AOSD fits the use case by using an interaction specification
language describing behavioral dependencies between components, and runtime adaptation in
the interaction scheme.
AOSD refers to the general concept of aspect that is implemented in a particular language.
We are discussing the aspect paradigm through the presentation of Aspect-Oriented Program-
ming. The term Aspect-Oriented-Programming [KLM+97] (AOP) has been coined around 1995
by a group led by Gregor Kiczales, with the goal to bring proper separation of concerns for cross-
cutting functionalities. Roots for foundations can be traced back to adaptive programming, or
composition filters [Lop05]. O. Selfridge introduced a notion that can be related to AOP as
"demons that record events as they occur, recognize patterns in those events, and can trigger
subsequent events according to patterns that they care about" [Sel58]. But the approach has then
derived to become a discipline apart.
It is a paradigm to ease programming concerns that crosscut and pervade applications. The
aspect concept is composed of several advice/pointcut couple. Pointcuts allow to define where
(points in the source code of an application) or when (events during the execution of an appli-
cation) aspects should apply modifications. Pointcuts are expressed in pointcut languages and
often contain a large number of aspect-specific constructs that match specific structures of the
language in which base applications are expressed, such a pattern language based on language
syntax. Advices are used to define modifications an aspect may perform on the base application.
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Advices are often expressed in terms of some general-purpose language with a small number
of aspect-specific extensions, such as the proceed construct that allows the execution of the be-
havior of the base application that triggered the aspect application in the first place. The main
advantage using this technology is the ability to intervene in the execution without interfering
with the base program code, thus facilitating maintainability.
Aspect Oriented Programming goal is to intervene in first class language execution. Most
of current languages are related to programming languages such as the well known AspectJ.
AspectJ is a java-based language that allows different weaving scheme and provides the most
recent progress related to AOP features. Through the definition of a pointcut based on a pointcut
language, one can represents an aspect that enhance base classes. It is possible either to enhance
business objects with inter-type declarations, or adding a specific behavior when conditions are
met. The language heavily relies on program syntax to wrap behavior respectively Before,
Around, or After a method execution. But AspectJ is not the only language. It exists nowa-
days a language for several common programming languages, but also other domain-specific
languages.
For example, AO4BPEL represents the willingness to provide a clear definition of cross-
cutting concerns for business processes described with the BPEL language. cross-cutting con-
cerns are normally tangled and scattered across the code, such as Activities and Tasks within
the business process that are composed with other services, with no distinction between the real
business code and the concerns. In order to provide functionality that pervades and crosscutt
several business process, Charfi [Cha07] focused on modularity of workflow process specifica-
tions. It allows, with a language extension to describe non-functional requirements separately.
The approach is similar to Aspect concept for object language but translated for business process
languages. The defined aspect language is able to represent concerns such as logging, transac-
tion or security. Charfi proposes deployment mechanisms to ensure correct application of non
functional requirements, based on an XPath pointcut language describing where and when to
inject behavior in business process. The BPEL engine is responsible of interpreting deployment
descriptor and weave cross-cutting concerns.
2.2.1 A pointcut-advice model
AspectJ is the foundation language for cross-cutting concern definition and implementation for
java programs. It relies on a so-called pointcut-advice model for the definition of cross-cutting
concerns, such as many of other aspect-languages. It allows to clearly separate the definition of
the cross-cutting concern to the definition of their weaving points in the application.
The pointcut model in AspectJ defines boolean expressions that matches some points in a
target application (the application in which one want to inject the cross-cutting concerns). The
boolean expressions can be combined and mostly relies on the syntax of the application. For
instance, the pointcut model defines method call, construct call, method execution, construction
execution, advice execution, within method code, field getter and setter, static class instantiation,
within class, this, target, args primitives. It makes it possible to select and filter several points
from a target application, that are called joinpoints. The joinpoints are the concrete points that
are selected when applying a pointcut boolean expression. The pointcut model is the first part of
an aspect, and its expressivity can be extended through several works. For instance, Masuhara
24
Figure 2.2: cross-cutting concern visualization with the AJDT eclipse plugin for a deliberate
vulnerable application
and al. defined a new primitive called dflow [MK03] to quickly select points in the application
to track a dataflow. Another example comes from Belblidia thesis in which she defines two new
primitives getlocal, setlocal [Bel08] that allows to track local variables from within a method
body, thus observe the propagation of information flow from the aspect language. The Figure 2.2
presents a view that is produces by the AJDT eclipse plugin for AspectJ. It shows the actual
joinpoints that applies in the context of an application for several concerns. The different colors
present different concerns - hence aspects. With a simple pointcut language, one can defined
cross-cutting concerns that apply at several points in the application.
The second part is the advice model. The advice defines the actual concern, meaning the
code that executes in order to fulfill functional concern. There is several means to inject the
context of the application in an advice. For instance, it is possible to access variables, parameters,
or instances of the base applications. The aspects might either be independent or completely
modify the application flow. Typical aspect use cases that are completely independent from the
application are logging aspects. They need to access context to extract information and log them.
This technical code is best described as an aspect when you want to log common information,
such as every time a web application executes a method. In some cases, you want from within
an advice to modify the return of a method, an instances, or some variables. For example, you
can want to provide mock up application with aspects, that always replace some functionality
of your application on test platform. Also, you would need to modify variable content with
safe-content after security check.
The pointcut-advice model provides an elegant approach to describe cross-cutting concerns
that apply to components, such as objects, or any type of container. A problem has neverthe-
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less been encoutered in the practical use of aspects, which is called the fragile pointcut prob-
lem [SK04]. The problem occurs on specific pointcut languages, upon evolution of an appli-
cation. As the set of aspects is separated from the application, aspects use pointcut languages
to determine the joinpoints. Most of the pointcut languages propose a syntax-based approach
to write pointcut. It the pointcuts get desynchronized from the syntax of an application (i.e, a
package is renamed, or an object type change its name), the aspects can no longer interact with
the base application.
The binding between the application and the advice is complex, but is not the only weak
points. De Fraine et al. [FSJ08] present StrongAspectJ which provides flexible and safe binding
between the advice and its corresponding pointcut. The problem in this case is related to the
type system used by the advice/pointcut. They enhance the existing pointcut model to recover
type safety for both generic and non-generic pointcut/advice declarations.
In the next sections, we provide concrete examples of the pointcut-advice model with the
AspectJ language.
2.2.2 AspectJ
We illustrate the usage of the Aspect-Oriented programming concept through AspectJ examples.
AspectJ is one of the many implementation dedicated for the java language. It is also the primary
language created by Gregor Kiczales and its team in Xerox parc. Since, it represents the most
updated language, back-porting several of concepts developed in the scope of the research in the
field.
We represent a base program example in the Listing 1. A base program traditionally provides
the functional concerns of an application. These concerns are those defined by the business
users during the design of the application, either through careful specification or requirements
documents, or through other communication means. In this example, we are presenting a simple
execution of methods with some latency. The program, for demonstration purpose only does
nothing else than a loop with a delay.
AspectJ and aspect-oriented programming in general manipulates indirectly languages. They
introduce several instructions that are not directly represented in a first-class language. For in-
stance, developers and aspect writers write java lines of code independently. Then, through an
additional step called weaving in aspect terminology, they unify the concerns together. In such
case, the syntax of the base program does not change, but its semantic will when the aspects are
added to the program. The modification are introduced in this case in java-bytecode. In order
to compare the effects of aspects static compilation, we presents in Listing 1 the correspond-
ing instructions obtained after compilation in Java 1.7(check http://docs.oracle.com/
javase/specs/jvms/se7/html/index.html).
The code presented in Listing 2 represents a cross-cutting concern defined in AspectJ. The
java annotations add information for AspectJ system to interpret correctly the different methods.
In this case, it presents a concern called aroundMethod which is inserted in the program execu-
tion flow, every time a method is called from a place which is not the aspect module. The aspect
itself monitors execution time of the base application, and displays a message for each method
execution. An output result is given in Figure 2.3.
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Listing 1 Simple class counting with delay and its equivalent bytecode
public class Simple {
public static void main(String[]argv) {
countFast(1000);
countSlow(1000);
}
public static void countSlow(int value) {
count(value,5);
}
public static void countFast(int value) {
count(value,0);
}
private static void count(int value, int delay) {
for (int i=0;i<value;i++) {
try {
Thread.sleep(delay);
} catch (Exception e) {}
}
}
}
public class Simple {
//...
public static void countSlow(int);
0: iload_0
1: iconst_5
2: invokestatic #4 // Method count
5: return
public static void countFast(int);
0: iload_0
1: iconst_0
2: invokestatic #4 // Method count
5: return
private static void count(int, int);
0: iconst_0
1: istore_2
2: iload_2
3: iload_0
4: if_icmpge 22
7: iload_1
8: i2l
9: invokestatic #5 // Method Thread.sleep
12: goto 16
15: astore_3
16: iinc 2, 1
19: goto 2
22: return
}
In order to properly implement new concerns into the base application, AspectJ adopts dif-
ferent strategies. It is for instance possible to weave the concerns either statically or dynamically.
In the following, we have compiled statically the two java classes (Simple.java and WhereDoes-
TheTimeGo.java) and apply the static weaving approach. We can achieve the same result by
loading the aspects at the beginning of the application execution. It is realized thanks to java
bootstraping, intercepting calls to methods and injecting when detecting a pattern match the
loaded concerns. In our case, the static weaving renders bytecode application with the different
concerns already inlined in the application. We present in Figure 2.4 an UML class diagram
of the base application and the aspect module. We differentiate in this picture the different el-
ements that are added by the weaving process in the application. The black elements are class
diagram representing the base application and the cross-cutting concern. The red elements are
the addition when compiling and weaving the aspects into the application. Several inner classes,
and several wrappers around the concerned methods are added to execute at runtime the desired
properties.
We provide a last listing, to observe the change at the bytecode level. The Listing 3 con-
tains therefore several new constructs compared to the compilation with no aspects. To keep
high modularity in the aspect concern, AspectJ transforms the bytecode to obtain a separation
between the actual concern and the original source code. Therefore, for the countSlow function,
the original method content remain unchanged in the bytecode, but the call to the method as
additional wrappers to execute matching aspects at the joinpoint.
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Listing 2 A cross-cutting concern to display the time spent in methods.
import org.aspectj.lang.ProceedingJoinPoint;
import org.aspectj.lang.annotation.Around;
import org.aspectj.lang.annotation.Aspect;
import org.aspectj.lang.annotation.Pointcut;
@Aspect
public class WhereDoesTheTimeGo {
@Pointcut ("execution(* *(..)) && !within(WhereDoesTheTimeGo)")
void methodsOfInterest() {}
private int nesting = 0;
@Around ("methodsOfInterest()")
public Object aroundMethod(ProceedingJoinPoint thisJoinPoint)
throws Throwable {
nesting++;
long stime=System.currentTimeMillis();
Object o = thisJoinPoint.proceed();
long etime=System.currentTimeMillis();
nesting--;
StringBuilder info = new StringBuilder();
for (int i=0;i<nesting;i++) {
info.append(" ");
}
info.append(thisJoinPoint+" took "+(etime-stime)+"ms");
System.out.println(info.toString());
return o;
}
}
Figure 2.3: Application execution output result
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Figure 2.4: Class diagram of the example. The aspect and the base application are in black. The
weaving addition are in red.
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Listing 3 Result of weaving on application bytecode for the countSlow function.
public class Simple {
//...
public static void countSlow(int);
Code:
0: iload_0
1: istore_1
// Field Lorg/aspectj/lang/JoinPoint$StaticPart;
2: getstatic #82
5: aconst_null
6: aconst_null
7: iload_1
// Method org/aspectj/.../Conversions.intObject
8: invokestatic #88
// Method org/aspectj/.../Factory.makeJP
11: invokestatic #55
14: astore_2
// Method WhereDoesTheTimeGo.aspectOf
15: invokestatic #75
18: iconst_2
// class java/lang/Object
19: anewarray #3
22: astore_3
23: aload_3
24: iconst_0
25: iload_1
// Method org/aspectj/.../Conversions.intObject
26: invokestatic #88
29: aastore
30: aload_3
31: iconst_1
32: aload_2
33: aastore
// class Simple$AjcClosure3
34: new #92
37: dup
38: aload_3
// Method Simple$AjcClosure3."<init>"
39: invokespecial #93
// int 65536
42: ldc #63
// Method .../AroundClosure.linkClosureAndJoinPoint
44: invokevirtual #69
// Method WhereDoesTheTimeGo.aroundMethod
47: invokevirtual #79
50: pop
51: return
static final void countSlow_aroundBody2(
int, org.aspectj.lang.JoinPoint);
Code:
0: iload_0
1: iconst_5
// Method count
2: invokestatic #26
5: return
//...
}
public class Simple$AjcClosure3
extends org.aspectj.runtime.internal.AroundClosure {
public Simple$AjcClosure3(java.lang.Object[]);
Code:
0: aload_0
1: aload_1
// Method org/aspectj/.../AroundClosure."<init>"
2: invokespecial #10
5: return
public java.lang.Object run(java.lang.Object[]);
Code:
0: aload_0
// Field org/aspectj/.../AroundClosure.state
1: getfield #14
4: astore_2
5: aload_2
6: iconst_0
7: aaload
// Method org/aspectj/.../Conversions.intValue
8: invokestatic #20
11: aload_2
12: iconst_1
13: aaload
// class org/aspectj/lang/JoinPoint
14: checkcast #22
// Method Simple.countSlow_aroundBody2
17: invokestatic #28
20: aconst_null
21: areturn
}
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2.3 Security Implication in the Software Development Life Cycle
The secure software development lifecycle gather techniques and methodology to follow in ad-
dition to the software development lifecycle to produce high quality solutions, respecting com-
pliance and quality level to avoid flaws and vulnerability when developing applications. At the
early age of software development, the complexity and time to write a single piece of software
was too high to let someone abuse of a system. With the rapid and growing usage of application
for any kind of problems, people started to exploit software logic to bypass some internal limi-
tations. Then, when systems became ubiquitous and inter-connected, a new category of people
have been given access to mass systems. Software are complex pieces designed and developed
by individuals and automated tasks. Sometimes, without the possibility to control entirely the
process, some errors are introduced in the application. It goes from architecture flaws, where
specifications represent a subset of the real-environment, letting some unknown behavior at the
mercy the luck. It can also be software weaknesses, that when exposed to some attackants
can introduce security vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities can be detected and exploited by a
large range of attackers. The rapid growing of systems and complexity to manage several teams
together to timely deliver softwares combined to the structuration of governments, groups of
security experts, talented system hackers and a whole range of malicious users lead to the emer-
gence of a new discipline in computer science. The aim is to not only produce softwares, but
produce high quality softwares compliant with regulations in place, internal company policies,
etc. Furthermore, the lifecycle involves several actors from the early gathering of specifications
to the final stage of testing, deployment, and detection. In this section, we detail the different
steps that are traditionally accepted as being part of the so-called SDLC (Security Development
Lifecycle).
The global picture is presented in Figure 2.5. It presents several points around the traditional
software development lifecycle in which actors interact to augment the system coverage with se-
curity properties. This Figure is the starting point for the numerous contributions of this thesis,
as it brings an approach to ease integration of security at different points over the security devel-
opment lifecycle. We try to makes more flexible and completely modular the security properties
with clear separation of concerns from business code to technical code, and from security code
to business code.
The overall vision of the thesis starts from the design and development of web applications
to assist concerned stakeholders in their tasks to properly implement secure applications. It also
touches the branch of application testing through careful review and assistance in correction in
an integrated plugin. The thesis has some important implications at the runtime: the solutions
separate concerns during the development of the application, and then delay the final binding
of security code with business and technical code to the last moment: deployment or execution.
In some cases, we have bundle security out of the direct application, and preferred to offer it as
a service, wrapping around the application. It is the case for instance with service framework
security and platform security.
The field is also known as security hardening, and pertains different levels: code level hard-
ening, software process hardening, design level hardening, and operating environment harden-
ing. The achievement of these levels render systems resilient to attacks.
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Figure 2.5: Software Development Life-Cycle
2.4 Security Requirements
The engineering of the requirements for software application, systems, or components cover
several functional and non-functional definitions. Among them, we can identify requirements
such as quality, interoperability, performance, portability, availability, reliability, usability, and
security requirements. Security requirements are one of the most difficult to deal with, as re-
quirement engineers are not used to complexity and diversity of security. They lack of security
architectural overview, and often confuse security mechanisms and security properties. There
are several kinds of security requirements, that we specify in the following with our specific
needs throughout the thesis.
Identification Requirements specifies the extent to which the application shall identify the
actors before interacting with them. This requirements often goes along with authentication
in order to properly know the involved actors. In industry, the identification steps is generally
mandatory to render services.
Authentication Requirements specifies the verification that apply to validate the identity of
involved actors. In industry again, and in most of our use-cases, the application shall verify
the identity of all of its users before granting the system access. In some cases, we restrict
authentication to critical sections, where sensitive or personal data is manipulated.
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Authorization Requirements specifies the access and usage control of authenticated users
and actors. The authorization needs both a correct authentication and identification of the users,
in order to grant the execution of critical part of system.
Immunity Requirements specifies the protection against infection. Although this require-
ments generally apply for virus infection, in our use-cases we define some requirements to pro-
tect against injection attacks. For instance, we indicate an application shall be immune against
injection attacks that are frequent in web application and service-oriented applications.
Integrity Requirements specifies the extent to which application shall ensure the consistency
of data. The requirements permits the detection of any alteration or deletion of data. In our
industrial use cases, the integrity applies to communication, whom we prevent unauthorized
users to manipulate data.
Non-repudiation Requirements specifies to which extent an application shall capture evi-
dences of interaction with actors. The non-repudiation is fundamental to avoid deny of actors
for having participated in a conversation with the application. It generally tracks information
such as the identity of the involved actor, as well as actions or data in manipulation throughout
the interaction.
Privacy Requirements specifies how an application or component deals with sensitive and
personal data. The data are generally under regulations and have a specific lifetime. Also, the
privacy requirements keep information private from unauthorized actors, and is a good way to
respect the "need-to-know" principle.
There are a couple of additional security requirements categories that we are not addressing
along the thesis. It is for example survivability requirements to survive the alteration or loss of
system or part. Physical protection requirements that address physical locations and plans to
avoid robbery and deterioration of hardware. Intrusion detection requirements provides spec-
ifications to detect and record attempt to access application by unauthorized parties. Security
auditing requirements which specifies to which extent an application shall collect and report the
state of its security. Finally, system maintenance security requirements propose plans to properly
manage migration and upgrade with no conflict with existing security requirements.
2.5 Security and aspects
AOP has been proposed to represent functionalities of a software in a decorrelated fashion, so
that they can be incorporated anytime, and at any location. Several languages exist to describe
the behavior of the functionalities, and to bind the behavior to the actual code. In the follow-
ing, we are calling them advice language and pointcut language. Over the past decades, these
languages evolved to incorporate new primitives to ease definition of location. They have also
exposed through an API context of an application to be reused inside aspects. These languages
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have been used to represent several cross-cutting concerns : logging, transactions, and some
security concerns. In the past, these concerns where encapsulated in applications with intro-
duction of explicit calls. AOP render the binding of these properties more transparent from an
engineering point of view.
There is a long list of already identified cross-cutting concerns [Mic, Paw02]. Authentica-
tion & Authorization code, that tends to appear before critical sections. Database encryption to
provide systematic encryption of data prior of its storage but also decryption after data access.
Data integrity to ensure at multiple points the correctness and freshness of the data. Session
management that pervades a whole application to expose a context. Digital signature that pro-
vides identification and integrity of data. Persistence and transaction are technical elements who
are present prior access to a data-layer, and that manage lifecycle of transaction independently
from the remaining of the application. Monitoring and custom logging is highly scattered and
tangled to the application code. Caching of data objects might appear at different place in the
code. The configuration management provides technical code to retrieve and store configuration
of an application. Exception treatment are sometimes cross-cutting an application, when the
exception are not related to the business code but rather manages technical errors. The manage-
ment of state such as automata is also a cross-cutting element as the internal logic of the state is
not directly related to the application.
There has been several work talking about Aspect-Oriented Programming for security. The
premises of the decoupling of security mechanisms from the base programs have been intro-
ducedway before the emergence of aspect-oriented solutions. The "metaobject protocol [KDRB91]
(MOP) defines specifications of a set of generic functions for accessing and manipulating core
structure of an object. It defines the notion of meta classes that represent how a class is structured
and behaves. The meta classes are responsible of the overall behavior of an object system. The
concepts behind metaobject protocols are intensively used in introspection, in which it is possi-
ble to consult information about object’s methods, or inheritence structure. Metaobject protocols
also define the premises to intercession, which is the ability to modify the behavior of an exist-
ing object. The notion of introducing security with meta-object protocols is tackled by Braga et
al. [BDR00]. They outline a metaobject protocol for secure composition of cryptography-aware
meta objects. Their goal is to enable the definition of secure composition in a decoupled man-
ner and orchestrate the cryptographic mechanisms in a control environment. By reducing the
coupling in the application, they transparently introduce security in an order they control. For
instance, they provide several mechanisms that can be mutually exclusive if introduce at once,
and they show that a careful handling at the meta-level allows to control the order of secure
composition, as well as the possibility to evolve the application on the fly. In a nutshell, they
achieve inversion of control to centralize security requirements in a module through reflection
mechanisms.
There are different strategies in which metaobject protocols can be used to define security
enforcement. One needs to control how metaobject protocol interact with the base program and
control somehow the permissions. The work from Caromel and al. [CV01] proposes to study the
possible type of MOP strategies and their implication in security. They assume a component-
based application, in which java security applies: protection domains are specified to limit the
scope of permissions for principals. According to their classification, it exists four categories of
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Meta-Object Protocol (MOP):
• Compile-time MOPs. It reflects on language constructs available at compile-time. The
meta-level code is executed at compile-time in order to perform a translation on the source
code of a program.
• Load-time MOPS. It reflects on the bytecode and make use of a modified class loader in
order to modify the bytecode at the moment it is loaded into the JVM. They operate on
bytecode rather than java source code.
• VM-based runtime MOPs. It accesses to runtime information, such as method invocation,
read or write operations on fields, etc. It reacts on events to execute meta-level objects.
• Proxy-based runtime MOPS. It introduces hooks into the program to access specific run-
time events, such as method invocation.
The type of MOPs depends on the time of reflection shift. The type of MOPs impacts the
constraints on permission sets, meaning that the strategy of reflection will impact the propagation
of security from the meta-level objects to the base level components.
Viega and al. [VBC01] focuses on the application of aspect-oriented programming to the se-
curity domain. They discuss the motivation and principle to achieve consistent security through-
out an entire application. As aspect-oriented programming defines a new paradigm to separate
cross-cutting concerns, they anticipate simplification in the separation of security module from
the base application. The tasks are split with clear separation between stakeholders, security
policies can be define once and the system takes care of the coherency and the enforcement
within the application. They tackle the language expressiveness of such system: wildcarding
that allows one system designer to express point of application of the security modules, context
gathering that allows transmission of context from the base program to the security aspect, order
of aspect composition that can change the semantic of the application. They list several possi-
bility in applying AOP to security that they partially discusses through C-language example:
• Perform error checking on security-critical callas
• Implement buffer overflow protection, or inserting special code at function entry and exit
• Log data that may be relevant to security
• Replace generic socket code with SSL socket code
• Insert code at startup that goes through a set of lock-down procedures that most program-
mers would not add to their programs
• Specify privileged sections of a program and request privileges when needed
The transition between meta-object protocols and aspect-oriented programming to tackle se-
curity requirements is discussed to learn lessons from MOP and understand how aspects can
benefits from such mature discussions [WS02]. The different experiments that have been made
with meta-object protocols can be applied to aspects. They both tackle security as a cross-cutting
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concern, to increase the flexibility of enforcement mechanisms. MOPs correct enforcement de-
pends upon all accesses to the object being controlled by a reference monitor. Such approach
might not prevent against local use to bypass reference monitor checks on specific objects. One
needs to guarantee the complete mediation of the system to ensure that all calls are correctly
redefined through the meta-objects. The implementations should also be protected against tam-
pering: it can be achieved by relying on operating system controls, or using code signature to
verify the integrity of the implementation. A last lesson from MOP is the verification process
that should allow verification, analysis and testing of modules. Meta-object protocol defines
standard and very general interfaces that makes it possible to test them independently of the
base level application. The advantages of aspects over MOPs, according to the paper, is that
they offer domain specific language. It is easier to define high level application abstractions,
that make direct expressive modeling to the security designers. A second advantage is the ex-
pressiveness of the weaving language. Pointcuts are expressive and sophisticated. Unlike MOPs
which rely on a binding specification language, pointcut languages does not need to introspect
the base program to gather the context.
In the following, we introduce several works that also address security with aspect-oriented
programming. We distinguish twomain categories in the different works: security with AOP, and
AOP for security. The main distinction is that the first category introduces security mechanisms
using aspect techniques, while the second extends AOP approaches to provide security construct
included in the aspect system. The foundation of aspect-oriented programming for application-
level security has been debated in a 2004 workshop attached to the main AOSD conference.
2.5.1 Security Engineering With AOP
Security is one of the several domains that aspect-oriented programming aim to address. Re-
searchers started at the early stage of aspect-oriented programming design to think about security
ease of management with modular cross-cutting concerns. In this section, we present various
works that addresses security engineering, starting from the architecture of secure software sys-
tems to the secure programming enhancement for enterprise systems.
In the early workshop on aspect for application-level security, Ron Bodkin introduces a posi-
tion paper to present enterprise security aspects [Bod04]. The main scenarios the author develop
to highlight interesting use case of aspect for enterprise security are authentication and access
control properties. The author lists the different scenario that one can encounter in enterprise
environment, such as database authentication, role base access control, audit, encryption, fil-
tering, etc. From these scenarios, the author focus on some use cases to outline problems and
opportunities in applying aspect to security. He also states few development areas , such as the
development of more expressive pointcuts (for predicting control flow and tracking data flow)
or extension of the aspect for a better integration in third party systems (distributed systems,
external librairies, etc.). Even with the tools available at that time, security with aspects already
offers benefits: code is compact, separation of role is clear.
The problematic of security engineering is discussed in Bart de Win’s thesis [Win04]. He
explains why it is so difficult to address security during the software development process. Se-
curity is pervasive: it appears anytime anywhere. Each single piece of code that is written
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need to be secure, in the sense that a developer would think of all potential situations to avoid
abuse of the program. Security also crosscut the application, even tough attempts to modularize
security concerns have been going on. On top of this, the recommendation to build secure sys-
tem require to build it from the very beginning. But, as the author mention, security comes from
unanticipated risks and changes. Laws and policies can change, as well as threats within an envi-
ronment. Changing a part of the application will often lead to a change in security requirements.
The focus of the thesis is on the relation between business logic and security requirements, to
achieve strict modularization of security. The author compares interception-based and weaving-
based techniques, and shows that both approaches provide better security with each merits and
deficiencies. More precisely, according to the author, interception is suited for situations that
require coarse-grained but flexible composition whereas weaving provides rigorous, but more
fine-grained support. The listed advantages of AOSD are numerous: support for advanced mod-
ularization leads to easier development with better separation of roles, the security binding is
easier to modify and verify as it is centralized, explicit modularization leads to reusability in
security mechanisms, and the explicit and late composition strategy of AOSD enables more
flexible composition scenarios.
A couple of years before, Wohlstadter and al. [WTD02, WJD03] propose a framework for
cross-cutting concerns in distributed and heterogeneous systems. The challenge in such diverse
environment is to tackle complex implementation that crosscut the variety of systems, languages,
platforms and OSs. From the different approaches already identified to deal with cross-cutting
features (namely language-based, middleware-based and container-based approaches), the au-
thors propose an approach that combine pieces of code in heterogeneous systems. They provide
cross-cutting functions called adaplets, that are placed at the points where the application inter-
acts with the middleware. In the course of their examples, they provide reliability, performance,
and security use cases. The adaplets propose contract for client and server extension, and reuse
partially notions of the AspectJ language. For instance, a service architect can declare a cer-
tain number of advices to be available on client side or on server side, declare pointcuts, etc.
The authors also defined several features for the approach: modeling, type-checking through an
enhanced-IDL and code generation. Their pointcut-based binding allows static transformation
(weaving) or dynamic wrapping. Finally, to address the distributed and heterogeneous aspect,
adaplets on client-side and server-side communicate through CORBA messages to exchange in-
formation. In the scope of security, they can transparently introduce security protocol to request
for request authorization to perform some client actions.
Some efforts have been made to modularize security and provide maximal resuability. Hence,
Huang and al. [HWZ04] propose security functions in a reusable and generic security aspect li-
brary. The goal is to provide the basic reusable components developers need in the phase of
security implementation. The library is called JSAL and is implemented in AspectJ. It provides
four independent categories of security aspects: encryption/decryption, authentication, autho-
rization and security audit. This library encapsulate code that refers to the numerous security
packages of java security, such as Java Cryptography Extension API (JCE) and Java Authen-
tication and Authorization Service (JAAS). The security behavior is encapsulated in abstract
classes, letting the developer determine the exact pointcut on application’s integration. Whereas
the contribution represent a first step towards reusable and generic security aspect library, the
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authors lack of a method to address evolution of the application, as well as evolution of the
security aspects.
Aspect-Oriented security is debated in a work that compares advantages and disadvantages
of the approach with container-based security [SZ03]. It augments the flexibility of security
in environments that are container-based, such as application servers. Security in application
servers is generally provided and managed by containers. More precisely, the different com-
ponents representing the application do not have to execute specific security actions when the
container provide the security for them. The security is centralized in container’s configuration.
The application server typically provides identification of a principal and its authentication, that
does not need extra code. While addressing access control (role-based authorization for exam-
ple), the container might provide some functionality, but generally needs modification in the
components’ code. The paper shows that container provide no support or standard solution for
accountability in audit. Therefore, additional code in components is to be provided. The contri-
bution shows that identification and authentication of a principal in a typical J2EE application
can be modularized with few efforts in an aspect. The access control follows the same behavior.
The accountability and audit of the code can also be put in cross-cutting modules with no com-
ponents’ code modification. The authors state that combination of container-based security and
aspect-oriented security is complementary for maximal flexibility.
Industrial approaches of aspect leads to the development of new languages for specific needs.
AspectJ2EE [Coh04, Coh07] is a language developed along a thesis that address the problematic
of cross-cutting concerns in middleware framework such as application servers. The language
is voluntary less general and complicated than AspectJ, and focus on the large scale distributed
applications. It introduces parameterized aspects for flexibility and reusability of aspects. The
aspect’s code is weaved in a novel stage: deployment of the application. The authors claim
several advantages to this approach: preserving the object model, better management of aspect
applicability, and semantic model is more understandable hence maintainable. The approach
proposes a standard library of core aspects:
• Lifecycle aspect
• Persistence aspect
• Security aspect
• Transaction aspect
Aspect for java security has been discussed in a master thesis [Far01]. Java security relates
to the security model of the java language and java execution platform. The work address java
application like applets, that run through several layers of protection to provide features to se-
cure the environment against trusted or untrusted applets running on local machine. The author
define a security aspect for java to define strong security models through security policies and
specifying security restrictions.
The notion of decoupling security concerns to the application and architecting secure soft-
ware systems using aspect-oriented approach is discussed in a survey [DS06]. The survey pro-
vides an exhaustive list of the different approaches. As the paper expresses, the properties to
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respect when designing, developing and implementing secure system in which developers and
software engineers aim to produce secure systems are:
• The security-related properties in a system should be abstracted out of the main system to
improve clarity, maintainability, manageability and reuse.
• Legacy source code with known or potential security vulnerabilities should be able to be
patched with a minimal amount of new code. It should also be possible to avoid modifying
the original code.
• When applicable, security-related properties should be reusable across different applica-
tions.
The survey discusses the different approaches, including design solutions, architecting frame-
works, approaches with secure coding, etc. In the discussion part, the author expresses a state-
ment that security cross the different layers of the computing stack, and AOP can help address
the concern across layers. Also, security is not a localized concern. It is a distributed concern
present across the network. Aspects can help in addressing distributed concerns, like mentioned
in [NSV+06].
2.5.2 Secure AOP
In this section, we present several approaches that extend the general aspect-oriented approach to
propose security as feature built-in in the aspect parts. The solutions develop specific languages
or techniques.
Under the supervision of Mourad Debbabi, two thesis propose an aspect-oriented frame-
work for security hardening. Although one is oriented on an applied approach [Mou08], the
other poses semantic foundation [Bel08]. In the course of the thesis, they develop a complete
framework to overcome the difficulty of AOP usage in software development for systematic se-
curity hardening. They propose a pattern-based approach that limits the need of high expertise
in security to secure software. They also propose a programming-independent language called
SHL to propose security hardening plan and security hardening patterns, that combined together
creates security hardening aspects.
They have defined new pointcut primitives to augment expressivity of pointcuts. For in-
stance, they define pointcut to match data-flow, but also points relative to control-flow:
• GAFlow In the scope of control flow graph, which are potentially cyclic directed graph
that represent the calling structure of a program, GAFlow computes from a list of join-
points a unique joinpoint. The output joinpoint is "the closest common ancestor that is (1)
the closest common parent node of all the nodes specified in the input set and (2) through
which all the possible paths that reach them pass."
• GDFlow. It also operates on control flow graph and computes a unique joinpoint from a list
of joinpoints. The output joinpoint "(1) is the common descendant of the selected nodes
and (2) constitutes the first common node reached by all the possible paths emanating
from the selected nodes."
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They present several primitives that are useful for security. The primitives have been sug-
gested in different works
• Predicted Control Flow [Kic01] pointcuts identify join points based on the predicted be-
havior at the current join point.
• Dataflow Pointcut [MK03]. The pointcut identifies join points based on the origins of
values.
• Loop Pointcut [HG06] is a loop join point model that demonstrates the need for a more
complex join point in AspectJ. Their approach to recognize loops is based on a control-
flow analysis at the bytecode level.
• Pattern Matching Wildcard to perform pattern matching.
• Type Pattern Modifiers. Patterns are used inside primitive pointcut designators to match
signatures and consequently to determine the required join points
• Local Variables. It would gives access to local variable that are created within a method,
and not only parameter or return object of a function.
• Synchronized Block Joinpoint.
Belblidia proposes a semantic for the java virtual machine language bytecode [Bel08], and a
semantic for the AspectJ weaving. Then, she provides at the practical level an implementation
for two new AspectJ pointcut: getlocal, setlocal and dflow that matches local variable in function
and dataflow in the information flow.
A recurrent use case for AOP is the access control strategy. Mariscal and al. [PMMD05]
formalize a compilation mechanisms for security specifications. It translate representation of
role-based access control in aspect-oriented code for security enforcement. The formal model
gives some basis to evolve the model in future. The model translates role slices, which is a record
of the permissions for methods in a system. The translation outputs a policy database, and an ac-
cess control aspect for the enforcement part. The control usage is also part of multilevel security
strategy. Aspect-oriented has been applied to usage control [PE07] to facilitate the introduction
of the security logic with a non-intrusive approach. The claim is that this technique allows to
abstract the different features one need to put in the application, which ease the management and
evolution of the features.
Sewe and all. [SBM08] worked the applicability of several aspect-oriented languages to ef-
fective java security, regarding the security model in java language. They indicates that security
with AOP is not trivial, and that the languages does not fully take the security model in account.
They also argue security implications in case of inability to address some issues related to the
class loading. A protection domain may be erroneously assigned when advice is inlined in the
application, and the separation of namespace can not be guaranteed.
We have seen that many extensions are proposed to better control application of aspects
within a base program. In addition to verify that pointcut languages are expressive enough to
describe cross-cutting concerns, one need to provide proof of correct mapping of aspects in
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the program. The work of Balzarotti and al. [BM04] propose an analysis of aspect-oriented
composition using program slicing.
All these works demonstrate an high interest in securing systems using the aspect-oriented
paradigm. The works tackle the different aspects of software engineering, to either enhance de-
sign of application with the numerous cross-cutting concerns, either to enhance the applicability
of aspects solutions in system with a fine-grained control of side effects.
2.6 Service Oriented Architecture
The thesis deals with distributed systems, although we are mainly referring to the service ori-
ented architectures. In few paragraphs, we introduce the terminologies we are using in the thesis.
Service Oriented Architectures (SOA) enable a world of loosely-coupled and interoperable soft-
ware components towards reusability. Nowadays, the main entity used to represent a software
service is a Web Service. Web-Services represent a paradigm defined by W3C as "a software
system designed to support interoperable machine-to-machine interaction over a network. It
has an interface described in a machine-processable format (specifically WSDL). Other systems
interact with the Web service in a manner prescribed by its description using SOAP messages,
conveyed using HTTP with an XML serialization in conjunction with other Web-related stan-
dards" [BHM+04]. Web Services can also be addressed through other transport mechanisms
such as JMS or ESBs. The Web Service standards stack goes beyond the atomic service, and
proposes different approaches depending on the level of abstraction. Service behavior can be
defined when linking different services together, e.g., with BPEL4WS or BPMN 2.0 [HS04]. It
allows definition of service composition to realize a so-called business process.
In the following, we describe standards that are commonly used with Web Services, namely
WSDL and SOAP for WS-* related standards. We also present RESTful services that are getting
widely used for lightweight resource consumption and other means.
2.6.1 WSDL
WSDL 2.0 is a language based on the XML format, which provides a model for describing
Web services [CMRW07] . Means for expressing service interfaces are at the core of all service
models, and WSDL provides very flexible, highly-extensible, and well designed methods for
doing this. This description is done in two fundamental stages: an abstract and a concrete one.
At an abstract level, WSDL 2.0 provides the structure description of the messages sent to
and received by a Web service, such as data types, messages patterns and method description.
"An operation associates a message exchange pattern with one or more messages. A message
exchange pattern identifies the sequence and cardinality of messages sent and/or received as well
as who they are logically sent to and/or received from. An interface groups together operations
without any commitment to transport or wire format".
At a concrete level, "a binding specifies transport and wire format details for one or more
interfaces. An endpoint associates a network address with a binding. Finally, a service groups
together endpoints that implement a common interface." It means WSDL contains information
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of how messages are mapped to a concrete network protocol - a so-called binding - so that these
messages can be exchanged in an interoperable fashion.
2.6.2 SOAP
SOAP is "a lightweight protocol intended for exchanging structured information in a decen-
tralized, distributed environment. It uses XML technologies to define an extensible messaging
framework providing a message construct that can be exchanged over a variety of underlying
protocols" [GHM+07].
The protocol specifies the exchange of structured information in the implementation of Web
services. SOAP uses the HTTP for RPCs, hiding the HTTP semantics from SOAP applications.
In fact, ”SOAP treats HTTP as a lower-level communication protocol” and uses its own seman-
tics [Man05]. The major goal while designing SOAP have been simplicity and extensibility. The
focus has been put on specifying a model for message exchange and operation execution with no
specific treatment of reliability, security or other concerns that are normally directly addressed
in distributed protocols. Nevertheless, these concerns are covered thanks to the extensibility.
2.6.3 REST
The term REpresentational State Transfer (REST) was coined by Roy Fielding in his PhD dis-
sertation [Fie00]. "REST provides a set of architectural constraints that, when applied as a
whole, emphasizes scalability of component interactions, generality of interfaces, independent
deployment of components, and intermediary components to reduce interaction latency, enforce
security, and encapsulate legacy systems". R. Fielding describes the software engineering prin-
ciples guiding REST and the interaction constraints chosen to retain those principles, contrasting
them to the constraints of other architectural styles.
In REST, everything is a resource. A resource can be thought of as a distant object one can
interact with, but not manipulate directly. This is similar in spirit to object oriented programming
where everything is an object, but the approach is fundamentally different. Every resource,
identified by a unique identifier, is interacted with using a universally predefined set of verbs.
These verbs are defined for every resource globally. On the web, the unique name is the Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI) and the verbs are the standard HTTP methods as POST, GET, PUT
and DELETE. The research community is having several opinions on how these methods can
be mapped to the CRUD operations. For instance, these methods can respectively associated
with the CREATE, READ, UPDATE and DELETE operations. Each method has clear defined
semantics that can be relied upon.
2.6.4 WS-* Security
The most common nowadays is the primitive stack associated to security model named WS-
Security. This standard provides quality of protection through integrity, confidentiality and au-
thentication on messages with SOAPmessaging enhancements. It allows one to sign and encrypt
part of messages, that are at the XML Format to have a fine-grained control on a end-to-end
communication. Credentials are then transmitted securely in the form of security tokens.
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Figure 2.6: WS-Security standards
The initial roadmap has been submitted in 2002 to the OASIS consortium and the first ver-
sion was ratified in 2004, with a version 1.1 in 2006. The core standards use several token
profiles, such as UserName Token Profile [LKa06c], X.509 Token Profile [LKa06d], Kerberos
Token Profile [LKa06a], and SAML Token Profile [LKa06b]. These tokens are the different
means to serialize and transmit credentials across platform in a consistent manner.
Using WS-Security allows one to cover different scenarios with a same standard, such as
providing an end-to-end security instead of a point-to-point. The latest release improves perfor-
mance as all security mechanisms are ported to the Transport Layer (mostly TLS) or even the
communication protocol (IPSec for example). The drawbacks are a less precise and fine-grained
control on what is being transmitted. With a point-to-point protection, one can intercept a mes-
sage in plain text before final delivery of the application and modify it without further detection.
Also the transport layer protection provides security at the transport level rather than at a mes-
sage level and allows to encrypt and sign only necessary elements in a large XML-document set.
WS-Security can then be viewed as run-time declaration of how content is formatted, and what
steps are required to process it, during messages exchange.
The web-service stack also proposes a declarative approach during the modeling phase.
In a typical SOA, where the client and the service may not be in the same security domain,
policies enforce security rules on the outgoing (client side) and incoming (service) messages.
WS-SecurityPolicy [LKa09] is an OASIS standard. It describes how senders and receivers can
specify their security requirements and capabilities. For example, a service can specify that it
requires a SAML token and signed message in the incoming SOAP request. WS-Security Policy
is based on WS-Policy (a W3C Recommendation). WS-Policy is fully extensible and does not
place limits on the types of requirements and capabilities that may be described. It also defines
a mechanism for attaching or associating service policies with SOAP messages.
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Part I
Modularization of defensive security
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The modularization of defensive security can be simplified to the evaluation and enforcement
of secure programming best practices. In reality, best practices are a set of methodologies, pro-
cesses, rules, concepts and theories that have to be properly defined and exchanged. All people
involved in the definition and implementation of a system have to share the same overall vision
in term of security, and also to up-scale in order to detect and react to new threats. There are sev-
eral sources to exchange such knowledge, with different scopes. Government and cross-national
institutions are publishing guide for information security, or IT security guidelines. For example,
the french government has a dedicated structure [Age13] to propose documents in french with
guides, news around information security. The German government proposes a similar structure
in quality of the "Federal Office for Information Security" [Bun08]. Europa has an agency to
improve network and information security across europe nations. It publishes guides such as se-
curity awareness [Eur09] to the destination of citizens, businesses, public sector, etc. One of the
most significant worldwide institute is the National Institute of Standards and Technology [oST]
(NIST). It provides guidance for several field of engineering with information security among
the covered fields. Independent institutions also exists, such as the Information Security Forum
since 1989 dedicated to investing, clarifying and resolving key issues in information security
and risk management, by developing best practice methodologies, processes and solutions. They
have published guides such as Standard good practices for information security [Inf12] to the
benefits of they members, world-leading organizations and businesses.
In addition to all these institutions, there are groups that structured themselves to pursue a
common goal of knowledge sharing and centralization of best practices for specific areas. In the
area of internet security, there are groups such as the CERT Coordination Center that provides
approach for better system security, such as tools and techniques for threat and vulnerability
evaluation [CER]. The CERT was initially a team at Carnegie Mellon University, but now desig-
nate a team dedicated to respond to internet and computing incident. OWASP [OWA, Fou] is an
open-source project for web-application security. It is a community for corporations, academia,
and individuals with several regional events to share knowledge and understand latest threats.
Its scope limits to web-applications and related. Another organization promotes the use of best
practices for providing security assurance in cloud-computing: the Cloud Security Alliance orga-
nization. [Clo09]. They publish documents specific to cloud security, such as security guidance.
Although numerous organizations edit guides for proper information security management,
security vulnerabilities are still prevalent in applications, and specifically web and cloud appli-
cations. These type of applications are specially exposed to a larger audience with high press
coverage. They interact with users and collect large set of data subject to privacy, thus regula-
tions. Developing such type of applications require carefulness in specification of the applica-
tion, then rigorous enforcement of security properties. Finally, application needs built-in quality
to remove from the development stage any vulnerability that can be exploited later on. In term
of development, there are several strategies to ensure working and safe applications, that highly
depends on IT environment: frameworks, libraries, programming language, application servers,
etc.. These pieces provide advantages and drawback. It is generally a trade-off between flexibil-
ity, performance and security. Whereas flexibility is given at some points, rigorous verification
needs to propagate. For instance, a web application taking input from its users will have to prop-
erly verify the data, and format it regarding the actual usage. Modularization of security helps to
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understand when security behavior is applied within the components of the application. These
are additional points of control injected in the application to properly ensure the non-exploitation
of the application by non-authorized users for example. In the following, we present a first work
where we leverage user’s development environment to detect and protect against common vul-
nerabilities in web applications. Then, we propose another approach that generalizes and render
flexible the automation of input validation in applications.
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Chapter 3
Vulnerability remediation with
modular patches
Security vulnerabilities are commonly encountered in systems despite the existence of best prac-
tices for several decades. In order to detect the security vulnerabilities missed by developers,
complex solutions are undertaken like static analysis, often after the development phase. The
problem of solutions after the development resides in the loss of context: people in charge of
correction have all the difficulties to understand the architecture and the reasons behind partic-
ular pieces of code. Although vulnerabilities are found, there is also an absence of systematic
protection against them. In this chapter, we introduce an integrated Eclipse plug-in to assist
developers in the detection and mitigation of security vulnerabilities using Aspect-Oriented Pro-
gramming early in the development life-cycle. The work is a combination of static analysis and
protection code generation during the development phase. We leverage the developer interaction
with the integrated tool to obtain more knowledge about the system, and to report back a better
overview of the different security aspects already applied. We discuss the challenges for such a
code correction approach. The result is a solution to assist developers in order to obtain software
with higher security standards. The whole solution, combining static analysis and remediation,
proposes a better approach in terms of integrated security with clear modularization of secu-
rity code. It contributes to the secure programming best practice enforcement, with enhanced
flexibility.
3.1 Introduction
After more than decade of existence, cross-site scripting (XSS), SQL Injection, and other of
types of security vulnerabilities associated with input validation can cause severe damage once
exploited. Scholte et al. [SBK11] conducted an empirical study that shows that the number of
reported vulnerabilities is not decreasing. Listing 4 provides an example of how a developer can
introduce a vulnerability within a few lines of code.
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Listing 4 Vulnerable java code in a servlet class.
1 package com.sap.research.nce;
2
3 import javax.servlet.ServletException;
4 import javax.servlet.http.HttpServlet;
5 import javax.servlet.http.HttpServletRequest;
6 import javax.servlet.http.HttpServletResponse;
7
8 import org.json.JSONException;
9 import org.json.JSONObject;
10
11 /**
12 * Servlet implementation class RestSevices
13 */
14 public class RestServices extends HttpServlet {
15
16 protected void doGet(HttpServletRequest request,
17 HttpServletResponse response) throws ServletException, IOException {
18 System.out.println("doGet on RestServices");
19 PrintWriter writer = response.getWriter();
20
21 String title = request.getParameter("title");
22 long seed;
23 try {
24 seed = Long.parseLong(request.getParameter("seed"));
25 } catch (NumberFormatException e) {
26 seed = 1000;
27 }
28
29 //potential SQL Injection
30 Connection con = DriverManager.getConnection("jdbc:mysql://localhost:3306/bigbro");
31 Statement statement = con.createStatement();
32 String parameter = request.getParameter("parameter");
33 String query = "SELECT * from user where ID=’"+parameter+"’";
34 statement.executeQuery(query);
35
36 try {
37
38 JSONObject root = new JSONObject();
39
40 JSONObject obj = new JSONObject();
41 obj.accumulate("serviceName", "BarChartService");
42
43 Random rand = new Random(seed);
44 JSONObject objarray;
45 for (int i = 0; i < 3; ++i) {
46 objarray = new JSONObject();
47 objarray.accumulate("year", 2000 + i);
48 objarray.accumulate("problem", rand.nextInt(101));
49 objarray.accumulate("return", rand.nextInt(101));
50 objarray.accumulate("buy", rand.nextInt(101));
51 obj.accumulate("sales", objarray);
52 }
53
54 response.setContentType("application/json");
55 root.accumulate("Result", obj);
56 writer.print(root.toString(2) + "{ \"title\" : ");
57 //XSS vulnerability at this point
58 writer.print(title);
59 writer.print("}");
60
61 } catch (JSONException e) {
62 e.printStackTrace();
63 }finally{
64 writer.flush();
65 writer.close();
66 }
67 }
68
69 }
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The Listing presents two distinct vulnerabilities. From line 32 to 35, the application get a
parameter from a HTTP request, and uses it to construct manually a query. The problem occurs
as there is no verification of the input, and the query is executed as is. A malicious user can
forge the parameter to control the result of the query. These lines have no consequences on
the direct output, but one can still inject data or control the underlying database. The second
vulnerability is present at line 58. A JSON object is populated with values coming from an
HTTP parameter, and the object is written to the response with no particular treatment. One can
control the parameter and exploit this XSS vulnerability.
While computer security is primarily a matter of secure design and architecture, it is also
known that even with the best designed architectures, security bugs will still show up due to
poor implementation. Thus, fixing security vulnerabilities before shipment can’t be considered
optional anymore. Most of the reported security vulnerabilities are simply forgotten by devel-
opers, thought to be some benign code. Such mistakes can remain unaudited for years until they
end up being exploited by hackers.
The software development lifecycle introduces several steps to audit and test the code pro-
duced by developers in order to detect security bugs,ranging from code review tools for early
detection of security bugs to penetration testing. The tools are used to automate some tasks nor-
mally handled manually or requiring complex processing and data manipulation. They are able
to detect several errors and software defects, but developers have to face heterogeneous tools,
each one with a different process to make it run correctly, and they have to analyze their results,
merge them, and fix the source code accordingly. For instance, code scanner tools are usually
designed to be independent from the developers’ environment. Therefore, they gain in flexibil-
ity but lose comprehensiveness and the possibility to interact with people experienced with the
application code. Thus, tools produce results that are not directly linked to application defects.
For example, code scanner tools trigger false positives, which are not actual vulnerabilities.
Our contributions are twofold. First, we focus on static code analysis, an automated ap-
proach to perform code review integrated in developer’s environment. This technique analyzes
the source code and/or binary code without executing it and identifies anti-patterns that lead to
security bugs. We focus on security vulnerabilities caused by missing input validation, the pro-
cess of validating all the inputs to an application before using it. Although our tool handles other
kinds of vulnerabilities, here we discuss on three main vulnerabilities caused by missing input
validation, or an incorrect validation of the input: cross-site scripting (also called XSS), Direc-
tory Path Traversal, and SQL Injection. Second, we provide an integrated assisted remediation
process that employs Aspect-Oriented Programming for semi-automatic vulnerability correc-
tion. The combination of these mechanisms improves the quality of the software with respect to
security requirements.
Figure 3.1 presents the interaction between the two phases: the static analysis phase allows
scanning the code in order to identify and classify the different vulnerabilities found. It is de-
scribed in details in Section 3.4. The measurement is performed directly by developers who
decide what to remediate directly within the development environment. The full remediation
process is given in Section 3.5 .
We present the contribution in following sections: Section 3.2 presents the overall agile
approach to conduct code scanning and correct vulnerability during the development phase.
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Figure 3.1: Vulnerability remediation process. The two first blocks correspond to the static
analysis component. The two last blocks correspond to the remediation component. The last
one corresponds to assisted processing component
Then, Section 3.3 presents the architecture we adopt to combine the static analysis with the code
correction component. Section 3.4 describes the static analysis process with its integration in
the developers’ environment. Then, we explain techniques for assisted remediation along with
pros and cons in Section 3.5. Finally, we discuss an evaluation of the methodology compared
to other solutions in Section 3.6, and we present a summary in Section 3.8. This work has been
awarded in [SGEKSDO12].
3.2 Agile management of vulnerabilities
Agile approaches to software development require the code to be refactored, reviewed and tested
at each iteration of the development lifecycle. While unit testing can be used to check the ful-
fillment of functional requirements during iterations, checking emerging properties of software
such as security or safety is more difficult. We aim to provide each developer with a simple way
to do daily security static analysis on his code. That would be properly achieved by providing
a security code scanner integrated in the development environment (we selected Eclipse IDE
in our case), and a decentralized architecture that allows security experts to assist the develop-
ers. Typically, that would include verifying false positives and correspondingly adjusting the
code scanner test cases, or assisting in reviewing the solutions for the fixes. It brings several
advantages over the approach in which the static analysis phase takes place only at the end. The
expertise of the context in which the code was developed lies in development groups. Therefore,
the interaction between development team and security experts makes it faster and easier to find
and to apply corrections to the security functionalities. The experts provide support on a case-
by-case basis for a better tuning of false positive detection across teams and reducing final costs
of maintenance: solving security issues into the development phase can reduce the number of
issues that the security experts should analyze at the end.
Maintaining the separation of roles between the security experts performing the code scan-
ning and the team members developing the application raises a critical complication, typically,
from a time perspective, due to the human interaction between security experts and develop-
ers. If such an approach would have to scale to what most of the agile approaches describe, the
amount of iterations between developers and experts would need to be reduced. That could be
reduced by up-skilling the developers and reducing their interactions with the security experts
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for the analysis of the security scans of the project, which is simplified by the introduction of
our tool.
Our incentive is to harvest the advantages acquired by using our approach in an agile and
decentralized static analysis process early in the software development lifecycle. It raises secu-
rity awareness for the developers at the development time and reduces maintenance costs. A tool
covering the previous needs should fulfill several requirements:
• easy-to use for users non-expert in security
• domain specific with integration into the developers’ daily environment, to maximize its
adoption and to avoid additional steps to run the tool
• adjustable to maximize project knowledge and reduce false positives and negatives
• collaborative feedbacks to adjust accuracy of the scan over time.
• supportive to assist developers in correcting and understanding issues.
• educative to help developers understanding errors, steps to correct existing error, and tech-
niques to prevent future vulnerability
We have developed an Eclipse plugin, presented in [GEKS11], made of components leveraging
an agile and decentralized organization for static analysis. It gives direct access to detected flaws
and global overview on system vulnerabilities. The developer analyzes its code and reviews
vulnerabilities when necessary.
3.3 A flexible architecture
Figure 3.2 represents the architecture of our prototype. We consider two main stakeholders in-
volved in the configuration and usage of the prototype. Security experts and developers have to
communicate and collaborate. Their role is to configure altogether the knowledge database in
order to avoid false positives and negatives, and to provide better accuracy during the analysis
phase. The security experts have two main tasks. First, they update the knowledge base, adding
to its classes or methods that can be considered as trusted for one or more vulnerabilities. Sec-
ond,they analyze queries from developers to enhanced the knowledge database . The analysis
is on possible trusted objects for one or more security vulnerabilities; they must analyze them
more in detail and, if these objects are really trusted they tag them as trusted into the knowledge
base. We better explain the different concepts and tasks in Section 3.4.
The second role is the developer, interacting directly with the static analysis engine to ver-
ify vulnerabilities in the application code and libraries under its responsibility. The remaining
libraries have to be covered by the security experts group. The developer at this stage doesn’t
need to understand the complexity of security properties. The knowledge base is shared among
developers. It contains all the security knowledge about trust: objects that do not introduce
security issues into the code. Security experts and developers with understanding of security
patterns maintain and keep under control the definitions used by all developers in an easy way
using one admin web application or some web-services. In this way, the code scanner testing
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Figure 3.2: Architecture
rules are harmonized for the whole application or even on a project-basis. The knowledge base
allows developers to run a static analysis that is perfectly adapted to the context of their project.
In industrial scale projects, daily scans are recommended. In order to facilitate this task,
we wrote a plugin for Eclipse that uses an abstract syntax tree (AST) generated by the JDT
compiler - the compiler that Eclipse provides as part of the Java Development Tools platform,
to simplify the static analysis process. The plugin accesses the knowledge database via web-
services making it possible for each developer to run the code scanner independently. We detail
the scanner component in the next section.
The overall process is to find in applications where security checks are not performed, or not
properly applied, leading to potential vulnerabilities. We use a specific taxonomy to describe
security related code concepts Entry points are points from an application where injection during
an attack can start. These are points that are not directly created by the application, but rather
points opened to external components, thus susceptible to bring untrusted data and objects within
the application. These entry points are present in external libraries, web applications dealing
with forms and parameters, databases accesses, file system interactions, application arguments,
property files, objects from web services, etc. In contrast, exit points are points of the application
where data reach an outside domain, not under the control of the application anymore. These exit
points are the result of application execution, like web pages, database writes, filesystem writes,
etc. As we are going to see in the next sections, the purpose of our approach is to find in the
control flow connecting entry points to exit points, which ones are introducing or propagating
objects with potential leaks. A vulnerability is declared when an these objects are connected to
53
an exit point. These objects will later be described as untrusted objects.
3.4 Static analysis process
Static analyze can report security bugs even when scanning small pieces of code. Another family
of code scanners is based on dynamic analysis techniques that acquire information at runtime.
Unlike static analysis, dynamic analysis requires a running executable code. Static analysis
scans all the source code while dynamic analysis can verify certain use cases being executed.
The major drawback of static analysis is that it can report both false positives and false negatives.
The former detects a security vulnerability that is not exploitable, while the latter means that it
misses to report certain security vulnerabilities. Having false negatives is highly dangerous as
it gives one a sense of protection while vulnerability is present and can be exploited, whereas
having false positives primarily slows down the static analysis process. Modern static analysis
tools, similarly to compilers, build an abstract syntax tree that represents the abstract syntactic
structure of the code from the source code and analyze it.
3.4.1 Static analysis process
In a nutshell, our process allows developers to run a check on their code to uncover potential
vulnerabilities by checking for inputs that have not been validated. It finds information flows
connecting an entry point to an exit point that does not use a trusted object for the considered
vulnerabilities. The process uses an abstract syntax tree of the software in conjunction with the
knowledge base to identify the vulnerable points. The Figure 3.3 shows an excerpt of an AST
tree for a class type. It gives a structured tree that one can handle with all required information
regarding the syntax of a program. Each object has an object type. This type has its own
information, such as parameters for a method, or interface information for a type, etc.
The static analysis works on the Document Object Model (DOM) generated by the Eclipse
JDT component able, which can handle all constructs described in the Java Language Specifi-
cation [GJSB05]. Figure 3.4 presents the different analysis steps performed from the moment
developer presses the analysis button to the display of results. The static analysis process is
described as follows:
• The engine contacts the knowledge database in order to retrieve the up-to-date and most
accurate configuration from the shared platform. If the developer cannot retrieve the con-
figuration, it can still work independently with the latest local configuration.
• The process identifies all entry points of interest in the accessible source code and libraries.
The analysis is based on the previously mentioned AST. We are gathering the different
variables and fields used as well as the different methods. We apply a first filter with
pattern-matching on the potential entry points: a method call or a new object instantiation
might be tagged as returning trusted inputs.
• For each entry point, the control flow is followed to create the connections between meth-
ods, variables and fields to discover all the exit points. For instance, the engine visits
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Figure 3.3: AST view example of a class
assignments, method invocations, and construction of new objects with the variables and
fields detected during the entry point gathering.
• Once the different exit points have been collected, we evaluate the risk of having security
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Figure 3.4: Static Analysis Activity Diagram
vulnerabilities in the code. We check for an absence of validation in the flow for the
different kinds of vulnerabilities. For instance, if the flow from an entry point to an exit
point passes through a method or a class, which is known to validate SQL input, the flow is
tagged as trusted for this specific vulnerability. Of course, the tag runs from the moment
where the method validates for the vulnerability to a novel composition with potential
vulnerable code, or until it reaches an exit point.
3.4.2 Multiple vulnerability analysis
In the previous section, we have presented the global analysis process. In this section, we dis-
cuss more in-depth the notion of trusted object and vulnerability propagation for the different
vulnerabilities we address. The Listing 3.1 presents some source code vulnerable to cross site
scripting. The vulnerability propagates from the request parameter to the object query, which
is then written in the response. The problem of identifying security vulnerabilities caused by
errors in the input validation can be translated into finding an information flow connecting an
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entry point and an exit point that does not use a trusted object for the considered vulnerabilities.
1 /** This servlet proposes XSS example. */
2 public class EchoServlet extends HttpServlet {
3 protected void doGet(HttpServletRequest req, HttpServletResponse resp) {
4 PrintWriter writer = resp.getWriter();
5 String query = req.getParameter("query") ;
6
7 resp.setContentType("text/html");
8 writer.print("<html><h1>Results for ");
9 writer.print ( query );
10 writer.print("</h1></html>");
11 writer.flush();
12 writer.close();
13 }
14 }
Listing 3.1: Vulnerability propagation of a cross site scripting
We define an input as a data flow from any class, method or parameter into the code being
programmed that is external from the application. We also define as entry point any object
into the source code where an untrusted input enters to the program being scanned, like the
query input from Listing 3.1. In an analogous way we define as output any data flow that goes
from the code being programmed into external objects or method invocations. Our approach
relies on our trusted object definition, which impacts the detection accuracy. A trusted object
is a class or a method that can sanitize all the information flows from an entry point to an
exit point for one or more security vulnerabilities. We implemented the trust definitions into
the centralized knowledge base presented in the previous section. The knowledge database
represents definitions using a trusting hierarchy that follows the package hierarchy.
Security experts can tag classes, packages or methods as trusted for one or more security
vulnerabilities, according to their analysis, feedbacks from developers, or static analysis results.
Obviously, defining a trusted element in the trust hierarchy also adds all the elements below it:
trusting a package trusts all the classes and methods into it and trusting a class trusts all the fields
and methods in it. A trusted object can sanitize one or more security vulnerabilities (e.g., the
sanitization method can be valid for both SQL Injection and cross site scripting). This approach
enables developers and security experts to define strong trust policies with regards to the system
they are securing.
Defining a trusted object is a strong assertion as it taints a given flow as valid and free from
a given vulnerability. The definition process to trust a class, a package, or a method must be
supervised: it influences the risk evaluation accuracy. The object must not introduce a specific
vulnerability into the code. This is the reason why developers report feedback and security
experts take the decision. The experts can also analyze, manage, and update the base if the class,
package or method is considered trusted. This phase allows system tuning that is related to a
given organization and leads to fewer false positives. There should have no false negatives, as
our approach will first detect all possible problems, that are eliminated with fine-grained control
with the knowledge base.
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Figure 3.5: Code Analysis result
The detected vulnerabilities (Figure 3.5 gives an example of the result of an analysis in the
tool) are mainly caused by lack of input validation: SQL Injection, Directory Path Traversal, and
Cross Site Scripting. The engine also detects a more general Malformed Input vulnerability that
represents any input that is not validated using a standard implementation. The engine can be
easily extended to support new kinds of vulnerabilities caused by missing input validation. The
administrator needs to add the definition of the new vulnerability to the centralized knowledge
base (and, if exists, adding trusted objects that mitigate the vulnerability), and to create a new
class extending an interface, that implements the checks to be done on the result of the static
analysis to detect the vulnerability.
3.5 Assisted remediation with a security aspect library
Performing a static analysis is already integrated in quality processes in several companies. Yet,
the actual identification of vulnerabilities does not mean they are correctly mitigated. Given
this problem, we can have several approaches: (i) refactoring the code, (ii) applying a proxy to
inbound and outbound connections, and finally the solution we adopted, (iii) generate protection
code linked to the application being analyzed.
Software refactoring requires the developer to understand the design of the application and
its potential threats, in order to manually rewrite part of the code to implement the refactoring.
The refactoring improves the design, performance, and manageability of the code, but is difficult
to achieve. It costs time and is error prone. Up to six distinct activities have been observed
in [MT04]: (i) identify where the software should be refactored (ii) determine which refactoring
should be applied to the identified places (iii) guarantee that the applied refactoring preserves
behaviour (iv) apply the refactoring (v) assess the effect of the refactoring (vi) maintain the
consistency between the refactored program code and other software artifacts. The impacted
code is generally scattered across the application, and some part can be left unchecked easily.
This can lead to an inconsistent state where the application does not reflect the intended goal.
Software refactoring is one of the most powerful vulnerability remediation approache due to its
flexibility in terms of code rewriting and architecture evolution.
The proxy solution is equivalent to a gray-box approach, with no in-depth visibility of inter-
nal processes. It can be burdensome to put in place, especially when the environment is under
control of a different entity than the development team. For instance, on cloud platforms, de-
velopers can deploy their application but have limited management capabilities, leading to the
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Vulnerability Origin Potential Remediation
Cross-Site Script-
ing
Server does not validate
input coming from ex-
ternal source
Validate input and filter or encode prop-
erly the output depending on the usage:
the encoding differs from HTML content to
Javascript content for example
SQL Injection Server does not validate
input and use it directly
in a construct of a SQL
Query
Use a parameterized query or a safe API. Es-
cape special characters. Validate the input
used in the construction of query
Directory Path
Traversal
Application server is
misconfigured, or the
file-system policy con-
tains weaknesses
Enclose the application with strict policies,
that restrict access to the filesystem by de-
fault. Filter and validate the input prior to
direct file access
Other malformed
input
Misvalidation Validate input, determine the origin and pos-
sible manipulation from externals
Table 3.1: List of detected vulnerabilities with potential origin and potential remediation.
impossibility to apply a filter on the application. The lack of flexibility and the absence of small
adjustments make it complicated to adopt at the development phase.
In this work we provide a protection inlined with the application. It means that the protection
code is directly applied to the application to slightly modify the execution flow on vulnerable
points. This solution has several advantages due to the underlying technology we use: Aspect-
Oriented Programming paradigm (AOP) [KLM+97], which is a paradigm to ease programming
concerns that crosscut and pervade applications. In the next section, we describe our methodol-
ogy and provide a comprehensive list of its advantages and drawbacks.
3.5.1 Methodology
Our methodology comprises the automatic discovery of weaknesses in the code. In addition,
we integrate a protection phase tied to the analysis process which guides developers through the
correct and assisted correction of the vulnerabilities previously detected. The protection phase
uses information from the static analysis engine to know what vulnerabilities have to be cor-
rected. Then the phase uses inputs from the developer to extract knowledge about the context,
Figure 3.6 gives an example of the feedback asked from the developer and of the tooling support-
ing this feedback. These steps are necessary for our methodology to gather application context,
therefore places in the application where to inject security correction. The security correction
uses AOP. The goal is to bring a proper separation of concerns for cross-cutting functionalities
such as security. Code related to a concern is maintained separately from the base application.
The main advantage of using this technology is the ability to intervene in the control flow of a
program without interfering with the base program code.
The list of vulnerabilities we cover are in Table 3.1. The table highlights the potential origin
vulnerabilities and some of known remediation techniques. These vulnerabilities are known and
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subject to high attention. For instance, they have been in in the OWASP Top Ten [OWA10] for
several years now, but also in the MITRE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Errors [MIT11]. Al-
beit several approaches exist to remediate the vulnerabilities, we have chosen to apply escaping
and validation techniques with aspect-orientation to consistently remediate the problems.
Figure 3.6: Gathering context for vulnerability protection
By adopting this approach, we reduce the time to correct vulnerabilities by applying semi-
automatic and pre-defined mechanisms to mitigate them. We use the aspect component to apply
the protection code which is mostly tangled and scattered over an application.
Correcting a security vulnerability is not trivial. Different refactorings are possible depend-
ing on the issue. For instance, the guidelines for secure programming recommand SQL prepared
statement to prevent SQL Injection. Yet, developers might be constrained by their frameworks
to forge SQL queries by themselves. Therefore, developers would have to try another approach
such as input validation and escaping of special characters.
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Listing 5 Example of correction snippet generated for a malformed input
1 package sap.nce.research.security.aspects;
2
3 import org.aspectj.lang.ProceedingJoinPoint;
4 import org.owasp.esapi.ESAPI;
5 import org.owasp.esapi.Logger;
6 import org.owasp.esapi.errors.IntrusionException;
7
8 public aspect Validation {
9
10 private final Logger logger = ESAPI.log();
11
12 pointcut mainMethod(String s) :
13 (cflow(execution(void com.sap.research.nce.RestServices.doGet
14 (*..HttpServletRequest, *..HttpServletResponse)))
15 && (execution(String javax.servlet.http.HttpServletRequest
16 .getParameter(java.lang.String)) && args (s)))
17 && !within(Validation)
18 ;
19
20 java.lang.String around(String s) : mainMethod(s) {
21 s = proceed(s);
22 String sanitized = "";
23 try{
24 sanitized = ESAPI.encoder().canonicalize(s);
25 }catch (IntrusionException e){
26 //in case of wrong encoding, log the error but still accept at this time
27 logger.error(logger.SECURITY_FAILURE,
28 "Canonicalization failed. Try without strict mode on : " + s);
29 sanitized = ESAPI.encoder().canonicalize(s, false);
30 }
31 //add ESAPI.validator if needed
32 logger.info(logger.SECURITY_SUCCESS,
33 "In " + thisJoinPointStaticPart.getSignature() + "Sanitized to " + sanitized);
34
35 return sanitized;
36 }
37
38
39 /***
40 * encoding
41 * @param s : the string object which needs encoding
42 * @param target : the encoding scheme we have to apply
43 */
44 pointcut encodingPointcut(java.lang.String s) :
45 (cflow(execution(void com.sap.research.nce.RestServices.doGet
46 (HttpServletRequest, HttpServletResponse)))
47 && execution(void java.io.PrintWriter.print(java.lang.String)) && args (s)
48 && !within(Validation)
49 ;
50
51 java.lang.String around(java.lang.String s) : encodingPointcut(s) {
52 String encoded;
53 encoded = proceed (s);
54 encoded = ESAPI.encoder().encodeForHTML(encoded);
55
56 logger.info(logger.SECURITY_SUCCESS,
57 "In " + thisJoinPointStaticPart.getSignature()
58 + "Encoded " + s + " to (HTML) : " + encoded);
59 return encoded;
60 }
61
62 }
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We assist developers by providing them an automated solution. For the previously mentioned
correction, our integrated solution would propose to mitigate the vulnerability with an automatic
detection of incoming, unsafe and unchecked variables. The developer does not need to be a
security expert to correct vulnerabilities as our approach provides interactive steps to generate
AOP protection code, like in Listing 5. The listing is an example that was generated for one
of our test application. It consists of an aspect that contains two parts: sanitization of data,
or encoding for a specific target format of the data. From line 12 to 18, the aspect defines
one pointcut indicating which method needs data sanitization. From line 20 to 35, the actual
protection code is written in an advice. The protection code uses a third-party library, although
we can envision any code. From line 44 to 50, another pointcut is defined to match encoding
joinpoints: points in the application that need special encoding. The advice from line 51 to 60
encode the content for an HTML target. The advice is yet statically generated by the tool, and
the HTML information has been indicated through the assisted step of the plugin.
Although semi-automation simplifies the process to introduce protection code, the technique
can introduce several side-effects if the developers are not following closely what is generated.
The plugin gives the developer an overview of all corrected vulnerabilities, allowing him to
visually manage and re-arrange them in case of need. Currently, the prototype does not analyze
the interactions between the different protection code generated. By adopting this approach,
we allow better a understanding of the different vulnerabilities affecting the system from a user
point of view, and we guide the developer towards a better compliance of its application with
best practices and corporate policies. The protection code can be deployed by team of security
expert and modified without refactoring.
3.5.2 Security-aspect library limitation
The use of AOP in the remediation of vulnerabilities bring us more flexibility. One can evolve
the protection library, making the security solution independent from the application. But this
approach also brings us some limitations we discuss in this section.
Firstly, the language is designed to modify the application control flow. One of the lim-
itations we have is related to the deep modification we need to perform in order to replace a
behavior. For example, let us suppose that we would like to validate a SQL query written man-
ually in the application. We are able to weave validation and escaping code, but we can hardly
modify the application to construct a parameterized query. For instance, the modification would
pertain several line of codes, and would concern functional code rather than crosscutting con-
cern. The pointcut language could not handle such case, and aspect-oriented programming does
not cover such case.
Secondly, the aspects cover the application in whole. When more than one aspect is involved,
the cross-cutting concerns can intersect. Therefore, we need to analyze aspect interaction and
prevent an annihilation of the behavior we intended to address. We further discuss this limitation
in next section.
Thirdly, the evolution of the program leads to a different distribution of vulnerabilities. The
vulnerabilities are detected after the static analysis phase. We are not yet addressing this problem
of evolution to maintain the relation between the aspects and the application. This differs from
the fragile pointcut problem inherent of aspect using pointcut languages referring to the syntax
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of the base language: the evolution affects the application as a whole, by introducing new entry
points and exit points that need to be considered, or introducing methods that validate a flow for
a given vulnerability.
The fourth constraint is that aspect weaving has no specific certification. The actual protec-
tion library is defined globally, but applied locally, with a late binding to the application. The
protection code is the same everywhere, but we put strong trust in the protection library by as-
suming that aspects are behaving properly with the actual modification of the flow to mitigate
the vulnerabilities.
Finally, the fifth constraint is user acceptance. Since the developers rely on a cross-cutting
solution, the code itself does not reflect the exact state of the application. The point where the
aspect interferes with the base application is not displayed in the code. We address this limitation
with the strong interaction with the developer’s environment. The Eclipse plugin provides a
mean to display remediation code in place at a given time.
3.5.3 Solution pertinence
The choice of using aspect-oriented injection of security protection code relies on a correct
detection of vulnerabilities and specification from a developer. The developer is an involved and
implicated stakeholder that uses our solution to improve the overall solution quality.
Compared with other approaches, we provide a built-in solution with an efficient static anal-
ysis phase to collect vulnerability points in the application, in which to immediately propose
corrections or guidance. We have intentionally reduced the separation between the two phases,
as we are in a still flexible phase: the application is still under development and thus subject to
frequent changes, refactoring, etc. Developers are left with some decisions, but the decisions are
limited to the minimal interaction in order to let him correct most of the problems with minimal
efforts.
Minimal efforts for the developer doesn’t mean absence of reflection. We trust and leverage
developer capacity to understand the problem, and our efforts are to highlight the problem and
quickly enable a solution. The developer’s knowledge is required to decide on these situations
in which our analysis might fail, although we have general guidelines. The interference between
several security code is problematic in our approach. We intensively rely on aspect-oriented
programming, and thus refer to the notions of pointcut-advice model. It means we are using
tools of a language - AspectJ, for instance, to syntactically detect points in the application in
which we are weaving the security code that mitigate the vulnerability. One single joinpoint
might inject several security snippets to correct different vulnerabilities. The order of injection
is crucial to the correct anticipation of the application’s behavior. For instance, we are proposing
security code to validate and sanitize an input, or security code to encode content in order to
normalize its data for a given usage. If one combines these different security codes, one ends up
with different results:
• sanitize + encode : generally, the process one wans to achieve which validates the data
and modifies it according to their future usage.
• encode + sanitize : this situation might lead to undo the encoding phase. For example,
an html element is encoded once, and then decoded to be used by the application.
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• sanitize+ sanitize : you over control the data, with no real side effects.
• encode + encode : you loose the control over the data, having situations in which the
client application is not able to properly interpret the data. For instance, imagine you get
the following string from a database to display it as an html content : "html <- value". A
first encoding will replace html entities to get "html &lt;- value" which renders properly
on browser. A second encoding on this text will produce "html &amp;lt;- value" which
renders incorrectly.
These situations already require user decisions, and are simple when located at a single
joinpoint. The problem grows with a complete application in which we have to inject security
code in all of a call-tree hierarchy as depicted in Figure 3.6. The decision of weaving security
code at a certain point might introduce side effects, such as a desirable behavior is no longer
possible. For instance, the situation in which we get and store a data in a backend and later
use it in both an HTML element and in JSON output triggers two security alerts: cross site
scripting and malformed input. If we inject our protection code before the retrieval of data from
the backend, we achieve an incomplete protection and introduce a side-effect. The encoding
code that we introduce will modify the data in HTML, or JSON valid data (depending on the
developer’s decision), and will mutually exclude the possibility to retrieve original data. The
problem in such a situation is to control the point of application in the AST and decide of the
best emplacement for aspect weaving. For this purpose, there are several alternatives. We have
decided to represent graphically the interaction in the plugin, but we envision in future works to
introduce work like in Hannousse et al. [HDA11]. They propose to detect potential interferences
among aspects by formally modeling interactions between aspectualized components.
3.6 Evaluation
In order to test the accuracy of the methodology as well as the pertinence of the solution, we have
defined a protocol to test several security tools and understand their capabilities at vulnerability
detection of these different frameworks. We evaluated different java web applications, that are
for some deliberately insecure, or that simply contains some known flaws.
Webgoat Webgoat [MO12] is one famous test application for web application security. The
application has been developed by the OWASP consortium to create deliberate vulnera-
bilities in the application. For the sake of performance, we have decided to use a partial
version of this project in our tests. The platform is specialized in web application vul-
nerabilities such as malformed inputs, cross site scripting, cross site request forgery, SQL
injection, session fixation, etc.
Insecure InsecureWebApp [Ist05] is another OWASP project. It is a web application that in-
cludes common web application vulnerabilities. It is a target for automated and manual
penetration testing, source code analysis, vulnerability assessments and threat modeling.
The project proposes to guide user through user story to understand the vulnerabilities and
how they can be fixed in the code.
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Roller Roller [Apa04] is an Apache Project. It was featured in onjava.com. Roller is the open
source blog server that was driving Sun Microsystem’s blogs.sun.com employee blogging
site, the Javalobby’s JRoller Java community site, and hundreds of other sites. We have
tested an old version that was in the test bench of Ben Livshits [Liv].
Testbench Testbench is a web application project we have crafted in order to test several test
cases. It contains servlets and web applications that deliberetely contain SQL injection,
cross site scripting, malformed input, directory path traversal, etc.
Personal Blog This java web application project also comes from the Ben Livshits test bench.
PersonalBlog [PCE05] is a light-weight personal blogging application that is suitable for
installing on your own host provider. It’s written in Java and uses a variety of J2EE
technologies, including: Servlets, Jsp, Jdbc, Hibernate, Struts, Tiles and Log4j.
Several tools are capable of static analysis on Java programs. We have decided to test tools
that were correctly integrated in the Eclipse IDE. The following list describes the two solutions
we have tested in comparison of our approach.
Bigbro Bigbro is our tool, from which we test the static analysis part. The tool was not specif-
ically tuned for the projects, thus running with the default settings. One needs to pay
attention to the fact that the results might contain several false positive. With the correct
definition of trusted packages and untrusted packages in the knowledge database, that are
specific to an application, the static analysis would reduce the number of false positive
drastically.
LAPSE Lapse [LL05] (Lightweight Analysis for Program Security in Eclipse) is a tool de-
signed and developed by Ben Livshits during its PhD. thesis at Standford. He was focus-
ing on web application vulnerabilities, with also an enhanced integration into the Eclipse
plugin. LAPSE is designed to help with the task of auditing Java J2EE applications for
common types of security vulnerabilities found in Web applications. It helps to quickly
gather taint sources, taint sinks and find the path between sources and sinks. It is similar
to the type of detection we propose, but we are proposing some additional categories.
Codepro analytix The project [Goo12] is a Java software testing tool for Eclipse developers
who are concerned about improving software quality and reducing developments costs
and schedules. The Java software audit features assist the developer in reducing errors
as the code is being developed and keeping coding practices in line with organizational
guidelines". Among the different modules for code quality, there is a specific module for
security audit. It provides warnings as well as critical reports for several vulnerability
sources.
Table 3.2 presents the raw results that we obtain when we perform the static analysis on the
different projects. The evaluation is currently limited to human-sized projects with a number of
code source lines going up to 30k lines. The number of classes from the application are obtained
through code pro analytix, or bigbro that both provide the information. The number of source
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lines is also gathered by the two tools, but we have preferred to use the sloccount project 1 to
normalize the numbers.
The categories XSS, SQL, and Malformed input are common to the different tools, with
some distinctions for directory path traversal. There is some disparity on the malformed input
category as different notions are falling into this category.
Project Nb classes SLOC Tool XSS SQL Malformed Input Path Traversal Total
Webgoat (par-
tial project)
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java=7525;
jsp=3448
bigbro 8 162 282 29 481
lapse 3 13 61 N.A 77
codepro 4 29 3 2 38
Roller 275
java=30874;
jsp=2806
bigbro 41 18 135 2 196
lapse 47 6 112 N.A 165
codepro 14 9 10 72 105
Testbench 6 java=181
bigbro 6 2 4 1 13
lapse 5 2 10 N.A 17
codepro 2 2 0 1 5
Personal blog 38
java=3049;
jsp=1469
bigbro 0 38 81 3 122
lapse 0 2 41 N.A 43
codepro 0 2 0 0 2
Insecure 15
java=678;
jsp=395
bigbro 7 8 20 0 35
lapse 3 13 69 N.A 84
codepro 2 7 1 0 10
Table 3.2: Comparison of static analysis tools on several projects. It presents the detected vulnerabilities
for the different categories when applicable. SLOC means Source Line of Codes.
An example of the static analysis display in terms of result is presented in Figure 3.7 for Code
pro analytix. It presents the result of the security audit, with the different warning regarding
programming advices, along with critical reports such as SQL Injection, or cross site scripting.
The tool provides a complete explanation of the vulnerability, as well as different locations in the
analyzed source code. The analysis result for a LAPSE scan is provided in Figure 3.8. It presents
the different suspicious calls detected by the analysis. For instance, the Webgoat analysis has
several command injection, cross-site scripting, as well as other vulnerabilities. In Table 3.2
for the Insecure webapp project, the reported numbers are not complete as the analysis failed
with some exceptions. The exceptions minor, therefore we provide the analysis result in the
table. Bigbro results are shown in Figure 3.9. The summary view try to quickly indicates the
problems, their origin, and it gives helper to correct the detected vulnerabilities. The helpers are
directly available in the source code editor provided by eclipse, and give hints.
1Source Line of Codes (SLOC) is obtained by using sloccount program from http://www.dwheeler.com/
sloccount/
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Figure 3.7: Example of result with code pro analytix
6
7
Figure 3.8: Example of result with lapse
6
8
Figure 3.9: Example of result with bigbro
6
9
The different projects have the goal to provide a quick overview of potential vulnerabilities in
applications or web applications. They all encourage code quality and leverage the developer’s
ability to understand and correct the mistakes. The pertinence of the results (detection accuracy
in the different categories) has not been completely tested, but a simple and quick overview
allows to direct the developer towards vulnerable code. The developer is also redirected to
pertinent documentation to understand and correct the vulnerability. Among tools, the higher
detection rate does not mean that the tool performs better as several false positives might appear.
We prefer to guarantee a solution free of false negative, then we can tune the results to limit the
number of false positives.
3.7 Related work
The goal of static analysis is to determine whether tainted data, that is data that originate from
possibly malicious users, reaches sensitive sinks (e.g. vulnerable points in the program) without
being properly sanitized. For this purpose, data flow analysis techniques that operate on the
control flow graph are used. Static analysis can be applied in cases where the source code or the
bytecode is available. The advantage is that it is not necessary to execute the program to detect
injection vulnerabilities. They analyze the application based on a model they abstract from the
application. Unfortunately, approaches based on static analysis suffer from false positives and
false negatives. This is due to imprecise approximations of the control and data flow available
at runtime. In addition, false positives might result from some runtime validation at which the
security label of the data (tainted/untainted) is not changed after the validation.
3.7.1 Static analysis
The literature related to static analysis is abundant. We provide in this section a quick review
on approaches and position our work with regards to the developed techniques. A first approach
consists in detecting common mistakes through pattern matching and string analysis in source
code, like in [VBKM00, GSD04, WS04, CMS03]. The approach has been developed to provide
offline and quick techniques to support code review. The downside of this approach is the limited
analysis: they mostly read the code, looking for patterns. For instance, some tools are looking
for strcat function in C language to report them as unsafe function. More complex techniques
arisen to provide in-depth, contextual, and flow-sensitive analysis [LWLa05, LM10, BCF+08]
There are also several commercial tools, such as Fortify [HP12] or CodeProfiler [Vir12]. They
propose a large range of techniques to easily embed code review process, especially static anal-
ysis directly in developers environment. The target of these solutions is mainly large industries.
The WebSSARI project [HYH+04] pioneered vulnerability detection in web application
with runtime protection. WebSSARI uses a combination of static and dynamic analysis to de-
tect vulnerabilities in PHP code. Jovanovic et al. designed Pixy [JKK06b, JKK06a], a static
analyzer tool that features a high-precision data flow analysis engine. This engine is flow-
sensitive, interprocedural, context-sensitive, and performs alias analysis or literal analysis. An-
other approach that aims at overcome some of the limitations of WebSSARI is the work by
Xie and Aiken [XA06]. Their approach performs an interprocedural analysis, which is able
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to model conditional branches and supports dynamic typing. The work by Wassermann and
Su [WS07] employs a string-analysis based approach to detect SQL Injection vulnerabilities. It
tracks the source of string values and ensures that user-supplied input is isolated within a SQL
query. [WS08] presents a static analysis approach to detect Cross-Site Scripting vulnerabilities.
It also employs string analysis techniques.
Several tools are based on the Eclipse’s platform and detect vulnerabilities in web applica-
tions. Livshit et al. [LL05] developed a technique to review major web application flaws through
a query language, to follow tainted object propagation in source code. We can also mention the
SSVChecker tool [DFH06] that combines several external security detection tools to aggregate
results and provide easy to review interface from the IDE. A bunch of Eclipse plugins have also
been developed to enhance code quality [Uni12] or to verify the adherence to organizational
guidelines [Goo12]. While the focus is on quality, these tools can detect some security vulnera-
bilities. Recent work from Xie et al. [XCLM11] studies programmers’ behaviors to understand
their needs, and proposes an IDE support for web application security. Their integration of se-
curity protection code is made through the refactoring of some part of the code. It consists of
input validations and other checks.
3.7.2 Detection and protection with AOP
Compared to the aforementioned techniques, we aim at a better integration into the daily de-
velopment lifecycle with our tool, and propose an integrated correction with good accuracy as
we leverage the developer’s knowledge about the development context. More specifically, we
leverage aspect-oriented techniques to clearly separate business code from security code.
Hermosillo et al. [HGSD07] use AOP to protect against web vulnerabilities (XSS and SQL
Injection). They use AspectJ - the mainstream AOP language, to intercept method calls in an
application server then perform validation on parameters. Viega et al. [VBC01] present a simple
use case for the use of AOP for software security. Masuhara et al. [MK03] introduce an aspect
primitive for dataflow, allowing to detect vulnerabilities like XSS. More recently, Masuhara et
al. introduced a design and implementation of AspectShield [SW13] in order to mitigate the
most common web applications. They leverage AOP to clearly separate concerns. They identify
vulnerabilities from an external tool (Fortify in this case), to then produce aspects with control
points at the detected places where vulnerability might be exploited. Their solution comprises
what we offer in our approach, but they are a bit less flexible than ours, due to the binding from
Fortify to AspectShield. In our case, the static analysis process is part of the whole process.
It means that we provide the process is integrated and maintained by us, which makes it easier
to correctly bind security aspects to the application. Furthermore, AspectShield covers SQL-
injection and Cross site scripting vulnerabilities, whereas we provide an extension system to
map new vulnerabilities.
Our approach reduces the overhead brought by the detection of vulnerability patterns at
runtime and allows a wider range of vulnerability detection. Our integrated approach differs
also from the state of the art, as the aforementioned approaches use either external tools or
manual processing to understand the architecture and to decide where to apply aspects/security
validation. Our approach also brings more awareness to the developer as he obtains a visual
indication of what is applied at which place in his application.
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A combination of detection and protection is found in Deeprasertkul et al. [DBO05]’s ap-
proach. It detects faults through pre-compiled patterns. Faults are corrected using a correction
module. The difference with our approach lies in the detection of faults rather than security
vulnerabilities. Faults are different than security vulnerabilities as they are not introducing se-
curity breaches. They rather introduce defects in the application. Also, the correction module
fixes the faults statically and prevents further modifications of the introduced code. A recent
work conducted by Yang et al. [YAM+11] uses static analysis to determine the security points
where to deploy protection code with aspects, for distributed tuple space systems. These two
approaches suffer from the same limitations as the ones presented in the previous paragraph,
which is a lack of visual support from the tool, and a loss of context: people responsible in
correcting the problems detected are not familiar with the architecture and technical choices. It
is worth mentioning the work from Hafiz et al. [HAJ09], in which the authors propose several
techniques to correct data injection through program transformations. They have listed several
cases along with transformations to realize security policies. Their work can benefit from our
overall methodology to propose multiple corrections once vulnerability has been identified.
3.8 Summary
We presented how to overcome several security vulnerabilities using a combination between a
static analyzer that assists developers to report security vulnerabilities and a semi-automated
correction of these findings with AOP. The usage of an integrated tool to provide support for
security bugs detection and mitigation has several advantages. It benefits several stakeholders
at the same time. First, security teams are able to distribute the maintenance of the code to the
people writing their code and let them mitigate security bugs whenever they are detected. They
can interact closely to decide of the best solutions for a given situation, and apply security across
development teams. Developers benefit from this approach, having an operational tool already
configured for their development. They can focus on writing their functional code and, from
time to time, verify the accuracy of their implementation. Security concerns are often cross
cutting the application, which tends to have security checks spread around application. Using
one central tool to have an overview is more efficient and productive, and gives the possibility
to track all applied protection code. The automation allows a broader and consistent application
of security across applications. The use of AOP eases the deployment and change of security
protection code, in a single environment and during the development phase. The overall vision
we would like to achieve in the future is the specification and maintenance of security concerns
in one central place, and usage by developers of these concerns by defining some places in
application where they should be active.
We have designed an Eclipse plugin for an improved awareness of security concerns from
a developer point of view. It is important to notice that correcting vulnerabilities doesn’t make
the whole system secure. It only means the code tends to be free of security bugs. Other parts
of the application, such as authentication flow, authorization checks, etc. are not covered by our
analysis. Besides, we encourage developers to look further in vulnerabilities’ descriptions, as
the automated correction proposed might not be the best choice in all situations. We do not want
developers to believe our solution is bullet-proof. It leads to a false sensation of security, which
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is the opposite of our goal.
This contribution brings a programming approach to the modularization of security. We
start from the source code of an application and try to inject security code at correct places.
Such integrated tool has several benefits mentionned above, but it suffers from limitations due
to implementation decisions. For instance, when we are developing a tool such as an Eclipse
plug-in, we are targeting a platform and a language, thus voluntarily restricting the scope of
application. From the tool itself, we have designed a working prototype that we have validated
on projects internally at SAP and compared to commercial software. In several cases, the agile
approach that consists in daily code scan and vulnerability remediation leads to a reduction of
false positives and an absence of false negatives. Also, the approach of providing support for
correcting the vulnerability is novel and we focus now on improving accuracy of the protection
code as well as the accuracy of interaction between the several security snippets we introduce
with aspects.
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Chapter 4
Automation of input validation
verification in application
We address the problem of modular input validation for web services as a countermeasure to
several kinds of code injection attacks. The solution relies on annotations that provide meta-data
concerning the application’s input parameters. This information is then used to automatically
insert validation code in the target application, using an aspect-oriented approach. The solution
allows to mitigate risks and to maintain security functionality separated from the application
logic. The difference with the previous chapter mainly relies on the method to gather points
where to inject security. Whereas in previous solution we were using a static analyzer, we now
leverage annotations in the application source code to indicate specific meta-data.
4.1 Introduction
Many web applications and web services are prone to input validation vulnerabilities. Well
known instances of this class of vulnerabilities include Cross-Site Scripting, SQL Injection,
and Command Injection. Although Input Validation vulnerabilities are well-known and have
been well studied in the past decade, Input Validation Vulnerabilities such as SQL Injection
and Cross-Site scripting dominate the charts for many years now. One well-known security
awareness program is the Top Ten Project hosted by the Open Web Application Security Project
(OWASP)1. It aims to identify some of the most critical risks facing organizations by publishing
lists of these risks. In the past decade, several versions of this list have been released. SQL
Injection and Cross-Site scripting vulnerabilities have always been among the top positions on
this list.
Input validation vulnerabilities all have the same root cause: an improper sanitization of
user-supplied input that results from invalid assumptions made by the developer about the input
of the application. Injection attacks, that exploit input validation vulnerabilities, are attacks
in which an attacker creates inputs containing special characters and/or markers that alter the
behavior of the targeted application in some undesired way. Such attacks can have devastating
1https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_Top_Ten_Project
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consequences, ranging from information leakage to privilege escalation in which the attacker
can gain full control of the system under attack.
Injection attacks, also called code injection attacks, can take several forms:
• SQL injection is the insertion of a SQL query via the input data from the client to the
application. Via this attack, one can obtain sensitive data from the database, to modify it,
or to execute administrative operations on it.
• Command Shell injection allows to insert and to execute commands specified by an at-
tacker from the input to a vulnerable application, making it possible to execute unwanted
system commands.
• Cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks: In this type of attack, malicious scripts are injected
into the otherwise benign and trusted web sites. Cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks occur
when an attacker uses a web application to send malicious code, generally in the form
of a browser side script, to a different end user. Cross-Site scripting vulnerabilities are
quite widespread and occur whenever a web application uses input from a user, that is not
validated or encoded, and that is propagated in the output of the application.
• Other kinds of injection are possible, but the mitigation strategy is similar and covered in
this work. We can mention for instance XML and XPath injection, which occur when a
web site uses user-supplied information to construct an XPath query for XML data. By
sending intentionally malformed information into the web site, an attacker can find out
how the XML data is structured, or access data that he may not normally have access to.
He may even be able to elevate his privileges on the web site if the XML data is being
used for authentication (such as an XML based user file).
Preventing input validation vulnerabilities is a complex task. Scholte et al. have shown
in [SBK11] that despite security awareness programs and tools for detecting input validation
vulnerabilities, this class of vulnerabilities is still very prevalent across web applications and the
number of reported vulnerabilities is not decreasing. Moreover, the complexity of the attacks
exploiting this class of vulnerabilities has not been increasing.
In order to prevent input validation vulnerabilities, every input read by the program must un-
dergo a validation and sanitization process. We focus on input validation which is, essentially,
the process of assigning a semantic meaning to unstructured and untrusted inputs of an applica-
tion, and ensuring that those inputs respect a set of constraints describing a well-formed input.
Depending on the data type, additional validation checks might be necessary. For example, a
string might contain only allowed characters. As another example the length of a string should
stay within certain boundaries. As a third example, the validation process for numerical input
might check if the value stays within the expected range and if the value is signed or not.
One of the reasons behind the prevalence of input validation vulnerabilities is that the ap-
plication of any techniques to prevent them relies entirely on the developers. Although several
frameworks do provide libraries containing validation and sanitization functions, these still need
to be explicitly called from the application logic in order to validate or sanitize the input pro-
vided by users. This has two distinct and important disadvantages: first, developers simply
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forget (or ignore) to use the already available input validation functionalities. Second, it is hard
to maintain, update and evolve the application logic independently - since validation function
calls would be scattered all along the application code. Moreover, the validation functionalities
built in web application frameworks do not have the necessary degree of granularity to handle
the validation of a large number of different datatypes that an application typically handles.
Since preventing input validation vulnerabilities relies entirely on developers, prevention
techniques that are part of the design and implementation phases of the software development
lifecycle will help in making web applications and web services more secure. We develop in
this work a method that prevents input validation vulnerabilities through strictly separating in-
put validation code from application code. In this way, the assignment of data types to input
can be enforced while maintaining consistency between the input validation and the application
logic. More specifically, it consists in the non-invasive use of Aspect-Oriented Programming
for the automatic generation of input validation code, without altering the business logic of the
concerned application.
The term Aspect-Oriented-Programming [KLM+97] (AOP) has been coined around 1995
by a group led by Gregor Kiczales, with the goal to bring proper separation of concerns for
cross cutting functionalities. As we have explained in previous chapters, the aspect paradigm is
uses advice and pointcut. Pointcuts allow to define where (at which points in the source code of
an application) or when (based on which events during the execution of an application) aspects
should apply modifications. Pointcuts are expressed in pointcut languages and often contain a
large number of aspect-specific constructs that match specific structures of the language in which
base applications are expressed, such as a pattern language based on language syntax. Advices
are used to define the modifications an aspect may perform on the base application. Advices
are often expressed in terms of some general-purpose language with a small number of aspect-
specific extensions, such as the proceed construct that allows the execution of the behavior of
the base application that triggered the aspect application in the first place.
The solution that we have designed has a very high intrinsic business value, especially within
SAP landscape. Many customers around the world expose back-end software functionalities
through web services. Providing this kind of automation would improve the overall security of
software and also the protection of customer data. It is even more important as applications as
a service (such as SAP Business By Design) are spreading, with the release of numerous web
applications highly exposed to security risks.
The next sections are organized as follows:
• Section 4.2 details the components and method of our solution.
• Section 4.3 presents a concrete example.
• Section 4.4 presents some evaluation using black-box tools to uncover vulnerabilities.
• Section 4.5 discusses related work that we can compare to our technique in this domain.
• Section 4.6 summarizes the advantages of our solution.
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4.2 Aspect-based modularization with enhanced data-types
4.2.1 Architecture and methodology
Our solution comprises a methodology and a tool for mitigating input validation vulnerabilities.
The methodology requires that the application developers annotate source code of the applica-
tion components to be protected. Annotations are a simple way to extend a given programming
language in a non-invasive way. In our case, the annotations indicate what the input parameters
are and their corresponding enhanced data-types individually. After the programs are annotated,
the tool will generate new executable or object code, using aspect-oriented programming tech-
niques [KLM+97]. The obtained code will intercept the execution flow whenever an input is
received in order to check whether the input is in conformity to some pre-defined format. In the
case an incorrect input is read by the application, then a programming exception is raised.
The methodology we propose assumes that all input parameters in the code must be anno-
tated by the developer, otherwise the application will not be executed. However, this feature
can be turned off, allowing the developers to partially annotate the code, or to disregard com-
pletely the annotation phase. In other words, annotating all input parameters in the source code
is mandatory by default.
Correctly annotating the input parameters is critical as it ensures the future verification of all
incoming data. An incorrect validation mechanism can compromise the risk mitigation process.
In order to correctly bind the parameters and variables of interest, we adopt a semi-automatic
approach combining user-based knowledge as well as an automatic detection of data types. We
have not implemented this part, which as then been covered in [SRBK12]. The automatic de-
tection of data type can come from several sources, for instance by using information gathered
from model repositories, database schemas, and so on.
4.2.2 Definition of enhanced data types at the design phase
At the design phase the developer has to define the enhanced data types, also called Global Data
Types, that are used across the application. Enhanced data types have business semantics and
convey more precision on the expected user inputs. Therefore, these data types differ from the
basic primitive and built-in types of the programming language. Examples of enhanced data
types are types with business semantic that are specific. A mail address is more specific than a
string, as one can define constraints. It is also the case for phone number, addresses etc. These
enhanced types are added as an intermediate layer between the language types and our model,
in order to obtain a fine-grained and stronger typing related to variables and parameters used in
the application.
For instance, in a declaration such as String email; the developer would add the an-
notation @Email String email; indicating that only strings obeying a certain pattern for
email addresses shall be accepted. The actual validation of an input can take several form, such
as pattern validation, but also check of mail existence, etc. Here, we consider that the set of
enhanced data types is extensible as well as the corresponding validation functionalities for each
extended data types.
The tool is built from three main components as illustrated in Figure 4.1. The pointcut
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interface adaptor keeps a mapping between enhanced types and validation functions. This com-
ponent can also extract data-type information from external knowledge bases to add meta-data
information necessary to the input validation. Examples of external information sources are
service repositories, such as the SAP Enterprise Services Repository, database schemas, WSDL
files, etc. These sources can provide information about the type structure used in the application
parameters, such that we can infer enhanced data types associated to them. In these knowledge
bases one can find further information, such as the required length for data fields, or enumerated
values, which can be useful to gain accuracy in the input data validation.
Figure 4.1: Solution components
4.2.3 An aspect-based tool for validation
The solution comprises different phases using several components to correctly implement an
automatic validation during the execution of the application. The Figure 4.2 presents the differ-
ent components that we use in our approach, along with the optimal separation of roles in the
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processing of concerns. The numbers also present the order of development required to achieve
the solution. In an optimal situation, there are two teams communicating to elaborate together
the exchange interface of the application. They define in the application a business model layer
that defines all business objects, and then they agree upon enhanced data types. The develop-
ers are responsible for developing the application, and can use enhanced data types when they
introduce new entry points in the application. The developers can also use enhanced data-types
in the business model, while building the application. Security experts are responsible of pro-
viding a validation library for the enhanced data types that they can adapt to the business model
specificities.
Security experts propose a set of enhanced data types, that can be extended over time. The
list of enhanced data types can also be extended by any developer, although a security expert
would have the most appropriate role to provide clear and accurate information to mitigate risks.
Beside the optimal situation, we have designed this approach to fit in an already defined
application. The business model can hardly evolve, which benefits to a non-intrusive approach
using the enhanced data types. Our non-intrusiveness is made possible by the annotation han-
dling in existing classes, that do not modify the control flow of the application, and do not
necessitate code refactoring.
The Aspect Engine is responsible for the detection of validation points during the execution
of the application. The Aspect Engine is capable of modifying the application control flow. It
takes into account the type annotations and inserts data validation code whenever there is an
assignment for an input parameter, called validation point, that is, whenever data is read from
untrusted sources or received from clients. A validation point refers to the validation of a spe-
cific parameter or variable from the base application. Upon detection of a validation point, the
Aspect Engine extracts the parameter’s enhance data-type that is indicated in an annotation and
looks for a corresponding validation library for the specified type. If the aspect finds a corre-
sponding library, it applies the validation mechanisms defined in the validation module. The
last component in the architecture consists of an extensible aspect library where the validation
functions for each enhanced data type are given. This library maps each enhanced data type
(Global Data Types), for example types present in SAP’s Enterprise Service Repository (ESR),
to validation functions that are represented as advices in the library. The implementations of
validation functions have a standardized interface in order to ensure compatibility and ease the
introduction of new validation functions. We provide concrete examples in the coming sections.
The regular process to create a new enhanced data type is the following. When someone
identifies a specific data type, he creates an identifier name for it. This name is released among
the application developers and stakeholders. The Listing 6 is an example used in our application
to share data types as a Java enum.
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Figure 4.2: Components and ideal roles
Listing 6 Available enhanced data types presented in a Java enum. These types can be used by
developers in dedicated annotations
public enum DataType {
FLIGHT_NUMBER,
DATE,
EMAIL,
NAME,
ID,
TITLE,
SSN,
PHONE,
ADDRESS,
SALARY,
}
The enhanced data types can be used to taint variables and parameters along the base ap-
plication. The Listing 7 shows the different use of our method: the annotations can apply to a
method parameter, a constructor argument, or a class variable. It provides a large range of possi-
bility from application to business model tainting. The listing present a Customer object that has
several fields: a name, a firstname, and an email. The value of the fields change in several places,
and we would like to cover the different possibilities with our approach. We use code annotation
at three different places to showcase three different situations in which our approach can indi-
cate a need for input validation. The first possibility is at line 6, which is field annotation. Such
annotation will allow us to attach a tag to the field and later detect any change to the field value.
For instance, any affectation to this field will be seen by an aspect engine. Such positioning is
desirable when a developer want to monitor all changes to a field object. In other situations, he
still has two other possibilities. At line 9, a second possibility is to annotate a method parameter.
In our case, it happens that the method is also the email setter, but the behavior is thoroughly
different. Any method in an application can be annotated this way. For instance, the behavior is
desirabled when one wants to tag parameters coming from a servlet, from property files, etc. A
third possibility, shown at line 13 is to tag a constructor’s parameter. Even if there are less cases,
one might still want to tag inputs to apply a validation during instantiation of an object.
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Listing 7 Business model can be annotated in several places
1 public class Customer {
2
3 private String name;
4 private String firstname;
5
6 @Type(DataType.EMAIL)
7 private String email;
8
9 public void setEmail(@Type(DataType.EMAIL) String email) {
10 this.email = email;
11 }
12
13 public Customer(String name, String firstname,
14 @Type(DataType.EMAIL) String email) {
15 this.name = name;
16 this.firstname = firstname;
17 this.email = email;
18 }
19
20 /* ... */
21
22 }
In parallel of tagging through annotations to augment the type system information of the
application, security experts can rely upon the enhanced data types (acting as the exchange in-
terface layer) to develop corresponding validation aspects and put them in the validation library.
The validation behaviour is represented by several code advices. It is possible to define multiple
validation aspects to a single identifier in the validation library. Having several validation mech-
anisms for a similar enhanced data type in the validation library will enforce as many validation
as mechanisms present in the library.
In most cases, the behaviour to validate a type can be given in terms of regular expressions.
For instance, a telephone number might check length and digits with a pattern. The handling
of regular expressions is frequently provided as a built-in functionality in many programming
languages. The downside of such expressions, is that they depends on application context: sev-
eral format of telephone number exists depending on customer’s area for example. When it
comes to complex types (as opposed to a phone number which represent one element), a com-
plete validation can be introduced by the validation library as the business model is available
from security experts (who write validation code). The validation can therefore validate com-
plex business types, and validate them through different means: functional validation, additional
technical checks, etc. For instance, one can verify existence of an e-mail address by contact-
ing a mail transfer agent, or wire transfer validation might involve third parties services. More
sophisticated attack vectors would require advanced pattern matching, therefore the valid input
would need to be specified through XML-Schema validation, for example. This would allow
for a more expressive class of languages to be accepted as input, that is, context-free languages.
Once the advice code for a specific enhanced data type is created, one needs to encapsulate the
validation code into an aspect and deploy the validation library.
In Figure 4.3, we represent the activity diagram of the solution we have implemented. We
consider that aspects are inserted at deploy time into the target application. We assume at this
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Figure 4.3: Internal activity diagram
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point that several aspects exist in the validation library. The second assumption is that the ap-
plication about to run has accurate tagging through annotation with enhanced data types. In
this implementation the Aspect Engine is a specialized class loader which bootstraps all target
applications. The first action of the Aspect Engine is to search for available aspects in the aspect
library. As the application code is loaded, the Aspect Engine discovers the points in the code that
will need a validation and also the applicable validation aspects at those points. If no annotation
for an input parameter is found, the application execution is aborted. This behavior can of course
be adapted, depending on the desired strategy. The Aspect Engine will also abort the execution
if there is no validation aspect corresponding to a used enhanced data-type.
Next, the Aspect Engine will proceed with the execution of the application code and ob-
serve the application execution until it reaches a validation point. At this point, it detects an
enhanced data type annotation used by the base application and searches among the loaded val-
idation library one or more corresponding validation aspects. The Aspect Engine then applies
the validation function for the parameter found. It finally loops to monitor application execution
to cycle until the end of the application. These steps correctly enforce input validation in the
application, albeit the application itself has been slightly modified to enhance type system of in-
put parameters through annotation tags. The mechanisms to enforce the validation of the types
is managed independently and use aspects mechanisms to apply a systematic protection in the
aspectized application.
4.3 Use case
In order to illustrate the technical solution we have developed, we apply the concept to a subset
of the loan scenario we have developed in [DGM+10]: the application contains components to
manage customers. A manager has the responsibility to create, read, update, delete managers. It
can perform these actions through web-services and web-applications. The server application is
object-oriented, allowing to easily encapsulate behaviors related to the customer’s manipulation.
In order to provide a consistent and systematic validation of customer’s fields, we decide to test
our solution in this environment.
Listing 8 presents a servlet in java. We enhance the data type of the servlet at several points
to properly execute a validation mechanism at runtime. At these points, the concrete validation
mechanism are not yet defined nor linked to the application, but we provide additional informa-
tion to later let the program verify automatically the input. Thus, the actual binding is deferred
for a maximal flexibility and to provide concrete mechanisms related to the actual environment
the application runs in. The actual locations to enhance data-type are manifold. The example
shows various points in comments. The possibilities are:
• Field attribute. It allows to indicate an enhanced data type to a class attribute. This
method is to choose when applicable as all classes and services manipulating an object will
transparently execute the type verification. The application is notified when a modification
to this field is run, i.e., when a new assignment occurs.
• Constructor attribute indicates an enhanced data type on a constructor parameter, thus a
verification should takes place at the object construction the correctness of the element.
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• Method attribute indicates an enhanced data type on a method parameter. It is a general-
ization of the constructor parameter, but that can be applied to any situation.
Listing 8 StatusServlet.java with enhanced type
1 public class StatusServlet extends HttpServlet {
2
3 public static void test(@Type(DataType.ID) String value) {
4 /** */
5 }
6
7 public static void test2(@Type(DataType.STRING2) String value) {
8 /** */
9 }
10
11 /**
12 * @see HttpServlet#doGet(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse
13 * response)
14 */
15 protected void doGet(
16 @Type(DataType.STATUS_ARGS) HttpServletRequest request,
17 HttpServletResponse response) throws ServletException, IOException {
18 test(request.getParameter("arg1"));
19 test2(request.getParameter("arg2"));
20 }
21
22 }
The tagging is yet defined manually, but there are some mean to automatically infer the
correct enhanced type from several data-model information: database schemas linked with the
application, data type description in documentation, constraints expressed in external framework
to assist the modification of the business objects, etc.. These components have already provide a
data description with specific constraints. One can use these definitions to verify at the applica-
tive level that data is properly formatted. The existence of enhanced data types are validated
during the compilation process, although they are considered as a virtual and intermediate layer.
The Listing 9 shows the definition of Java annotations . In the left part, we present the defini-
tion of the @V alidation annotation, which takes an object of type DataType. This annotation
indicates what DataType the currently annotated class validates. The right part presents the
@Type annotation which is the annotation used for tagging inputs in application.
Listing 9 Annotation definition
/***
* This annotation indicates what type is
* covered by the validation functions
*/
@Retention(RetentionPolicy.RUNTIME)
@Target({ElementType.TYPE})
public @interface Validation {
DataType value();
}
/***
* Type annotation is to indicate in the code
* of which type is a given parameter
*/
@Retention(RetentionPolicy.RUNTIME)
@Target({ElementType.PARAMETER, ElementType.FIELD})
public @interface Type {
DataType value () default DataType.STRING;
}
We present in the following an example of a validation class to verify correctness of the field
in Listing 10. The validation class is indicated to mitigate vulnerabilities for a given enhanced
data type thanks to the @V alidation annotation at line 6. In this case, it validates an email
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field, introduced in previous section in Listing 7. The validation class is one of the possible
implementation. It heavily relies on the application context, and can change. For instance, we
can envision an automatic verification of the email field through the sending of a mail to confirm
the mail reality and user’s legitimate request. Such a request brings additional cost in term of
performance or delay, but can be worth spending depending on the legal compliance, or business
policies. The validation code which is executed if one of the doProcessmethods, depending on
the Java type of the input being validated. One can validate an email from a string, like at line 27,
or from a complex object, like at line 34. For instance if an application is using a Customer input
and that an enhanced data-type is defined to valide this input, the shown validation class for email
will verify the customer’s mail.
Listing 10 Validation class example for the Email enhanced data-type
1 package validation;
2 import java.util.regex.*;
3 import annotation.Validation;
4 import data.Customer;
5
6 @Validation(DataType.EMAIL)
7 /**
8 * For example <a>http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Email_address#Syntax</a>
9 */
10 public class ValidationEmail implements ValidationInterface {
11
12 /**
13 * Excellent recap from http://www.regular-expressions.info/email.html,
14 * then adapted
15 */
16 final String emailpattern = "[\\w!#$%&’*+/=?^_‘{|}~-]+(?:\\.[\\w!#$%&’*+/=?^_‘{|}"
17 "~-]+)*@(?:[a-zA-Z0-9](?:[A-Za-z0-9-]*[A-Za-z0-9])?\\.)+[a-zA-Z]{2,}+\\.?";
18 final Pattern p = Pattern.compile(emailpattern);
19
20 /**
21 * Validate an email string.
22 * The policy is :
23 * <ul><li>the email has no value -> no validation is performed</li>
24 * <li>the email has a value -> a validation check is performed and raise an
25 * exception if not correctly formatted</li></ul>
26 */
27 public boolean doProcess(String email) throws Exception {
28 if (0 == email.trim().length())
29 return true;
30 Matcher m = p.matcher(email.trim());
31 return m.matches();
32 }
33
34 public boolean doProcess(Object o) throws Exception {
35 if (o instanceof Customer)
36 return doProcess(((Customer) o).getEmail());
37 return doProcess(o.toString());
38 }
39 }
Listing 11 presents an excerpt of what is present in the validation aspect. The validation
aspect is the enforcement part which unify the different components: application and validation
library. It is executed upon detection of enhanced data-type tagging during execution of the
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application, which trigger a code a retrieve the input value and validate it against the indicated
enhanced data type. The three pointcuts presented here are those for setter detection, constructor
argument detection, and method parameter detection.
Listing 11 Excerpt of the validation aspect to present the annotation detection with aspectJ.
1 @Pointcut("execution(* *(.., @annotation.Type (*), ..))")
2 public void pointcutMethodDataTypeAnnotedParams() {
3 }
4
5 @Pointcut("execution(*.new(.., @annotation.Type (*), ..))")
6 public void pointcutConstructorDataTypeAnnotedParams() {
7 }
8
9 @Pointcut("set(@annotation.Type * *) && args(val)")
10 public void pointcutFieldDataTypeAnnotedParams(Object val) {
11 }
4.4 Validation
In order to evaluate our solution, we have chosen to apply it to existing vulnerable applica-
tions and to verify the actual benefits of our technique. We protect against a whole range of
vulnerability that are derived from a common weakness: improper input validation [MIT09].
We can measure how exposed the sensitive assets are, as we are able to count the number of
vulnerabilities that can be exploited, first in absence of our solution, second in presence of our
solution.
The solution that we propose makes a static analysis difficult and potentially incomplete.
There are different limitations brought by both the approach and the implementation. The ap-
proach itself uses techniques to defer the introduction of the protection code to the last moment.
While it brings more flexibility to have a late change or a hot-swap change of protection libraries,
this prevents a static analysis based on source code or prior the final deployment to correctly an-
alyze the application. In the first case, the source code available from the the static analysis
component represents the application with enhanced data type annotations. There is no trace of
the validation mechanisms, which are developed separately. In the second case, i.e., the deploy-
ment of validation mechanisms, the static analysis can access both the application binary with
enhanced data-types and the validation mechanisms that will be executed at several determined
points in the application. Even in such case, with a flexible static anlayzer, there is a dose of
uncertainty, due to the rate of false positives and negatives that can limit the usefulness of the
methodology. Therefore, we use a different technique to evaluate our approach.
The evaluation of our approach is measured by the ability to mitigate security risks while
allowing the correct execution of the web applications. To validate the correct mitigation of
security vulnerabilities, we apply a rigorous testing to deliberately insecure web applications,
and compare the results prior to and after the correction. We verify that our correction does
not break the normal flow of the application manually, and by intensively testing the validation
library.
We have chosen a black-box approach for testing, as it allows to analyze the potential appli-
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cation attack surface available externally. Furthermore, the aspect-oriented approach has several
strategies for injecting validation, such as the static weaving or the load-time weaving of cross
cutting concerns (validation code) into the application. A white-box analysis would introduce
several layers of complexity, whereas we are only interested in an overall protection rate. There
are several tools trying to abuse software inputs to exploit certain parts of a system. Even though
the solution better suits web-based applications, with the traditional set of SQL injections, cross-
site scripting, cross-site request forgery, etc., it can also be used in regular applications. Tools
are either fuzzing tools or web application scanners with a more or less smart behavior to handle
stateful requests and to deepen the test coverage.
We have decided to use two specific tools specialized in web application security and audit.
They are classically introduced in penetration testing phase to support automated analysis and
collect of security vulnerabilities.
4.4.1 Penetration testing tools
Arachni
Arachni [Las13] is a web application security scanner framework. It comes as an open-source
Ruby framework to assist testers and administrators evaluating the security of web applications.
It provides all features going from web application crawling using a spider module to deep
packet analysis using blind SQLmodule for example. The application is able to activate modules
for common web application vulnerabilities: code injection (through several channels), cross-
site scripting, cross-site request forgery, path traversal, remote and local file inclusion, SQL
injection, etc..
W3AF
W3AF [Ria11] is a web application attack and audit framework. It helps in finding and exploring
web application vulnerabilities written in Python. It comes with several modules to crawl the
application and analyze common vulnerabilities. The set of vulnerability is similar to the ones
covered by Arachni, with additional modules.
4.4.2 Analysis
We have applied our methodology to concrete insecure web application, using the wavsep
project [Che12] to support our tests. The project we have chosen is designed to evaluate web
application security scanner and deliberately contains vulnerabilities: path traversal, remote file
inclusion, reflected XSS, blind and direct SQL injection, plus additional other tests. The down-
side of this project is from an analysis point of view. It defines separate projects with JSP pages
as a different test case for a given vulnerability. It means there is no specific data model with
business value. Hence, the annotations in our case would require several adaptations. An exam-
ple of such JSP is defined in Listing 12. The code is used to display a form to let user enters
information. Then, the code rends the user input within the HTML of the page. The problem oc-
curs from line 25 to line 28: a reflective cross script scripting occurs if one enters html specific
characters. For instance, a userinput <script>alert(document.cookie);</script> would render
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on client’s browser and execute. Such a problem has serious consequences on real-world web
applications, as one attacker can force a web browser to point to the vulnerable JSP to execute
code under attacker’s control. It leads to stealing of session of the attacked browser, denial of
service targeting other web sites, etc.
Listing 12 Vulnerable JSP from the wavsep project.
1 <%@ page language="java" contentType="text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1"
2 pageEncoding="ISO-8859-1"%>
3 <!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN"
4 "http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/loose.dtd">
5 <html>
6 <head>
7 <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1">
8 <title>Case 4 - RXSS via tag injection into the scope of an HTML comment</title>
9 </head>
10 <body>
11
12 <%
13 if (request.getParameter("userinput") == null) {
14 %>
15 Enter your input:<br><br>
16 <form name="frmInput" id="frmInput" action="Case04-Tag2HtmlComment.jsp"
17 method="POST">
18 <input type="text" name="userinput" id="userinput"><br>
19 <input type=submit value="submit">
20 </form>
21 <%
22 }
23 else {
24 try {
25 String userinput = request.getParameter("userinput");
26 out.println("The reflected value is within an html comment: "
27 + "<!--" + userinput + "-->");
28 out.flush();
29 } catch (Exception e) {
30 out.println("Exception details: " + e);
31 }
32 } //end of if/else block
33 %>
34
35 </body>
36 </html>
The evaluation of our methodology with this project is a good example of how we can ad-
dress input validation in different applications. JSP are transformed to obtain compiled servlets.
The methodology has first been defined for web applications with business model to factorize
input validation behavior. The wavsep project allow us to showcase that even with reflected
servlets, we can still benefit from our approach to write validation mechanisms once and apply
them at several places in the application. For instance, the project contains 61599 lines of code
in JSPs, and 563 lines of code in Java. There are also more than a thousand JSP files (we count
1787 for all JSP files, but the project has developped 1134 JSP files containing vulnerabilities).
A manual approach to validate the input of all these JSPs would take ages.
The first action is to add enhanced data-types if necessary to cover cases that are not already
defined in our validation library. The enhanced data-types are efficient when applications use
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a consistent data model. As the wavsep provides no data model, but reflected use of input
parameters through the request.getParameter() function of the HTTPServletRequest object, we
have adapted the enhanced data-types and the pointcut interface adaptor module.
The web application uses the following custom types, among others: username, password,
target, msgid, transactionDate, minBalance, description, etc.. We enhanced the validation library
with these types. Listing 13 presents a class validation following our methodology for the Name
enhanced data-type. The validation consists of a pattern to accept from two to fifteen word
characters.
Listing 13 Simple validation for a Name data type (used for username for example).
1 @Validation(value = DataType.NAME)
2 public class ValidationName implements ValidationInterface {
3
4 final Pattern p = Pattern.compile("\\w{2,15}");
5 @Override
6 public boolean doProcess(String str) throws Exception {
7 Matcher m = p.matcher(str);
8 return m.matches();
9 }
10 }
As this project contains too many different JSP files, we have decided to use another mean to
indicates the sensitive inputs that we need to protect with the validation library. Therefore, rather
than a manual annotation with @Type to indicate the enhanced data-type, we created an aspect.
The aspect defines a pointcut that wraps around the request.getParameter() calls, as shown in
Listing 14 from line 1 to 3. The advice that is executed determines the actual enhanced data-type
from the parameter name, from line 7 to 9. Then, it uses the validation library to validate the
value, or to detect any conflict between the claimed enhanced data-type and the real value.
Listing 14 Custom adaptation of our methodology to wrap getParameter() inputs for validation.
1 @Pointcut("call(* *..HttpServletRequest.getParameter(..))")
2 public void pointcutGetParameter() {
3 }
4
5 @Around("pointcutGetParameter()")
6 public String wavsepCustom(final ProceedingJoinPoint jp) throws Throwable {
7 String paramName = (String) jp.getArgs()[0];
8 String value = (String) jp.proceed(new Object[] { paramName });
9 DataType type = DataType.valueOf(paramName);
10 validate(type, value);
11 return value;
12 }
We provide in Table 4.1 the details of our executions. We launched the test application on
a Tomcat servlet container, with and without the validation library, and performed tests through
both Arachni and W3af. We retain only the vulnerabilities flagged as critical/high, and don’t
report the medium or informational issues. The miscellaneous category includes either unclas-
sified vulnerabilities reported as is by w3af, or phishing vector and code injection detected by
Arachni.
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Original Protected
SQL Injection
arac. 214 3
w3af 107 0
Cross Site Scripting
arac. 185 0
w3af 119 0
Directory Path Traversal
arac. 662 0
w3af 231 0
Remote File Inclusion
arac. 120 0
w3af 0 0
Miscellaneous
arac. 44 0
w3af 552 278
Table 4.1: Number of vulnerabilities detected by the arachni (arach.) and w3af web application
security scanners with a black-box approach on original and protected wavsep application.
To enable our validation library in web applications, we have configured AspectJ to provide a
load-time weaving of aspects at the startup of the web application. The results show a reduction
of the detected vulnerabilities. Albeit it doesn’t mean the application is free of bugs, we can
confidently claim that we achieved a pretty high coverage of this specific application. It has
been possible as we spent some time analyzing inputs and systematically providing a validation
library for all type of inputs. Especially, we have adopted an automated approach that shows
how we can adapt our methodology to benefit from aspects.
4.5 Related work
To the best of our knowledge, the solution we develop is the first one that addresses the prob-
lem of enforcing input validation through a strict separation between data type definitions and
application logic with the given environment we have. However, in the past decade, much
research effort has been spent on making web applications and web services more secure. Re-
searchers have focused on detection mechanisms including static analysis, dynamic taint anal-
ysis and client-side security mechanisms. In addition to detection techniques, researchers have
also worked on techniques to prevent security vulnerabilties. We give an overview of the differ-
ent techniques below. The static analysis has been widely discussed in previous chapter. Refer
to Section 3.7 at Page 70 to get related works for static analysis.
4.5.1 Dynamic Taint Analysis
In contrast to static analysis, dynamic taint analysis checks the program at runtime. In gen-
eral, approaches based on dynamic tainting assign meta-data to user-supplied inputs. All user-
supplied data is set to be tainted. When operations are performed on the input data, this meta-
data is preserved. After the sanitization of user-supplied data, the data is set to be ‘untainted’.
This allows the detection if untrusted data reseaches a sensitive sink.
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Nguyen-Tuong [NTGG+05] and Pietraszek [PVB05] worked both independently from each
other on dynamic taint propagation. They proposed an extension to the PHP interpreter that
tracks tainted input data. The extension proposed by Pietraszek can either prevent the execution
of code or sanitize the input. The approach proposed by Halfond et al. [HOM06] introduces
positive tainting, in this case, only trusted data are tracked.
Dynamic tainting has also its problems. First of all, the technique has a relative large over-
head in terms of performance. Moreover, the input data has to be untainted after a sanitization
function. As [BCF+08] shows, implementing sanitization functionality is far from trivial. Fur-
thermore, preventing second order attacks is difficult as it requires the tracking of data through
persistent data stores.
4.5.2 Client-Side Security Mechanisms
Unfortunately, not all developers of web applications protect effectively and in-time their appli-
cations against input manipulation attacks. It exists some client-side solutions to protect users
of these web applications. Several approaches exist that aim to provide client-side protection,
which are components in the middle (in between the client application and the server applica-
tion).
In [IEKY04], the authors propose a client-side proxy that detects the use of special characters
such as ‘<’ in HTTP traffic. When the proxy detects that the application response reflects these
presumably malicious requests, the traffic is blocked. Also Noxes [KKVJ06] is based on the
concept of a client-side proxy firewall. However, this work aims to improve the user experience
of personal firewalls by introducing some heuristics. In [VNJ+07], the authors propose the use
of browser plugin that uses static and dynamic tainting techniques to check whether sensitive
data are sent to a different domain than where the Javascript code is downloaded from.
BEEP [JSH07] tries to achieve client-side security by design. It is a policy-based mechanism
that forces the browser to execute only those scripts that are explicitly allowed to run as specified
by the policy.
4.5.3 Prevention Techniques
Besides the solutions to detect code injection vulnerabilities, there exist several approaches that
prevent code injection vulnerabilities based on the sanitization of data. Data sanitization is
the process of transforming data such that the resulting data only contains safe characters. In
contrast to the traditional practice of sanitization checks that a developer has to implement in an
ad-hoc way, these frameworks and/or language extensions ensure that documents and/or queries
are automatically protected. Thus, injection vulnerabilities are prevented by construction or by
design.
William Robertson et al. propose in [RV09] a framework that statically enforces a separation
between the structure (code) and content (data) of a software. In the framework, an (X)HTML
document is represented by nodes that are connected to each other. The document is a tree of
nodes and each node is an instantiation of the Node type. As a result, the document is strongly
typed. Once the document is constructed, a rendering function converts the document into a
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string that can be sent to the client. The rendering function automatically sanitizes unsafe char-
acters. The framework also allows developers to specify dynamic SQL queries using an embed-
ded domain-specific language. The only way to execute SQL queries and construct documents
is through the interfaces provided by the framework. In this way, sanitization is enforced.
In [JBGP10], Johns et al. propose a datatype to enforce the separation between data and
code. With this approach, the developer is forced to use the ELET datatype to construct for-
eign code. Once the developer has specified the foreign code using the ELET datatype, a pre-
processor translates the foreign code to an API representation in the hosting language. Data
provided by the hosting language can be inserted in the foreign code by using a special function.
The main limitation of this approach is that the dynamic construction of foreign code within the
foreign code (e.g. JavaScript’s eval function) is not supported. Moreover, the dynamic creation
of identifier tokens in the foreign language is not supported. In [JB07], Johns et al. proposes
a mechanism to secure web applications implemented using an interpreted language. A pre-
processor marks foreign code found in the source code as legitimate. After the work performed
by the interpreter, a post-processor identifies all the foreign code that has been injected by the
user/attacker and masks it such that it will not be executed. The main problem with this approach
is that the pre- and post-processors introduce false positives and false negatives.
These approaches are related to concrete implementations. We consider in this work that the
problem comes from a insufficient typing of the data. Type system of the programming language
used is important as it can influence the detection of type errors. For instance, if a developer uses
type system which is considered to be sound, a well-typed program would not cause type errors.
4.5.4 Input Validation
Several web application frameworks (and persistence layer frameworks) support input validation
through the use of annotations. Frameworks such as Spring MVC [Sou11], Hibernate [JBo11]
and Struts 2 [Fou11] support a limited set of input validation types. Hibernate is based on the JSR
303 Bean Validation standard [BP09]. In contrast to our work, the set of possible input validation
types cannot be extended. Furthermore, these frameworks do not support the enforcement of
validation functions, e.g. a developer is not forced to validate input. The solutions proposed
in [BP09] and in [Hoo05] allow a complete decoupling of validation code and application logic.
However, also these solutions do not force the developer to specifiy the inputs along with the
types resulting in less secure applications and a decreased level of quality of data.
Besides frameworks supporting input validation, there exist web application firewalls that
are capable of performing input validation. Web application firewalls are placed in front of the
web application or web service and all HTTP traffic is routed through the firewall. A firewall
can block known malicious requests (blacklist-approach) or only allow known benign requests
(whitelist-approach). Scott et al. proposed in [SS02] to secure web applications using web
application firewalls. Since then, the technique has been commercialized and many vendors
offer application-level firewalls as appliances [Imp11, Inc11, Tru11]. In contrast to our approach,
web application firewalls do not allow to establish and maintain consistency between the input
validation specification and the application code. Moreover, application-level firewalls support
a very limited set of input types which is not extensible.
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The correction of input manipulation often includes sanitization. The correctness of such
sanitization process is important, as an incorrect solution would let the developers think they
are protected. This problematic is addressed in Balzarotti et al. [BCF+08]. They introduce an
analysis of the sanitization process to detect incorrect or incomplete sanitization. They provide
for such purpose a tool called Saner.
4.6 Language approach for security modularization
We present a novel method and tool to prevent from the major cause of vulnerabilities to applica-
tions nowadays, which is the acceptance of malicious input. By adding simple and precise type
annotations to existing code, The solution brings a lightweight approach to enrich type informa-
tion concerning the expected input for an application. The solution derives validation functions
that are modularly integrated into existing code. The main originalities of our solution can be
summarized as follows
• Non-invasive use of aspect-oriented programming, which discharges the developers from
learning a new programming paradigm
• High degree of automation and the increase program security with minor effort. Moreover,
developer applying our innovation does not require security knowledge
• Extensibility: allowing developers to create business-specific enhanced data types and
their validation aspects
• Modular integration of new security functionality without disrupting existing code
• Security is adopted by design, considering that annotations to all input parameters must
be provided, but, in order to provide more flexibility to the solution, an administrator can
disable the obligation to annotate all code.
Moreover, we have also created internally a small demonstrator that proves the feasibility of
the concept.
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Part II
Modularization of constructive security
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The modularization of constructive security can be simplified to the modularization of busi-
ness security concerns. These are concerns that are specified to make the application working
in its environment. Generally, the concerns are not trivial and developers are prone to introduce
either bugs or vulnerabilities as they are not familiar with these concepts. The type of security
properties affected is large, and usually involves security mechanisms that needs to be correctly
defined and injected in the application. One vision of security architecture for distributed sys-
tems Authentication, Authorization and Accounting (AAA) gives a first glance of properties. But
we cover a larger range, such as privacy, confidentiality and integrity of messages, etc. These
concerns are often exposed through security policies.
In the following, we present two specific contributions showing modularization of security
properties at two different layers of the stack for distributed applications. The first contribution
introduces a security protocol for message security, including transmission of token securely,
confidentiality and integrity of transiting data. This particular protocol targets light and said-
to-be flexible web service using HTTP transport layer as an applicative layer: RESTful ser-
vices. The second contribution present an architecture to provide seamlessly integrated privacy
within cloud platform, which ease the integration of such security concerns for both the platform
provider and the application developers that will deploy application on the cloud.
Both of these approaches are in the context of distributed systems, hence systems executing
in different environments that communicate through communication mediums. All of these
components are possibly under different administrative domains.
96
Chapter 5
Service framework modularization for
message-based security
The modularization of security can be achieved by changing the way security is injected into
the application. Instead of waiting a complete definition of security inlined within the applica-
tion, we can obtain a flexible and modular security by letting the platform inject the security in
pre-defined points. This notion is often referred to as the inversion of control pattern, that let
containers decide and manage the orchestration of dependencies and cross-cutting concerns. It
is then possible to define security and provide late binding, taking in account custom needs in
the specific context the application is executing in.
In this contribution, we propose to introduce a new message security model for RESTful
services that allows to carry authentication tokens and protect resources in a fine-grained manner.
The security properties brought by this approach can be easily introduced by security policies.
To enhance the flexibility in transformation, we propose a module that intervene in the web
service framework layer, or as a reference monitor.
The security and dependability of cloud applications require strong confidence in the com-
munication protocol used to access web resources. The mainstream service providers nowadays
are shifting to REST-based services in the detriment of SOAP-based ones. REST proposes
a lightweight approach to consume resources with no specific encapsulation, thus lacking of
meta-data descriptions for security requirements. Currently, the security of RESTful services
relies on ad-hoc security mechanisms (whose implementation is error-prone) or on the transport
layer security (offering poor flexibility). We introduce the REST security protocol to provide an
end-to-end secure service communication, and explain to which extent it allows flexible security.
5.1 Introduction
With the growing interest of cloud computing, systems are getting inter-connected faster, as
applications and cloud API’s make intensive usage of RESTful services to expose resources to
consumers. There has been a shift from SOAP-based services to more lightweight communica-
tion, based on REST which allowed a number of advancements in the way resources are used on
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the web. As REST web services are self-described, resources can be manipulated through a set
of verbs already provided in the communication protocol, accelerating the adoption of the REST
philosophy. On the other hand, REST suffers from the absence of meta-descriptions, specially
concerning security requirements.
Different solutions have been developed to provide a common way to address service de-
scription and communication. For SOAP-based web services, the standard defines envelopes to
transmit requests and responses. In contrast, the REST concepts coined by Roy Fielding in his
Ph.D. dissertation [Fie00] simplify access to web services by reusing existing and widespread
standards instead of adding new layers to the communication stack. The reuse of HTTP protocol
contributed to the large industry adoption of RESTful services, supported by the simple CRUD
set of operations (Create, Read, Update, Delete).
RESTful services suffer from the lack of a specific security model, unlike SOAP-based ser-
vices which rely on the message security model defined in WS-Security [OAS06] standard.
Especially, the security of existing RESTful API’s rely on transport layer security and on some
home-made message protection mechanism. The former protects efficiently point-to-point com-
munication channels, but becomes a burden for mobile systems, as the TLS channel need to be
frequently reset. It is also difficult to have multiple parties involved in a secure communication,
as each of the peers would require to rely on each other entity. The latter can be error-prone, as
security protocols are difficult to design and implement. Thus, a custom security might lead to
inconsistencies, incompatibility with other standards, etc..
In this chapter we provide a security protocol to make message security implementation as
lightweight and efficient as possible, and yet to respect the REST principles. We show how
message signature and encryption can address communication security for RESTful services
at a fine-grained level. We then present the interest of such protocol in presence of multiple
stakeholders spanning several administrative domains. We present results of the benchmark we
conducted on our implementation and compare it to the equivalent realization using SOAP and
WS-Security.
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.2 presents the motivations for such an ap-
proach, Section 5.3 introduces the REST security protocol and the threat model we aim to
mitigate. In Section 5.4, we position our protocol with regards to WS-Security via a benchmark.
Then we discuss related works in Section 5.5 and conclude in Section 5.6.
5.2 Motivation
REST-Security provides tools to enhance flexibility of many use cases in which RESTful ser-
vices are exposed. In a nutshell, it allows business owners to define security properties for
application, disregarding the actual implementation of the web services layer. In this section,
we present the motivation of such a protocol through two different use-cases, in which REST-
Security provides key advantage, by removing unnecessary specifications from protocols, or by
facilitating enforcement of multi-party security policies.
REST security protocol is a pendant of WS-Security, which already provides a set of tools
and methods to encapsulate security behavior in dedicated modules. It is possible to define
the security of messages, per service. The service framework is responsible to interpret the
98
configuration of security and verify incoming messages to detect policy conflict, but also to
take action and modify outgoing messages to add required security tokens or perform security
transformations.
The novelty comes with the flexibility that we introduce with the new security protocol, but
also in the way we envision the transmission of security metadata across the application. Usually,
the security of messages is configured at the service framework level. The notion of protection
is therefore limited to the transport and the service framework itself. The business application
that handles the request has no specific information on the origin of the message, nor its validity.
Some frameworks propose the propagation of principal identity to the business application, but
the notion of integrity, confidentiality in the transmission as well as the signature is lost in transit.
Such behavior renders the handling of security properties at the business level problematic. For
instance, one might have a business rule of non-repudiation with proof of receipt that certifies
the receiver has received the message. The acknowledgment contains cryptographic proofs that
are carried along the message, and then generally interpreted by the service framework.
We would like to introduce at this stage another layer of flexiblity, that provide security
proofs to the business application, disregarding the underlying technology used for message se-
curity. The REST security protocol and web service security framework would provide accurate
concrete mechanisms, that one can use to define security properties. The security properties are
propagated to the business application, with the use of aspect-oriented techniques. We further
discuss the mechanisms in the perspective part of the conclusion in Section 8.
In the following, we intend to present two situations in which a flexible security protocol
would benefit.
5.2.1 OAuth 2.0 token protection
The OAuth 2.0 web authorization protocol allows services to act on behalf of users when inter-
acting with other services. It avoids sharing username and passwords across services, thus, in
principle protecting users from several threats. However, it is known that the implementation of
this kind of authorization protocol is complex, and potentially leads to vulnerable web services.
OAuth 2.0 proposes a multi-party environment in which the client (resource owner) uses its
credentials to request protected resources held by the server. If a third-party wants to access
these protected resources in accordance with the resource owner, then the resource owner has to
share its credentials with the third-party. This situation may lead to several undesired behaviors,
such as resource owner’s credential’s multiple storage (at the third-party location), complete
access to the protected resources (no limitation of rights to third-party) or difficulty of right’s
revocation (the resource owner needs to change its credentials). OAuth’s purpose is to mitigate
these concerns by granting access without credentials sharing.
The initial protocol has been defined by Hammer et al. in a standard defined by the IETF
as OAuth 1.0 [Ha10]. The current version is OAuth 2.0 [Rea12] and is a disruptive evolution
in which major companies have been involved to cover different use cases. The original author
Eran Hammer withdrew its name from the specifications, and OAuth 2.0 presents a framework
rather than a security protocol. The development is already mature and target industrial use-
cases, which is the reason why we chose to focus on OAuth 2.0. For readability reasons when
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we are referring to OAuth 2.0 we will simply speak about OAuth, and when needed we will
specify the version.
The OAuth protocol defines four different roles:
• The resource owner is an entity that holds protected assets. This entity is capable of
granting access to the assets under its control.
• The resource server is the server that hosts the resource owner’s protected assets.
• The client is the third party entity that needs to access the protected assets on behalf of the
resource owner.
• The authorization server is the server that issue authorization claims and generally verify
authentication and authorization of the different entities involved.
The general flow defined by OAuth is depicted in Figure 5.1. The flow starts when a client
(mobile application, third-party service, any application which needs to access resources of a
resource owner) needs to access resources on a resource server that he doesn’t own. To access
these resources, the client request an authorization to the resource owner (step A). The resource
owner generally gets an authorization grant by getting one from the authorization server and
send it back (step B). As an alternative, the client can directly request the authorization grant
from the authorization server. In step C, the client requests an access token by authenticating
with the authorization server and presenting the authorization grant. If the authorization grant is
validated by the authorization server, an access token is issued and sent back to the client (step
D). At this point, the client has an access token that indicates that a resource owner allows the
client to access a certain number of its resources on a specific server. The client can use this
access token to access the resources (step E). The resource server validates the token an send
back requested information (step F).
Cherreau et al. [CDR+13] present relevant problems faced by OAuth 2.0 implementations.
For instance, OAuth uses the concept of bearer token that is defined as "A security token with the
property that any party in possession of the token (a "bearer") can use the token in any way that
any other party in possession of it can. Using a bearer token does not require a bearer to prove
possession of cryptographic key material (proof-of-possession)". The specification also details
"TLS (Transport Layer Security) is mandatory to implement and use with this specification;
other specifications may extend this specification for use with other protocols". It means that
to convey bearer token, the services need to communicate through a secure channel to avoid
disclosure of tokens, thefts, replay attacks, etc.
The author of OAuth argues against using only transport layer security. It provides a po-
tential false sensation of security [Ham10]. For instance, there are issues occurring during im-
plementation, like several developers who do not try to understand the rational behind transport
layer security and break the hierarchy of trust (for example, they try to disable verification of
certificate authority). Such activation would void any effort in protecting tokens. In addition,
several attacks target the transport layer security with success. For instance, the latest attack use
a simple trick to extract content from a secure HTTPS channel [GHP13]. BREACH (Browser
Reconnaissance and Exfiltration via Adaptive Compression of Hypertext) approach takes ad-
vantage of HTTPS compression to byte by byte extract some part of the user provided content,
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Figure 5.1: OAuth generic flow
through HTTP responses. They adapted the approach from another approach which was target-
ing HTTP requests, the CRIME security exploit [RD12].
With the REST security protocol framework, we are given new tools to protect these sensitive
tokens, and thus propose an automatic protection of certain tokens along the HTTP messages.
We do not intend to replace completely the transport layer security required in the protocol, but
we aim to extend use cases in which you can transmit securely tokens to propose new possibil-
ities for service providers and consumers. For instance, the protocol can handle other security
constraints. We can think of carrying encrypted basic authentication tokens, signed P3P claims,
or even convey authorization token decisions. We position the REST security protocol as an
alternative to transmit securely data over the wire.
5.2.2 Flexible enforcement of security properties with cross-domain collabora-
tion
The definition of the protocol comes to fill a gap in existing scenario involving RESTful services.
The definition of security, on a fine-grained basis is hardly possible, and makes the transmission
and securisation of tokens difficult. It leads to situations in which specifications to newly defined
protocols force the usage of secure transport channel, like we have seen in the previous section.
In other situations, the secure transport channel is not sufficient to respect security policies and
attach security properties to flows. For instance, we have introduced in [DGM+10] a loan
origination scenario in which several parties have to collaborate to complete a business process.
The parties have their own specific environment, with their own security adaptations. In order
to collaborate, they need to agree upon a common process to handle security. We discus the
security properties and requirements that affect this system in [SdOS12].
For the specific needs that we have in our scenario, we have developed a security policy
language described in [DSI+12a]. HiPoLDS stands for A Hierarchical Security Policy Language
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for Distributed Systems. It has been designed to enable the specification of security policies in
distributed systems in a concise, readable, and extensible way. HiPoLDS design focuses on
decentralized execution environments under the control of multiple stakeholders. It represents
policy enforcement through the use of distributed reference monitors, which control the flow
of information between services. We are going to see in this section how the REST security
protocol protocol would assist the scenario’s needs in this kind of environment.
Figure 5.2: Domains of the scenario with hierarchical reference monitors per domain
The domains are presented in Figure 5.2. There are a total of four domains: the customer
domain, the government domain, the credit bureau domain, and the bank domain. The security
rules are handled by reference monitor in this approach. The reference monitors can either
verify the status of messages going through, or modify the messages to respect the security
policy. For example, the top level runtime monitor in the Bank domain hierarchy is referred to
as {{rmBank}}. The monitor has no visibility of the architecture of the outside world, but it can
detect some properties carried along the messages, or already known by the monitor (i.e range
of addresses corresponding to a specific actor). With respect to the internal domain, the monitor
{{rmBank}} is able to communicate with its direct sub-components, but might not know their
architecture. This grey-box view is important to define global rules that are then enforced locally.
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The bank reference monitor needs to address several security requirements according to a
policy that we have defined:
• Non repudiation : An external party shall receive a proof of receipt when sensitive loan
operations are performed
• Confidentiality : An incoming or outgoing loan resource needs to remain confidential
between requester and receiver.
• Signature : an incoming or outgoing loan object needs to carry a proof of authenticity
• Separation of duty : the platform needs to guarantee that at least two individuals are
involved in the verification of loans.
• Logging : The runtime monitor shall log incoming and outgoing messages that has for
origin or destination a domain outside the bank
Such security policy description is translated in an HiPoLDS rule, which is a domain specific
language. The detail of the language is explained in [DSI+12a]. For example, for a message
that contains loan information, the message should carry proof of integrity and the resource itself
should only be disclosed to the Bank and the Government. Such a requirement would translate
to the following HiPoLDS abstract rule:
m : message, x : loan-info ǫ m.contents
→ x is confidential(Bank,Government),
m is integrity_verified
(5.1)
The policy language specifies the security requirements, in a hierarchical way, and for dis-
tributed domains. These domains are not all under the same administrative domains. They have
to collaborate all together to process messages, add security proofs when they manipulate data,
but they would not put a blind trust in their partner. For instance, if a document requires the
successive validation of three different actors (a bank, a government agency, and a customer),
each of the actors would put a signature and transfer the document to the next actor. Such a
situation requires the signature to be attached to the document. The REST security protocol
allows to transmit the document with several security proofs attached to it without additional
processing. The tokens in this case would convey multiple signature for the different actors
at the same time. The elegant approach comes from the possibility for the different actors to
simply get the document, sign it, and transfer it to the next actor. They don’t need to interpret
signature of the previous actors. They don’t need to verify authenticity of other signatures: as
the signature is attached to the resource (the document), any party can verify the validity of the
document at any time. The tokens, transmitted in headers of the documents are flexible enough
to allow quick signature and verification from the different involved parties. In addition, the
security verification and transformations can be introduced directly by the reference monitors.
Another possibility with the REST security protocol is to encrypt partial content of re-
sources. In the context of cross-domain business processes, it allows new interactions such
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as a first actor which partially encrypt a document for an intermediate, and the remaining of
the document is encrypted for a different recipient. A second actor would affix a signature to
validate the message authenticity before transmitting it to the other actors. These behaviors, that
one can describe with HiPoLDS security policy language can be enforced transparently thanks
to reference monitors. We describe in [DSI+13] the details of the enforcement architecture.
5.3 REST Security
In the following, we present the materialization of the protocol to secure messages and resources
in case of RESTful services. We provide Encryption, Signature and their combination. We
do not aim to provide an equivalent of Secure Conversation from the WS-Security standards
for RESTful services, as it relates to some transport layer security for HTTP which is already
addressed in protocols such as TLS.
5.3.1 Message Security Model
We specify an abstract message security model based on confidentiality and digital signatures to
protect RESTful messages. The associated threat model is exactly the same as the one described
in Web-Service Security standard [OAS06]: “The message could be modified or read by attacker
or an antagonist could send messages to a service that, while well-formed, lack appropriate
security claims to warrant processing”. For instance, a malicious attacker can intercept messages
on any intermediary between peers. We want messages to carry tokens for non-repudiation (via
digital signatures), to provide data confidentiality by encrypting its content, and to have replay
attack protection.
The need to develop our own security for RESTful services comes from the frequent possibil-
ity to have man-on the middle attack on secure channels. The mechanisms to provide confiden-
tiality, integrity and non-repudiation for most of the RESTful services exposed by the industry
rely on transport layer security over the application protocol, such as HTTPS. There are several
attacks, or even programmatic mistakes that render the layer less secure. For instance, there
has been high coverage of SSL-attacks such as BEAST or CRIME that render possible plaintext
recovery from a partial controlled environment, as well as other attacks such as SSL stripping
or other manipulation regarding spoofing or man on the middle attacks [Jee13]. Georgiev et al.
present a paper in which they explain some basic failure of SSL-validation in general applica-
tions, which is the fundation step of the whole PKI infrastructure [GIJ+12].
Although secure channel provide a first defense line against most eavesdropping use cases,
the client and server can not guarantee the security from end to end, but rather from point to
point. In a multi-party environment, which is a frequent use case in modern computing commu-
nication and routing of internet, several hops trust each other to transmit the information from
one location to another one. The secure channel blur the intermediates to deliver the message
to a server, from which we don’t know the exact processing. With our approach, it would be
possible to intermediate to add secure tokens to messages, in addition to already existing ones.
It make senses in hierarchical environments that require high control on data coming in and out.
For instance, security policies in large companies can benefit from this approach by allowing
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enforcement of security properties at different places in the company infrastructure landscape.
We have already presented such need in the previous section.
5.3.2 PKI-based message exchange
We assume that a PKI landscape is in place and that certificates have been exchanged between
clients and servers prior to the communication. In this way we are able to transmit a certifi-
cate identifiers within the messages instead of full certificates, what would bring unnecessary
overhead.
In order to distinguish a certificate on both client and server sides, we rely on a unique
identifier, called Certificate ID, known to all entities. The Certificate ID is the aggregation
of a serial number and an issuer name. The RFC 5280 [IET08] specifies that serial numbers
“MUST be unique for each certificate issued by a given CA, i.e., the issuer name and serial
number identify a unique certificate”. The issuer name in our case can be represented by the
Distinguished Name of a X509 certificate.
5.3.3 The REST Security principle
The principle of our protocol is to propose secure communication at the message level with the
minimum overhead: we try to respect the philosophy of RESTful services and to reuse HTTP
protocol to its full advantage. For example, we take into account the specificity of HTTP verbs
in the design of the protocol. The REST security protocol is closely related to the WS-Security
standard: it proposes a fine-grained approach to provide authenticity, non repudiation, and con-
fidentiality to messages. But the approach targets another type of service. We claim that our
approach is complementary to provide consistent application of security policies, disregarding
the type of service being addressed. When comparing both approaches, we can highlight the
reduced development effort and also less computation at runtime. This is a consequence of the
optimization in the message size while we have performed, yet respecting the compatibility with
service’s definition and implementation.
We propose a set of HTTP-headers for transmitting meta-data, unlike WS-Security which
modifies messages to add its own container describing the security meta data. The headers are
described in Table 5.1. They start with a prefix “X-JAG” to distinguish them from other applica-
tion headers. The main difference with the WS-Security approach, is that we are agnostic about
the information format. WS-* services use a strict approach to determine the transformations
of XML-based messages to ensure the correct handling by interpreters at both sides. In our ap-
proach, we consider the information as a set of multiparts, and protocol headers. It allows us to
gain flexibility in terms of fine-grained signature and encryption of attached documents, and/or
to restrict visibility of a number of headers.
In the following, we present the REST security protocol process. For illustration purposes,
we present the interaction trace produced by the request of a RESTful service in the Listing 5.1.
A client requests customer information to the service and expects a JSON-encoded result. One
can notice the expected result can be in any format accepted by the server (e.g., XML, YAML,
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Header keys Value
X-JAG-CertificateID Unique identifier for a certificate
X-JAG-DigestAlg Algorithm used to obtain digest
X-JAG-DigestValue Value of the digest(s)
X-JAG-SigAlg Algorithm used to obtain the signature
X-JAG-SigValue Value of the signature(s)
X-JAG-EncAlg Algorithm used to encrypt headers and messages’ part
X-JAG-EncKeyAlg Algorithm used to encrypt the symmetric key
X-JAG-EncKeyValue Encrypted value of the symmetric key
X-JAG-MultiParts Designation of headers and messages’ part
Table 5.1: REST security protocol headers
plain text, audio file, binary content, etc.). The response produced by the application server starts
at line 6 .
1 GET /customer/123 HTTP/1.1
2 Accept: application/json
3 Host: 127.0.0.1:8080
4 Connection: keep-alive
5
6 HTTP/1.1 200 OK
7 Server: Apache-Coyote/1.1
8 Content-Type: application/json
9 Content-Length: 77
10
11 {"Customer":{"firstname":"Gabriel","id":123,"lastname":"Serme","title":"Mr
"}}
Listing 5.1: RESTful request and response
5.3.4 Message Signature
Providing digital signature along with requests gives confidence on the data being transmitted.
A server might need information on the authenticity of a message to launch internal orders and
to render the service correctly. A digital signature brings non-repudiation: a requester cannot
deny the request. Also, the service cannot later repudiate the response if it includes signed
token linked to the initial request. Additionally, digital signature protects from unintentional or
malicious modifications during the transmission.
Algorithm 1 presents the steps to attach signature information to the message after a “digest
then encrypt” processing. It starts with a message m or part of it, with: the digest algorithm,
the signature algorithm, the Certificate Id of the sender, and the private key of the sender. The
algorithms can be decided by the sender itself, or imposed by the server policy. In our imple-
mentation, we allow the client to decide about the algorithm to be used, but the server can deny
access if its policy considers the protection to be insufficient. We have defined a “digest then
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encrypt” function over the message payload, security parameters, and header information. The
digest always takes as input the timestamp to obtain a different value over time and thus prevent
future replay attacks. The algorithm vary slightly depending on the concrete signature algorithm.
The values are then attached to the message along with algorithm information.
Algorithm 1 Signature of REST messages
Require: m is a message, sig is a signature algorithm name, dig is a digest algorithm name, cid
is a Certificate Id, pk is the sender private key, urlpath the requested path, hds are headers
element to protect, ts is the current timestamp
dv ← digest(m.payload, ts, dig)
url← ‘’
if m is a request then
url← urlpath
end if
bytes← concat(dv, url, sig, dig, cid, hds)
digV alue← digest(bytes, ts, dig)
m.sigV alue← encrypt(digV alue, sig, pk)
m.{url, sig, dig, cid, hds, ts}← url, sig, dig, cid, hds, ts
In Algorithm 2, we present the signature verification function. It starts from a messagem, or
part of it, and with the public key of the sender. The steps are the reverse of the previous “digest
then encrypt” algorithm. We first calculate the digest value of a set of headers and the payload.
Then, we retrieve the digest value calculated by the sender. The encrypted value is transmitted
along with the message, on a specific header. When we decrypt the value, we are then able
to detect any corruption in the payload and headers but also to guarantee message safety and
authenticity, as it has been digitally proved by the sender.
Algorithm 2 Verification of REST Signature
Require: m is a message, Pk is the sender public key
dv ← digest(m.payload,m.ts,m.dig)
bytes← concat(dv,m.url,m.sig,m.dig,m.cid,m.hds)
calculatedDigest← digest(bytes,m.ts,m.dig)
retrievedDigest← decrypt(m.sigV alue,m.sig, Pk)
if retrievedDigest ≡ calculatedDigest then
return true
end if
return false
The Listing 5.2 presents a HTTP trace with concrete headers and payload value. The request
starts at line 1 and the response starts at line 10. We can observe for example that message
request is issued by a sender identified as the 4102th certificate issued by the CESSA Authority.
This sender protects the request of the customer 123. The response is given by another peer,
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1 GET /sign/customer/123 HTTP/1.1
2 Accept: application/json
3 X-JAG-CertificateID: CN=CA CESSA, <...>O=SAP Labs France, C=FR;4102
4 X-JAG-DigestAlg: w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1
5 X-JAG-DigestValue: 2jmj7l5rSw0yVb/vlWAYkK/YBwk=
6 X-JAG-SigAlg: w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#rsa-sha1
7 X-JAG-SigValue: CwgrRTaC0oGBMpLPF6m<...>+gjtCMnuC+2svEdI5zJvITbM=
8 Host: 127.0.0.1:8080
9
10 HTTP/1.1 200 OK
11 Server: Apache-Coyote/1.1
12 X-JAG-CertificateID: CN=CA CESSA, <...>O=SAP Labs France, C=FR;4
13 X-JAG-DigestAlg: w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1
14 X-JAG-DigestValue: RUAYhPTuXqwChvIGrclAyRtA22Y=
15 X-JAG-SigAlg: w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#rsa-sha1
16 X-JAG-SigValue: pmpc347XG/8a9QIFWYaHHsbt79hCwF<...>G/buHnjsHQvZhaggilRuM=
17 Content-Type: application/json
18 Content-Length: 77
19
20 {"Customer":{"firstname":"Gabriel","id":123,"lastname":"Serme","title":"Mr
"}}
Listing 5.2: Signed request and response
identified as the 4th certificate issued by the CESSA Authority, on line 12. The request and
response are here signed, which allows the party consuming the message to verify the identity
of the producer and the validity of the security token, to detect if the message has been tam-
pered with. A replay attack can be avoided by binding the messages to elements with unique
characteristics: MAC, timestamp , session related nonce, etc..
5.3.5 Message Encryption
Message encryption provides confidentiality to sensitive assets so that no eavesdropping and data
modification happen during messages transmission. In requests, several assets are transmitted,
such as payload, session headers in cookies, etc. In our approach, we focus on payload and
header protection mainly. We envisage extensions to address parameter encryption in GET
requests in future versions of the protocol. The encryption has the property to modify the payload
and headers, unlike signature which needs read-only access to the message. The encryption
mechanism is also process-intensive.
The Algorithm 3 processes the payload of a message, or part of it for encryption. The PKI
environment gives us mechanisms to share information between actors: the public and private
keys. However, asymmetric algorithms are too heavy in order to perform an encryption on
large amounts of data. Instead, we generate a symmetric key for encryption, using the function
generateSymmetricKey that takes two parameters: A symmetric algorithm like AES with
indication on the exact parameters, and the current timestamp that will be used to generate
the symmetric key. This second parameter can be seen as a salt value. The generated key is
small enough to be encrypted with an asymmetric algorithm and sent with the message. Thus,
the message contains an encrypted symmetric key for the receiver, the encrypted payload, and
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several headers expressing the algorithm used for encryption.
Algorithm 3 Encryption of a REST message
Require: m is a message, Pk is the receiver public key, enc is a symmetric algorithm name,
aenc is an asymmetric algorithm name, hds are headers element to protect, ts the current
timestamp
skey ← generateSymmetricKey(enc, ts)
m.payload← encrypt(m.payload, skey)
for all name, value← hds do
hds[name]← encrypt(value, skey)
end for
m.keyV alue← encrypt(skey, aenc, Pk)
m.{enc, aenc, hds, ts}← enc, aenc, hds, ts
The Algorithm 4 presents the reverse operation with respect to the above algorithm, to be
executed on the receiver side. The procedure is performed on an encrypted message m or part
of it. The message usually contains meta-information about encrypted parts and algorithms used
for key encryption and data encryption. Otherwise, these information should result of a previous
agreement between the sender and the receiver. To decrypt the data, the receiver retrieves the
symmetric key and uses it to replace the headers and the payload.
Algorithm 4 Decryption of a REST message
Require: m is a message, pk is the receiver private key
skey ← decrypt(m.keyV alue,m.aenc, pk)
for all name, value← m.hds do
m.hds[name]← decrypt(value,m.enc, skey)
end for
m.payload← decrypt(m.payload,m.enc, skey)
The Listing 5.3 presents a HTTP trace where the request does not contain custom informa-
tion apart from the Certificate Id. The service has been configured to send back all messages
encrypted. The service then processes and encrypts the message content for the requester. In the
Listing, the payload is protected and no eavesdropping can be performed during the transmis-
sion. The protection mechanisms described in the previous section for replay attacks are also
apply here.
5.3.6 Signature and Encryption
Signature combined with encryption is an important feature. Signature alone brings non-repudiation
to the system, but an attacker can still read the content of messages and remain unnoticed. Pro-
viding encryption-only brings data confidentiality, but do not prevent against data tampering:
any intruder can replace the payload and security tokens with its own, as there is no binding
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1 GET /encrypt/customer/123 HTTP/1.1
2 Accept: application/json
3 X-JAG-CertificateID: CN=CA CESSA, <...>O=SAP Labs France, C=FR;4102
4 Host: 127.0.0.1:8080
5
6 HTTP/1.1 200 OK
7 Server: Apache-Coyote/1.1
8 X-JAG-CertificateID: CN=CA CESSA, <...>O=SAP Labs France, C=FR;4
9 X-JAG-EncKeyValue: RHvEjpmkt2QF3ZPCtqFbflDzA48<...>/
UYNCYPbB265W2ZjYhL5VQSyv1Xs3Skm0=
10 X-JAG-EncAlg: w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#aes128-cbc
11 X-JAG-EncKeyAlg: w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#rsa-sha1
12 Content-Type: application/json
13 Content-Length: 101
14
15 eIdV39/XV/IHgPNWB2Hpo2jWglsI9p<...>k5c4+vVs9d53o6OEoh7M0bybmtGwdZE=
Listing 5.3: Encrypted payload during a request
with the proof of identity. For this purpose, the combination of encryption and signature at
the message level provides confidence that data is kept confidential from intruders, and that no
modification have been made to it. The signature testifies authenticity of the encrypted content,
and only the receiver can retrieve the original data. In the current version of our work, we do
not address ordering between the two mechanisms, therefore it is not yet possible to encrypt a
signature.
5.3.7 Multiparts
We consider the case where one request or response message contains several parts. It is the case
for example when forms are submitted with several fields containing user data, or when several
files are attached along the same request. In such case, we might have general-purpose infor-
mation and sensitive-information. To encrypt sensitive information, we need a mechanism that
specifies the format of the different parts. We have several choices: we can apply the security
requirements on the entire request/response of the RESTful service, or just on some parts/ele-
ments. HTTP makes usage of the Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (MIME) standard1 to
separate the content in several parts. We can take advantage of this usage to distinguish parts of
the data along requests. Therefore, if a request contains multiple parts, we can choose to sign
and encrypt some of them without affecting the others.
The approach differs from what is implemented in WS-Security standards and S/MIME
standard. In our approach, we are independent from the actual content-type, and proposes to
gather in one place all security meta-data. WS-* standards deal with XML-based content, so
they propose a fine-grained approach at the XML-data level. Our approach is more general, and
provides resource-grained encryption and signature. The Listing 5.4 highlights this principle.
It represents the signature for the first multipart element identified by <root>. In a multipart
environment, the meta-information vary depending on the part subject to encryption or signature.
1http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2045
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1 PUT /sign/customer/111/file HTTP/1.1
2 Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary="uuid:7d156074-35"; start="<
root>";
3 X-JAG-CertificateID: CN=CA CESSA, <...>O=SAP Labs France, C=FR;4102
4 X-JAG-DigestAlg: w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1
5 X-JAG-DigestValue: 0;8X3Ci4M+bhWKMg+f83CXoXXjjns=
6 X-JAG-SigAlg: w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#rsa-sha1
7 X-JAG-SigValue: 0;lcj7v4UAMxFOkhBoX+8<...>NKo393OQ=
8 X-JAG-Multiparts: 0;<root>
9 Host: 127.0.0.1:8080
10 Transfer-Encoding: chunked
11
12 --uuid:7d156074-35
13 Content-Type: application/octet-stream
14 Content-Transfer-Encoding: binary
15 Content-ID: <root>
16 Content-Disposition: attachment;filename=data.dat
17 <..binary content..>
18
19 <.. HTTP Response ..>
Listing 5.4: Multipart signature example
The header X-JAG-Multiparts contains a set of multipart elements and some headers referenced
by identifiers. These identifiers are used to reference digest and signature values in the other
security headers.
5.4 Evaluation of REST security protocol
The REST security protocol is close to the WS-Security standard. WS-Security [OAS06] de-
scribes enhancements to SOAP messaging to provide protection through message integrity, con-
fidentiality, and single message authentication. More precisely, it is an open format for signing
and encrypting message parts leveraging XML Digital Signature and XML Encryption proto-
cols, for supplying credentials in the form of security tokens, and for securely passing those
tokens in a message. As explained in previous sections, the REST security protocol has been
designed to be an equivalent alternative to WS-Security for RESTful services, with some differ-
ences in the way messages are secured and possible applications. In this section, we present few
indicators to compare REST-Security, both in term of performance and configuration.
5.4.1 Environment & Methodology
In order to position the protocol performance with respect to the state of the art, we have run sev-
eral performance tests to compare WS-* and RESTful based services. In order to have a clear
methodology and to reproduce performance tests, the evaluation has been made on the same
environment to eliminate network side-effects. We limited resource starvation on the server to
obtain accurate data. The Table 5.2 lists server characteristics. In order to compare the differ-
ent services, we evaluate them in a single framework proposing coverage of both JAX-RS and
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Processor Intel Core i7-2600 @ 3.40GHz
Installed RAM 16 GB
Hard Drive Seagate ST3500413AS Barracuda 7200 500 GB
Application Server Tomcat 7.0.21
Server JVM Memory -Xmx 8000m
WS framework CXF 2.4.2
Server certificate RSA 1024
Client’s certificates RSA 4096
Table 5.2: Benchmark environment
JAX-WS specifications. The CXF service framework2 allows us to compare the complexity of
the two kinds of web services under the same conditions.
We have defined and implemented three scenarios, corresponding to real-use cases. In this
way, we simulate several scenarios in order to evaluate and compare performance, message size,
etc. The three scenarios correspond to:
Simple Get In the following, we identify this scenario with the acronym Get. The scenario
retrieves information without further processing. It is materialized by the invocation of a method
in WS-* to retrieve customer information, from customer identifier. In RESTful services, the
client requests a customer through a GET action, and the service renders the customer in the
requested format.
Modify Post In the following, we identify this scenario with the acronym Post. In this sce-
nario, the data is transmitted in the request phase, and the response phase is just an indicator of
the success or failure. Some additional processing is made on background to modify objects on
the server. The modification of a remote resources is materialized by a method invocation with
WS-* services, whereas it is a POST request in REST.
Large payload In the following, we identify this scenario with the acronym Large or Big. It
corresponds to the transmission of large amount of data between client and server. The size of
messages brings out the real impact of the protocol. Each operation gives rise to accurate obser-
vation of the cost in terms of size and performance. It is materialized by a method invocation
for a customer document in the input for WS-* services, and by a PUT request in the RESTful
version. The reply contains indication of success or failure.
The different scenarios provide heterogeneous tests to verify several properties of the REST
security protocol, in different conditions. They cover the most problematic situation one can face
in a real production environment. They are a good basis for protocol comparison. For each of the
2http://cxf.apache.org/index.html
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scenarios, we have configured and run several tests with different security capabilities: signa-
ture, encryption, signature & encryption and no-security acting as the baseline. The experiments
were performed couple of times to ensure consistent and valid results for comparison. The REST
security implementation uses the same cryptographic algorithms as in the WS-Security configu-
ration. For instance, both SOAP and REST services are set to use the “Basic128Rsa15” security
algorithms suite: it determines the algorithms for digest, symmetric encryption, asymmetric
encryption, as well as key derivation algorithms and key-wrap algorithms.
5.4.2 Size comparison
The Table 5.3 indicates the measurement in size to compare REST and WS-* services in the
different scenarios. It lists the incoming and outgoing message sizes with distinction between
headers and payload size. The results correspond to the different scenarios, with an equivalence
between the Get and Post scenarios in terms of total size. The Large scenario sends a resource
of around 3311kB. In the Get scenario, a client sends a request to the server in order to retrieve a
customer object. In SOAPmessages, the request is embedded in a SOAP envelope. The envelope
grows with the type of security used. For each type, the SOAP headers comprise secure data to
indicate the type of algorithm, the encrypted or signed parts, and sometimes full certificates. In
REST messages, the request is directly represented by the HTTP verb used to query the server.
Therefore, no additional payload is necessary than the actual data plus some meta-data headers.
Figure 5.3: Overhead of SOAP messages compared to REST. For each scenario and security, the
REST size represents the base 100
The Figure 5.3 highlights the global overhead using SOAP with any security mechanisms
for the different scenarios. The REST size represents 100 for each scenario and security. We
compare then the message overhead of different security mechanisms with its REST equivalent.
For example, a SOAP-signed message size with the Get scenario represents around 460 when its
counterpart in REST is 100. In the figure, we distinguish a second dimension: the origin of the
overhead - from incoming message or outgoing message. The message increase for the previous
scenario is half due to the incoming message, and second half by the outgoing message. In all
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tests, the usage of SOAP services instead of REST services is less efficient in terms of message
size. The minimal overhead impact in all scenarios is 33%, which is the case where message
payload is really large. We can explain it by the minimal impact of SOAP overhead compared to
the actual data to transmit. This number is the result of our measurements, where the size of mes-
sages (including incoming and outgoing payload and headers) is larger when WS-* services are
used compared to REST services, with all security mechanisms. The experimental cases where
REST security protocol is the most efficient compared to WS-Security is on encryption of small
set of data. The Get and Post scenarios present high SOAP overhead when data to transmit is
small. For such cases, SOAP adds to much meta-data compared to the actual information, which
multiply up to eight times the message size for a request and response in our measurements.
5.4.3 Processing performance comparison
In this paragraph, we present the processing performance comparison. The server has a certifi-
cate with RSA 1024 bits key, and the different clients have RSA 4096 bits. The difference of
key size for the clients and the server impacts the time of processing depending on actions per-
formed by the different actors. This behavior is directly linked to the performance of asymmetric
algorithm that differs from encryption and decryption [Dai09]. For instance, the encryption al-
gorithm is straightforward has it uses a small value for the exponentiation (typically 0x10001).
The decryption algorithm requires more computation as the exponent is of the size of the private
key (1024 or 4096 bits in our benchmarks). Thus, the server can decrypt faster than clients at
the cost of less security. The calculated factor shows server decryption is around 20 times faster
than client decryption. In our benchmarks, it impacts the performance comparison between the
different scenarios we have defined. For instance, the server processes messages from the Get
scenario with one encryption (fast operation) when messages from the Post scenario needs to be
decrypted (slow operation) which lowers the processing time and throughput.
Figure 5.4: Average processing time comparison for the different scenarios
We have calculated the average processing time calculated under the same conditions. Each
scenario has been launched for 60 seconds, with a single client emitting requests. The client
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sends messages sequentially to not overload the server and to extract the optimal processing
time. The Figure 5.4 depicts the differences between the different scenarios. The difference
between REST and SOAP average processing time differs depending on the algorithm scheme
and scenario used. In the Get and Post scenarios, REST is twice more efficient than SOAP when
cryptography is used. It can be explained by the ratio of data related to XML format and SOAP
meta-information that impact size of messages. For thin SOAP messages, the ratio doubles the
size compared to REST messages. The time spent to process message is directly impacted by
this size. For large messages, the encryption scheme is shown to be slower than signature.
We can notice differences in term of performance with regards to encryption and signature,
depending on the size of data to be processed. Although SOAP encryption is always more costly
than SOAP signature, REST shows better performances with encryption when amount of data
remains low like in the Get and Post scenarios. If the data size growths, signature is faster than
encryption.
5.5 Related Work
In this section, we present some security models adopted by existing web services to expose
their REST API’s. Then, we provide alternative approaches to address REST security and per-
formance issues.
The security model adopted by Amazon S3 [Ama06] supports authentication and custom
data encryption over HTTP requests. The requests are issued with a token to prevent unau-
thorized users from accessing, modifying or deleting the data. The token conveys a signature
value calculated per request which transmits a proof of identity, ensuring the authenticity of the
request, similar to our protocol. The data encryption can be performed by the client itself, or
by the server prior storage. The communication is supposed secured through SSL endpoints.
Our approach brings more flexibility as actors decide of resources and headers to protect and
transform. The server benefits of the PKI environment to render services to its clients without
the need to generate and maintain a set of secret keys. The clients can also enable the REST
security protocol with different service providers by simply uploading their public key.
The other models adopt a slightly different approach, making intensive usage of the OAuth
2.0 protocol. Yahoo [Yah] uses OAuth Authorization protocol (OAuth Core 1.0 [Ha10]) which is
a simple, secure protocol to publish and share protected data when several actors require access
to the resource. Yahoo demands the usage of an API Key to sign requests and provide end-user
authentication. Twitter [Twi11] leverages the transport layer security by exposing REST APIs
over SSL. Facebook [Fac12] requires the OAuth 2.0 protocol [Rea12] for authentication and au-
thorization. They distribute SSL Certificates to consumers so that they can create signed requests
and force users to use HTTPS. The Dropbox model [Dro12] allows third-party applications to
use their services on behalf of users. Their model forces the requests through SSL and requires
additional authenticity checks on messages. Like the previous approaches, they are combining
transport layer security and application security. In our approach, we simplify the access of re-
sources by unifying security at the message level. For instance, performing a request to retrieve
a file with Dropbox transmits content metadata in an header. This content can be visible when
the packet reaches the endpoint of a SSL tunnel, whereas our approach protects the header until
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its consumption.
The idea of having RESTful security as an equivalent of WS-Security has been expressed
in a blog entry [Las10], using a similar approach but with no implementation and concrete
specification. An approach to sign and encrypt multiparts have been drafted in [GMCF95]. They
do not refer to REST services, but rather propose a model integrated to the multipart separation
content to describe meta-information. Our approach benefits from multipart to split the payload
in several resources, but we prefer centralizing security meta-data in headers to avoid service
disruption, and to incorporate other field protection: headers, parameters, etc.. Our lightweight
approach modifies content only when necessary.
Pautosso et al. [PZL08] describe the differences between REST services and “big” services
with a number of architectural decisions about which type of service is more appropriate. We
have used this work to compare security of both approaches and to provide an extension to
REST services for more security. The work in [RS07] addresses attacks targeting SOAP-based
services. Although attacks are based on the XMLmessage format, we advocate that the approach
presented can be easily introduced in our implementation using particular header fields to inform
about the document structure.
Optimizing service consumption in terms of performance has been addressed for a long
time. The problem is rather to balance usability and composability while allowing cross-cutting
concerns such as security to protect the messages with a variable level of granularity. We can
mention work on Fast Web Services [SPGK+03] which defines binary-based messages to lower
bandwidth and memory consumption. The price is the loss of self-description so that interme-
diaries cannot process the messages. In [STT05], Suzumura et al. propose a different approach,
which is based on SOAP messages. They boost performance by considering partial regions
of messages that differ from previously processed ones. Albeit the approach gives interesting
results, they can not help with encrypted SOAP messages in the current state of the protocol.
5.6 Summary
We have presented a novel approach to provide security for RESTful services equivalent to WS-
Security. Our solution respects the REST philosophy by minimizing the processing overhead
to service consumers, without interfering in the service composition already in place. We are
able to keep messages confidential and to sign them with a fine granularity. The custom and
ad-hoc processing on a per-message basis is a valid alternative to the existing approaches, which
consider mainly transport layer security for securing all REST services. The advantage of our
approach is to hide the complexity for the consumers, with no pollution on request parameters,
while still carrying security tokens processable and verifiable by recipients.
In addition, the REST security protocol allows us to build new secure collaborations be-
tween systems. We have presented two cases in which REST security protocol shows benefits:
providing proofs for the transmission of other tokens that are part of a flow, and easy application
of security properties in a flow of messages that pass through reference monitors to validate and
enforce security policies. This is made possible as we propose to work on part of the messages,
with custom security to specific business purposes. Also, the security properties are propagated
with the resource as we provide an end-to-end application of security.
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We also conducted a performance evaluation considering several use-cases to analyze the
impact of message protection to the performance of the web services. The analysis comprises
heterogeneous scenarios to compare different security mechanisms among them, but also the
behavior of the application server when dealing with RESTful services versus SOAP-based web
services. The results show that RESTful services are processed more efficiently from any point
of view, which is inherent to the service’s purpose. RESTful services are oriented to handle
resources, whereas SOAP-based services forge requests for operation invocation. The protocol
is self-descriptive, so all information about the message verifications and transformations are
specified to let the recipient informed about the message state.
The modularization of security properties can be introduced on either the application layer
or in between distributed systems, through gateways or proxies. Although we don’t use aspects
to introduce the security concerns, we rely on points external to an application to detect the
security in place, and react in consequence. This work is a first step towards a larger platform
that taint messages and propagate resource state across layers and across systems. We introduce
it in the perspective part of the conclusion (Section 8).
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Chapter 6
Modularization of privacy in cloud
platform around persistance layer
In this contribution, we propose the modularization of a different security properties than we
have seen in other chapters: privacy. The modularization is provided down to the platform level
on a cloud application server. Cloud platform providers compete to propose the best solution
for their customer. The attractivity of cloud platforms is growing as they propose on-demand
and flexible solutions for many situations. They free their users from managing complexity of
configuration, installation, and above all scaling of network traffic. In exchange of the contract
with these platforms, the customers agree to delegate data control with the platform. Security of
the cloud platform provider is a key differentiator in the choice of a suitable platform to host their
applications. The role of the platform provider is then to release reliable and security capabilities
to help their clients. Providing a modular and consistent process to properly ensure security for
both platform and users is complex, and thus we bring our solution for a modularization of
privacy concerns down to the platform. It means that the cloud platform provides new APIs and
tools to gather privacy requirements of the application to enforce privacy during the runtime of
the application.
Privacy in cloud computing is a major concern for individuals, governments, service and
platform providers. In this context, the compliance with regards to policies and regulations
about personal data protection is essential, but hard to achieve, as the implementation of privacy
controls is subject to diverse kinds of errors. In this chapter we present how the enforcement of
privacy policies can be facilitated by a Platform as a Service. Cloud applications developers can
use non-obtrusive annotations in the code to indicate where personally identifiable information
is being handled, leveraging the aspect-oriented programming (AOP) features. Subsequently
the evaluation of user defined preferences is performed by trustful components provided by the
platform, liberating developers from the burden of designing custom mechanisms for privacy
enforcement in their software.
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6.1 Introduction
In order to speed up the deployment of business applications, and to reduce overall IT capital
expenditure, many cloud providers nowadays offer the Platform as a Service (PaaS) solutions as
an alternative to leverage the advantages of cloud computing. We can mention for instance SAP
NetWeaver Cloud, Google App Engine, or VMware Cloud Foundry, to cite a few. PaaS brings
an additional level of abstraction to the cloud landscape, by emulating a virtual platform on top
of the infrastructure, generally featuring a form of mediation to the underlying services akin to
middleware in traditional communication stacks.
As the consequence of that shift, we observe that more and more personally identifiable
information (PII) is being collected and stored in cloud-based systems. This is becoming an
extremely sensitive issue for citizens, governments, and companies, both using and offering
cloud platforms. The existing regulations, which already established several data protection
principles, are being extended to assign new responsibilities to cloud providers with respect to
private data handling.
The provision of privacy preserving services and tools will be one of the arguments favoring
the choice of one PaaS provider over the other when a company is hesitating where to deploy
new cloud application. The proposed reform of the European data protection regulation points
out that privacy-aware applications must protect personal data by design and by default: “Ar-
ticle 22 takes account of the debate on a ’principle of accountability’ and describes in detail
the obligation of responsibility of the controller to comply with this Regulation and to demon-
strate this compliance, including by way of adoption of internal policies and mechanisms for
ensuring such compliance. Article 23 sets out the obligations of the controller arising from the
principles of data protection by design and by default. Article 24 on joint controllers clarifies
the responsibilities of joint controllers as regards their internal relationship and towards the data
subject1.”
The correct enforcement of privacy and data usage control policies has been recently subject
of several incidents reported about faulty data handling, perhaps on purpose, see for instance the
cases of Facebook2.
Therefore, addressing compliance requirements at the application level is a competitive ad-
vantage for cloud platform providers. In the specific cases where the cloud platform provider
is also considered a joint controller, a privacy-aware architecture will address the accountability
requirement for the PaaS provider with regards to the next generation of regulations. Such archi-
tecture can enable compliance also for the Software as a Service delivery model, if we assume
the software was built over a privacy-aware platform. On the other hand, this could be hardly
achieved in the context of Infrastructures as a Service, since there would be no interoperability
layer on which the privacy controls can rely on.
In order to achieve this, the PaaS must implement some prominent, possibly standardized,
privacy policy framework (such as EPAL[AHK+03], P3P[Cra03]), where privacy preferences
can be declared in a machine-readable form, and later enforced automatically. In such a setting,
1http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/review2012/com_2012_
11_en.pdf
2http://mashable.com/2011/10/21/facebook-deleted-data-fine/
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the privacy enforcement controls could be easily incorporated into new deployment landscape
accelerating the development process of compliant applications. Furthermore the cloud plat-
form can offer the guaranties ensuring the correct implementation of the enforcement compo-
nents. This could be offered either via a certification mechanism or an audit of an existing cloud
landscape that would be executed by the governing entities.
In this contribution we present work towards the implementation of privacy-aware services
in a PaaS. We aim to empower the cloud platform with capabilities to automatically enforce
the privacy policy that is result of the end-user consent over the application provider privacy
policy. End-user policies and service provider terms of use are defined in a state of the art
privacy and usage control language [BNP11]. In order to leverage the provided implementation
of privacy-aware services, cloud application developers need to introduce simple annotations to
the code, prior to its deployment in the cloud. These indicate where PII is being handled, towards
automating privacy enforcement and enabling compliance by design and by default. The idea
is outlined in Figure 6.1, and consists of design-time steps (declaring policies, annotation of
the code and deployment in the cloud); and run-time steps (including policy matching, privacy
control and obligation execution).
Figure 6.1: Privacy aware PaaS components
The enforcement mechanisms are provided by the platform with the help of a new approach
for aspect-oriented programming where aspects can be manipulated at the process and at the
platform levels [ISR+11]. That approach gives a possibility to maintain a more flexible configu-
ration of the enforcement mechanisms. The mechanisms interpret end-user preferences regard-
ing handling of the PII, presented in form of opt-in or opt-out choices among available privacy
policies of a cloud application, and later perform the required actions (filtering, blocking, dele-
tion, etc). We experimented on a Java-based Platform as a Service, SAP NetWeaver Cloud, to
demonstrate how privacy preferences can be handled automatically thanks to the use of sim-
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ple Java annotation library provided in our prototype. The platform provider can make in this
way an important step towards providing built-in compliance with the personal data protection
regulations transparently, as we describe in the next sections.
The remainder of the contribution is organized as follows: in Section 6.2 we present our
use case and we give a brief overview of the privacy policy language we adopt in this work,
Section 6.4 brings a discussion on related works, in Section 6.3 we introduce the technical
architecture allowing to enforce privacy on multiple PaaS layers and Section 7 presents future
perspectives along with summary of the contribution.
6.2 Privacy-Aware Applications in the Cloud
In this section we present our use case involving multiple stakeholders accessing users’ PII in
the cloud, as well as some background on privacy policy language that we used.
6.2.1 Use case
In our use case we consider a loyalty program offered by a supermarket chain, accessible via a
mobile shopping application that communicates with back-end application deployed on the PaaS
cloud offering. The supermarket’s goal is to collect the information about consumers’ shopping
behavior that results in the creation of a consumer profile. This profile could then be used to
provide consumers more precise offers and bargains. Supermarket’s business partners may also
want to access this information in order to propose personalized offers to the mobile shopping
application users themselves.
The back-end application for the supermarket loyalty program is developed using Java pro-
gramming language and uses the cloud persistency service to store application data. The inter-
face to access the persistency service is based on Java Persistence API (JPA)3, which is nowadays
one of the most common ways of accessing a relational database from Java code.
The supermarket employees can access detailed results of database queries regarding the
consumers’ shopping history and also create personalized offers, via a web-based portal. More-
over, the cloud application exposes web services through which third parties interact with the
back-end system to consume collected data: both for their own business analysis, but also to
contact directly the consumers for marketing purposes.
The interface for the consumers makes it possible to indicate privacy preferences with re-
spect to the category of products (health care, food, drinks, etc) that one wants to share his
shopping habits about. The consumer can also indicate whether he permits the supermarket to
share personally identifiable information with its business partners, among other usages. This
choices are then reflected by the private data access control mechanism that we will describe in
Section 6.3.
3http://docs.oracle.com/javaee/5/tutorial/doc/bnbpz.html
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6.2.2 Background: Privacy Policy Language
The users of the mobile shopping application are asked to provide various kinds of personal
information, starting from basic contact information (addresses, phone, email) to more complex
data such as shopping history or lifestyle preferences. Service providers describe how users’
data are handled using a privacy policy, which is explicitly presented to users during the data
collection phase.
We adopt the PrimeLife4 Policy Language (PPL) [BNP11], which extends XACML with
privacy-related constraints for access and data usage. PPL policy is then used by the application
to record its privacy policy. It states how the collected data will be used, by whom, and how it
could be shared. On the other hand, the end-user also selects among the possible choices as to the
conditions of the data usages, that are derived from privacy policies specific to the application.
This user opt-in/opt-out choice is managed by the application and as such is not part of the
generic enforcement mechanism developed by us. Before disclosing personal information, the
user can match his preferences against the privacy policy of the service provider with the help of
a policy matching engine. The result of the matching process is an agreed policy, which is then
translated into the set of simple rules that are stored together with users’ data inside the cloud
platform’s database servers.
In summary a PPL policy defines the following structures [BNP11]:
• Access Control Elements: inherited from the XACML attribute-based access control mech-
anism to describe a shared resource (in our case PII) in general, as well as entities (sub-
jects) that can obtain access to the data.
• Data Handling Preferences: expressing the purpose of data usage (for instance marketing,
research, payment, delivery, etc.) but also downstream usage (understood here as sharing
data with third parties, e.g. advertising companies), supporting a multi-level nested policy
describing the data handling conditions that are applicable for any third party retrieving
the data from a given service.
• Obligations: specify the actions that should be carried out with respect to the collected
data, e.g. notification to the user whenever his data is shared with a third party, or deletion
of the credit card number after the payment transaction is finished, etc. Obligations in
PPL can be executed at any moment throughout whole lifetime of the collected data and
can affect future data sharing transactions, e.g. with third parties.
An excerpt of a policy is shown in Figure 6.2. It shows part of a policy rule, stating the con-
sent to use the data collected for three distinct purposes (described using P3P purpose ontology),
but forbids downstream usage.
Consumer opt-in/opt-out choice is linked with PPL policy rule via XACML conditions that
we adopted for this purpose. We have reused EnvironmentAttributeDesignator elements syntax
to refer to the actual recorded consumer choice in the application data model, as shown in Figure
6.3. The location is provided as the AttributeId value and can be read as TABLE_NAME:COLUMN_NAME
of the database table where this choice is stored (CONSUMER_CONSENT) as well as a foreign
4www.primelife.eu
122
Figure 6.2: Excerpt of a PPL policy rule
Figure 6.3: Excerpt of a PPL policy condition
key to the product category table (CATEGORY_ID) that is used to join products table. This
information is used when enforcement mechanism is put in place to take consumer consent
into account whenever information about consumer’s shopping history (for certain product cat-
egories) is requested. This policy definition of how user consent is linked to the rest of the
application data model is left in charge to the application developer as he is the one possessing
full knowledge of the application domain.
6.3 Privacy Enhanced Application Programming
We have designed a framework able to modify, at the deployment time, the architectural elements
(such as databases, web service frameworks, identity management, access control, etc) enriching
it with the further components in order to enforce user privacy preferences. In this landscape
the new applications deployed on the modified platform can benefit from privacy-aware data
handling.
6.3.1 Programming Model
The privacy-aware components are integrated seamlessly with cloud application at the deploy-
ment time, so that the enforcement of privacy constraints is done afterwards automatically. They
mediate access to the data sources, enforcing privacy constraints. In this case we are taking full
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Figure 6.4: JPA entity class annotation indicating persistency of private information
benefit of the uniform database access in the PaaS landscape that is exposed via standard Java
database interfaces such as JDBC (Java Database Connectivity) or JPA.
Usually the application code handling privacy related data is scattered and tangled over the
application, being difficult to handle and to maintain if any changes in the privacy policy are
introduced. As we observed in the existing applications the operations, which are performed on
the private user data to ensure that privacy policies are enforced, are typically cross-cutting con-
cerns in aspect-oriented programming paradigm. Inspired by this, we designed a process for the
application developer that contributes to simplifying a way the data protection compliance could
be achieved. It consists of adding meta-information to the application code via Java annotation
mechanism in the JPA entity classes. Entity class in JPA terms is the one that is mapped into a
database structure (usually a table, but also more complex type of mappings exist, e.g. to map
object inheritance hierarchy) and enables the objects of that class to be persisted in a database.
We provide also a second type of annotations, for the methods that make use of a private data,
to indicate the purpose of the data usage.
The modifications to the code are non-intrusive, in the sense that the application business
functions flow will stay exactly the same as before, except for the data set it will operate on, that
will be obtained from database by adhering to the privacy policy. The changes are as transparent
as possible from the application point-of-view as new platform components propose the same set
of API as in the traditional platforms (in our case this API is JPA) and additional functionality
is obtained via non-obtrusive code annotations that in principle could be easily removed in case
described features are not required or not available.
This approach adds value with respect to legacy applications while allowing privacy man-
agement when needed. Another advantage is that the cloud service provider can easily move to
another cloud platform without being locked into the certain vendor, apart from the fact that the
guarantees given by the platform about private data handling could not be the same.
The platform we used to develop our prototype offers the enterprise level technologies avail-
able for Java in terms of web services and data persistency (JEE, JPA). In most of the examples
we present along the use case we assume that the application developer will likely use a frame-
work such as the JPA to abstract the database access layer.
In our approach developers are required to add annotations to certain constructs, such as
@PII annotation in the JPA entity class (Figure 6.4). This annotation indicates that the class
comprises one or more fields having private data (that usually are represented in database as
columns) or that all fields are to be considered as PII (thus whole database table row needs to
be either filtered or kept during the privacy enforcement, as JPA entity is by default mapped to a
database row).
In the business code that is handling the private data we propose to use two other annotations
to indicate class and method that processes PII sets. An example of annotated code is shown in
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Figure 6.5: Annotating private data usage class with PII meta-information
Figure 6.5. In this figure the method annotation holds the information that the shopping history
list items will be processed for marketing purpose.
In summary our library provides three different annotations:
@PII: It is a flag to indicate personally identifiable information inside a JPA entity class defi-
nition. Such information is usually stored in a database as a table or a column. In Figure
6.4 this annotation involves the scope of the class declaration, see lines 2 and 3.
@PiiAccessClass: This annotation should be put in the class to indicate where it contains access
methods to personal data (see line 5 in Figure 6.5). We assume that PII access method
performs queries to the database that are requesting private user data.
@Info: This annotation is applied to PII access method, to describe the purpose or set of pur-
poses of the query performed in that method (see lines 9 and 10 in Figure 6.5).
We expect the application developers to use this annotations to mark each usage of personal
data as well as to indicate correct purposes. Ultimately they seek compliance to regulations,
therefore we trust them to correctly indicate via the annotations the intended usage of the data.
One can envisage that automated code scanners and manual reviews can take place during an
audit procedure in order to check whether the annotations are rightfully used.
6.3.2 Implementation
In this section we detail the components of our prototype architecture. Technically our code
components are packaged as several OSGi (Open Services Gateway initiative framework5) bun-
dles. A bundle is a component which interacts with the applications running in the cloud plat-
form. Some of them are to be directly deployed inside the PaaS cloud landscape and managed
by the cloud provider while the other are part of the library to be used by the cloud application
developers. Cloud providers can easily install or uninstall bundles using the OSGi framework
without causing side effects to applications themselves (e.g. no application restart is required if
some of the bundles are stopped). In the context of our scenario, we have three main bundles
managed by the cloud provider (JDBC Wrapper, Annotation Detector and SQL Filter) and one
additional bundle (Policy Handler) that is providing a translation from an application privacy
policy file written in the PPL language into an internal representation stored in the Constraints
5http://www.osgi.org
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Figure 6.6: Enforcement components
Database. The diagram in Figure 6.6 presents the architecture of the system, which we are going
to describe in more details in the following subsections.
JDBC Wrapper
The Wrapper intercepts all queries issued by the cloud application directly or by the third parties
which want to consume the collected data containing shopping history of the fidelity program
participants. This component is provided on the platform as an alternative to the default JDBC
driver in order to enforce consumers’ privacy preferences. Actually the wrapper makes use of
the default driver to eventually send the modified SQL calls to database.
JDBC Wrapper bundle implements the usual interfaces for the JDBC driver and overrides
specific methods important to the Java Persistence API, necessary to track the itinerary of SQL
queries. As a matter of fact, it is wrapping all JDBC methods that are querying the database,
intercepting SQL statements and enriching them with proper conditions that adhere to privacy
policy (e.g. by stating in the WHERE clause conditions that refer to the consumer consent table).
In order to identify the purpose of each query, its recipient and the tables referred, we retrieve the
call stack within the current thread thanks to the annotations described in the previous section.
We look for the PII access class, then we look for the method that sends the request to get the
further parameters that help properly enforce privacy control.
Annotation Detector
First task of this component is to scan Java classes at the deployment time and look for the
JPA entities that are containing privacy-related annotation in its definition (@PII). List of such
classes is then stored inside the server session context. Information about entities considered
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as PII is used to determine which database calls need to be modified in order to help preserve
consumer privacy preferences.
In the second run the annotation detector scans the application bytecode in order to gather in-
formation concerning the operation that the application intends to perform on the data, annotated
with @PiiAccessClass and @Info annotation. It is important to recall that the annotations
are not a “programmatic” approach to indicate purpose, as they are independent from the code,
which can evolve on its own. The assumption is that developers want to reach compliance, thus
the purpose is correctly indicated, in contrast to [BBL05], where it is assumed that end-users
themselves indicate the purposes of the queries they perform. The cloud platform provider can
instrument the annotation detector with a configuration file where the required annotations are
declared. The detector can recognize custom annotations and stores information about related
entity class in the runtime for future use.
SQL Filter
This component allows us to rewrite original queries issued to the database by replacing the
requested data set with a projection of that data set that takes into account consumers’ privacy
choices. SQL Filter modifies only the FROM part of a query, implementing an adapted version
of the algorithm for disclosure control described in [LAE+04], also similar to the approaches
described in [AKSX03], [MT06], and [RMSR04].
The query transformation process makes the use of the pre-processed decisions generated by
the Policy Handler that concerns each possible combination of the triple purpose, recipient and
PII table.
The transformation of the SQL query happens at the runtime. Consumer’s privacy pref-
erences are enforced thanks to the additional join conditions in the query, relating data sub-
ject consent, product category and filtering rules. The output is a transformed SQL query that
takes into account all stated privacy constraints and is still compatible with the originally issued
SQL query (it means that the result set contains exactly the same type of data, e.g. number
of columns and their types). From a business use-case perspective, it was always possible to
visualize relevant data, e.g. shopping history information, etc, without disclosing personal data
when user didn’t give his consent. The process is illustrated in Figure 6.7. It depicts the process
of query modification when application is accessing data from the SHOPPING_HISTORY ta-
ble (top-left corner of this figure). Original query (bottom-left) is transformed so that it takes
into account the information derived from privacy policy that was put by the Policy Handler
in the CONSUMER_CONSENT table (top-center). This table stores the association between
the consumers and the different product categories with which these consumers opt to reveal
their shopping history. Modified query (bottom-right) yields the data set of the same structure
as original query but without disclosing the information that consumers declined to share, as it
can be seen in the RESULT table (top-right).
The negotiated privacy policies are stored under the form of constraints together with the data
in the database component provided by the cloud infrastructure. Whenever a query is launched
by the application, we use the information collected by the annotation detector in order to modify
queries on the fly, thus using the constraints to filter out the data that is not allowed to appear in
the query results.
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Figure 6.7: SQL transformation example
This approach is interesting because the behavior of the application itself is not modified.
The impact on the performance of the system is minor, as the policy enforcement is actually
pushed into a database query and also the complexity of this query transformation algorithm is
low, as shown in previous works [LAE+04]. The work in [AKSX03] brings some performance
evaluation for the same kind of transformations. We advocate that the ability to implement
privacy controls is more important than these performance questions when dealing with private
data in cloud computing.
6.4 Related Work
There are many similarities between our approach and the work described in [MT06]. It pro-
poses a holistic approach for systematic privacy enforcement for enterprises. First, we also build
on the state of the art access control languages for privacy, but here with an up-to-date approach,
adapted for the cloud. Second, we leverage on the latest frameworks for web application and
service development to provide automated privacy enforcement relying on their underlying iden-
tity management solutions. We also have similarities on the way privacy is enforced, controlling
access at the database level, which is also done in [AKSX03].
Although the query transformation algorithm is not the main focus of our work, the pre-
vious art on the topic [CNS99, RMSR04, BBL05] present advanced approaches for privacy
preserving database query over which we can build the next versions of our algorithm. Here
we implemented an efficient approach for practical access control purposes, but we envisage to
enrich the approach with anonymization in the future.
On the other hand, we work in the context of the cloud, where a provider hosts applica-
tions developed by other parties, which can in their turn communicate with services hosted in
other domains. This imposes constraints outside of the control of a single service provider. We
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went further in the automation, by providing a reliable framework to the application developer
in order to transfer the complexity of dealing with privacy preferences to the platform provider.
Our annotation mechanism provides ease of adoption without creating dependencies with re-
spect to the deployment platform. More precisely, no lock in is introduced by our solution.
However, changes in the database schema that involves PII data require an application to be
redeployed in the platform in order to process the eventually new annotations. An alternative is
to approach [TS12] to provide sticky policies in the cloud.
The work in [Lan02] presents an approach based on privacy proxies to handle privacy rele-
vant interactions between data subjects and data collectors. Proxies are implemented as SOAP
based services, centralizing all PII. The solution is interesting, but it is not clear how to adapt the
proxy to specific data models corresponding to particular applications in a straightforward way.
Our work is aligned with the principles defended in [PC09], in particular we facilitate many
of the tasks the service designers must take into consideration when creating new cloud-based
applications. In [MP09], a user-centric approach is taken to manage private data in the cloud.
Control is split between client and server, which requires cooperation by the server, otherwise
obfuscated data must be used by default. This is a different point of view from our work, where
we embed the complexity of the privacy enforcement in the platform itself.
Automated security policy management for cloud platforms is discussed in [Lan10]. Using
a model driven approach, cloud applications would subscribe to a policy configuration service
able to enforce policies at run-time, enabling compliance. The approach is sound but lacks of
fine-grained management for privacy policies, as it is not clear how to deal with personal data
collection and usage control.
In this work, we use privacy policy based on the data owner’s preferences, to then monitor
use of sensitive data and filter out the results. We have decided to let the application developer
in charge of linking user consent to the rest of the application data, so that no specific adminis-
tration model for the privacy policies is defined. In reality, the application hosted by the cloud
platform needs to address a combination of security policies coming from the cloud platform,
the application’s policy and the user consents. For such approach, we can benefit from Ajam et
al. [ACBC10] which propose three administration enforcement approaches of the privacy poli-
cies. From their work, we would have to define several types of context and clarify the different
policies from the different entities.
In [IKC09], cryptographic co-processors are employed to ensure confidentiality of private
data protection. The solution is able to enforce rather low level policies using cryptography as
an essential mechanism, without explicit support to design new privacy compliant applications.
Several works exist on privacy protection in Web 2.0 and peer-to-peer environments, such as in
[TSGW09], where an access control mechanism is adopted for social networks. Some of these
ideas can be reused in the context of cloud applications, but our approach differentiates from
this line of work in the sense we empower the cloud applications developers with ready to use
mechanisms provided directly by the cloud platform.
In [CW07], aspect-oriented programming is used as well to enforce privacy mechanisms
when performing access control in applications. The work adopts a similar approach to ours,
but privacy mechanisms are created in a per-application basis. In our approach, by targeting the
platform as a service directly, we are able to facilitate enforcement in multiple applications.
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In [Oul13], the author presents an approach that enforces the security and privacy require-
ments based on pre-processing of the queries to the data-sources. Although the technologies are
not the same, we used the same approach to rewrite queries. The author go into the problem
in depth, as they propose a model to enforce privacy and security policies without changing the
implementation of their services. They adapt the response of the services with a fine grained
control of information disclosed by services: depending on the call issuer and the purpose of the
invocation, they adapt the response.
6.5 Summary
We presented a solution to simplify the process of enabling personal data protection in Java web
applications deployed on Platform as a Service solution. We augment cloud applications with
meta-data annotations and private data-handling policies which are enforced by the platform
almost transparently from the developer perspective (the major overhead is only in placing the
right annotations in the code). We differentiate ourselves from other approaches by proposing
tools at the application layer. We intercept set of queries and base our adaption from the resource
description. The description is directly inlined in the application.
The cloud consumer applications indicate how and where personally identifiable information
is being handled. We adapt the platform components with privacy enforcement mechanisms able
to correctly handle the data consumption, in accordance with an agreed privacy policy between
the data subject and the cloud consumer.
The advantages of our approach can be summarized as follows: the implementation details
of the privacy controls are hidden to the cloud application developer; compatibility with legacy
applications, since the annotations do not interfere with the existing code; cloud applications can
gracefully move to other platform providers that implement privacy-aware platforms in different
ways. Sensible changes in the database schema, specifically those modifying PII, require the
application to be redeployed in the cloud, possibly with new annotations.
Some future directions include the orchestration of other components such as event monitors,
service buses, trusted platform modules, etc, in order to provide real-time information to users
about the operations performed on their personal data. We would also be able to provide k-
anonymization We plan to generalize our approach to enforce other kinds of policies, such as
service level agreements, separation of duty, etc.
An important improvement of this work is the integration of advanced k-anonymization
[Swe02] process at the database access level. Such solution would be more adapted to business
applications than access control, since the end-users could obtain more meaningful information,
without fully disclosing the identities of the data subjects.
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Part III
Conclusion and perspectives
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
In the course of the thesis, I have developed several contributions related to the secure develop-
ment of applications in a broad range. Initially, it was targetting service-oriented applications,
but we have observed that the techniques and concepts were applying to the discipline of soft-
ware engineering. The proper encapsulation of behavior, and application of cross-cutting con-
cerns in applications, components, platforms, as well as every piece of computer system is the
result of decades of research. The field is becoming more mature over the time, by differenti-
ating business code, technical code, and adapting behavior of the program to several environ-
ments. The thesis falls in an industrial context, where operational safety is central. It means
that developers have several constraints in their application, being both the implementation of
business-specific concerns, i.e., how to make the ERP creating business value to its customers,
but also transverse concerns. We leverage existing technologies related to software engineering
and cross-cutting modularization to adapt them towards secure softwares. Security is a com-
plex field, whom we concentrate on automation of secure programming best practices, but also
modularization of business security concerns.
The contributions can be separated in two categories: contributions that address secure pro-
gramming, and contributions that introduce security properties into application’s landscape. We
first assist developers in writing secure software with the minimal effort. We provide the tools
directly integrated into developers’ landscape to minimize the human factor and avoid the com-
mon pitfalls. The contributions are a direct application of secure programming best practices
in which we provide additional checks and boundaries to offer additional services. In the sec-
ond type of contributions, we propose to introduce security properties at a different level of
abstraction. Instead of developers’ assistance, we provide methods at the platform level. The
problematic differs from a single programming language, and one needs to combine several tools
to gather security requirements, enforce them in the application, and verify their correct appli-
cation during execution. We have developed a security policy language agnostic of concrete
technology, and highlighted the usage with a newly REST-services framework. It means that
the security policies where capable of orchestrating the components and augment their security
without the need to know the concrete service technology used. The specialization is deferred
to the last moment to provide greater flexibility in application of security. In another contribu-
tion, we have also demonstrated the need of platform-wide components to the direct application
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of privacy. Such components are desirable to offer a consistent approach to properties that are
generally custom made, therefore error prone.
The different contributions show the variety of approaches in modularizing security prop-
erties. From these works, we have observed common pitfalls for which we propose further di-
rections. First, security properties were discussed as they are one single domain which crosscut
application, and in which methodologies applies without distinction. In reality, we differenti-
ate two kind of security, that we express as defensive security and constructive security. The
two kinds of security are completely different. The two generally crosscut the application, but
methodologies to handle their enforcement are different. Second, aspect-oriented approach have
been proposed as one solution to cover all security cases. In fact, there are shade of differences
depending on the scope of the security properties. Aspect-oriented programming is best when
one can easily detect the weaving points . The applications we were analyzing does have points
such as inputs that are fixed and easy to detect. But when it comes to analysis in the dataflow, de-
tection becomes harder with several decisions that can be taken at runtime only. In such case, we
need to provide custom solutions, and generally think at a meta level to respect program seman-
tic and provide the best solution to the specific problem. Third, tackling security properties at
the program-level only might lead to inconsistencies. Programs are inter-connected and evolve
in complex landscape with different configuration, policies, environments. The encapsulation of
security behavior needs to be adapted to the distribute nature of programs.
In order to overcome these pitfalls, we describe in the following a perspective towards cross-
layer and parametric aspect system.
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Chapter 8
Perspectives: towards a cross-layer and
parametric aspect system
Aspect languages have evolved over the years to ease the integration of aspects in application.
New pointcut primitives have been defined to allow aspect developers to describe complex use
cases. The architecture of aspects has also evolved to follow the new java language specifi-
cations, such as annotations. Yet, the aspect languages are confined to their local execution
environment. The problem is that cross-cutting concerns span different administrative layers,
but also different technical layers. It is difficult to propose at the same time a solution that al-
lows flexible interaction between actors and that ensure definition and enforcement of security
properties across layers. We present in the following requirements for a solution that what we
would like to achieve: consistent and systematic application of cross-cutting security properties
across layers. For this purpose, we advocate new constructs in aspect languages to provide new
extension to existing pointcut languages and new context exposition for advices. It also means
that we have to provide tools for the aspect system. In a nuthsell, we would like to attach more
information to resources when going in and out the application. It provides means to aspect sys-
tem to work on resources into the execution environment of the platform, but also to share the
state of a resource with other applications. In the following, we provide a first section to present
the motivation that conducted to this work. Then, we give requirements for a language that we
briefly present. Then, we express how such a language would have assisted us in the course of
the previous contributions.
8.1 Motivation
Aspect systems are powerful to model cross-cutting concerns and apply them on an application.
Belblidia [Bel08] has presented in her thesis several AspectJ extensions that have been sug-
gested by the community and by her lab to express security issues that cannot be handled with
the AspectJ language. We already introduced some in the previous sections, like the dataflow
pointcut, which allows the detection of an input value in the application that is propagated to a
sink. Masuhara introduced such approach to protect against XSS, although there is no current
134
implementation and that the pointcuts need to explicitly declare propagation of data flow. The
other extensions are oriented towards more expressivity from an aspect developer point of view:
a predicted control flow pointcut, a loop pointcut, inline wildcard in pattern matching, local
variables tracking (and not only parameters of methods and return types), etc.
All of these extensions are there to enhance existing pointcut language with new primitives
in pointcut. In the contributions we have presented in the previous chapters, we also suffer from
aspect expressiveness limitations. In the following, we go through the different contributions of
the thesis and highlight the limitations we experienced with the state of the art aspect languages.
Finally, we present snippets of code to present our vision to handle such problems.
8.1.1 Towards static analysis replacement
In Chapter 3, we presented a solution that use a static analysis phase to gather points in the
application where vulnerabilities might occur.
The tools and methods that we provide in our solution allows developers to have an overview
on the application they develop, and quickly gather vulnerabilities. We have presented guided
steps towards mitigation of the vulnerabilities, depending on the detected categories and by
analyzing the paths between vulnerability sources (entry points) and sinks (exit points).
Using Aspect-Oriented programming for automation of validation library is a natural choice
as we introduce cross-cutting concerns in applications: security transformations in the applica-
tion are scattered and tangled in the application, which makes them difficult to address one by
one. The solution we have developed generates aspects, and builds the list of vulnerability pro-
tection by adding new joinpoints to a particular aspect. There are several pointcuts: one for each
of the couple (category, type), in which category represents a malformed input vulnerability, or
cross-site scripting, etc., and in which the type represents the correction module type to apply in
order to correct the problem. Examples of such correction modules are encodeForJavascript.
Our vulnerability detection approach relies on a built-in detection algorithm to pass directly the
static analysis results to the correction part (validation). The two parts of our approach are ded-
icated components, from which the detection component extracts sensitive points in a program,
and elicit the points where security transformation can be injected. The validation component
uses the output of the previous component to forge a specific pointcut.
We have adopted this approach because of the lack of straightforward information flow and
data flow interception with aspects. The mainstream pointcut language of AspectJ allows a
partial detection of information flow that we abused by recomposing the hierarchy of calls. In
these situations, our problem is the correlation between the pointcut language and the program
syntax. We rely on a specific component to statically analyze the program and elicit sensitive
points, whereas we would like to write a single pointcut that retrieve the sensitive points for us.
The problem is that such pointcut is not yet addressed. The closest approach with aspects, the
dflow pointcut, requires us to indicate entry points and sinks in advance, which we are not aware
of.
We present hereafter two snippets that present how we would use such constructs to propose
an inline analysis of the data through the pointcut language, to directly select joinpoints in which
security protection is injected. Hence, such a construct would limit the dependencies to external
static analysis tool and would provide higher coherence wihtin the security coverage.
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Listing 15 presents the first construct that categorizes data when passing through an entry
point. Our underlying system needs to follow the propagation of the data, hence following
the dataflow to propagate the tag information. Listing 16 presents another usage of the new
constructs to build and control the tags.
Listing 15 Dataflow tagging with the new construct
@Pointcut("call(* javax.persistence.Query.get*(..)) && settag(EntryPoint.REPOSITORY)")
public void pointcutTagDataSource() {
}
@Pointcut("call(* javax.xml.ws.Dispatch.invoke*(..)) && settag(EntryPoint.WEBSERVICE)")
public void pointcutTagWebServiceDispath() {
}
//...
Listing 16 Intercepting and tagging with the new constructs
@Pointcut("call(* com.sap.businessmodel.accounting.cashflow.*(..))"
"&& hastag(EntryPoint.WEBSERVICE) && settag(Business.ACCOUNTING)")
public void pointcutTagAccounting() {
}
Listing 17 presents the second step. Once the data has been tagged by our system, we can
define new pointcuts that, depending on the applied tag and the control flow, determine new
joinpoints with en enhanced expressivity. The pointcut would allow parameters passing to the
advice to enable complete context retrieval: control flow history including entry points, tags that
have been applied, etc.
Listing 17 Parametric advice with new construct
@Around("hastag(EntryPoint.WEBSERVICE) && call(java.io.PrintWriter.print(arg)) && String(arg)")
public void doApplyValidationField(final JoinPoint jp
, final ControlFlow flow, String value)
throws Exception {
final Signature signature = jp.getSignature();
final ControlFlowHistory history = flow.getHistoric();
final List<Tag> tags = flow.getTags(value);
}
These small snippets are for example purpose only to indicate what kind of interaction one
would like with new primitives.
8.1.2 Automated source classification for input verification
The model and tools we present in this contribution are close to the type of pointcut constructs
we would like to introduce in this thesis. In Chapter 4, we are combining different techniques,
and delegating manual processing to the developer for few tasks, such as annotating code in
the application to indicate enhanced data-types. The goal is to have a consistent view on data
meta-information for a systematic validation of inputs. The manual processing can be easily
automated with our pointcut constructs that observe entry points of a program and decide of the
correct verification code to introduce.
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Our focus is to augment aspect expressivity to let an aspect developer intercept points in
the application where he can introduce the verification code for a given data-type. The actual
type of the input is a-priori not known in the context of the application. This is the reason for
which we were annotating the source code. With our approach, we would like to replace the
annotation phase by an automated discovery of the actual enhance data-types. There are sources
that provide complete description of the type, such as a database schema, or an xml schema. But
the information might also comes from a policy file, or directly from a client along the data. In
any case, our solution would give the possiblity to extract information from elements outside of
the scope of the application to integrate the context into the application.
Then, an aspect developer would create aspects that rely on this information. For this pur-
pose, we need a system that intercept elements between layers (technical layers such as reposi-
tories, controller, service framework, communication, etc.).
8.1.3 Cross-layer context passing
In Chapter 5, we introduce REST Security, which allows flexible application of security on
messages. It simplifies the problem of handling security properties in the context of multiple
actor collaboration. We presented use cases in which REST Security provides novel approach.
The enforcement of security properties in cross-domain collaboration is implemented thanks
to dedicated reference monitors. Although reference monitors fill the requirements to analyze
traffic and apply security transformations, one would need to preserve the resource state in term
of security. For instance, a security policy would force a resource to come encrypted in an
application, and the reference monitor would transparently decrypt it. The problem in such case,
is that we loose the transformation history. The application which handle the resource is unable
to know if the resource was actually protected, and from which moment the resource has been
transformed in clear text.
Such behavior can benefit to the handling of any resource on the application. At anytime,
a developer would be able to retrace the history of actions, its provenance, etc. We need to
have mechanisms that pass context through layers, and that allow us to propagate the context
during the execution of an application. We would also be able to investigate an automated way
to configure services to enable security transformations when necessary, i.e. when the resource
is sensitive or contains restricted information.
8.1.4 Inference protection
The work we have presented in Chapter 6 does not allow us to prevent inference of data, as
we don’t collect enough context to detect such inference. In [BBA+13], the authors present a
privacy preserving composition execution system. This approach is interesting as it allows the
composition of several services to provide results that respect a k-anonymization. They target
data Services, which are somehow atomic services to access data source. Instead, we position
our solution to run at the application layer, while still communicating with data-source layers
and service layer.
In the approach described in Chapter 6, we are relying on custom declaration from develop-
ers or administrators in order to provide privacy for customer’s of the application that is hosted in
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a cloud platform. The problematic when we introduce such solution is to ensure to the different
stakeholders that they can provide protection against data inference to their customers. It means
that we need to have protection against a person or a group of persons that correlate application’s
results to extract personal identifier data.
We would like to assert that privacy requirement is fully respected without leaving the ap-
plication level. The problem is that for inference protection, we need to gather several requests
coming in the application and analyze them.
The requirements to achieve such detection is to have a system capable of capturing the
numerous requests and responses during the application’s execution. In the following (cf List-
ing 18, we are highlighting a potential implementation that could rely on our set of pointcut
and advice proposal. In a natural language, the protection against such attack would lead to the
following process
• Determine identity of the requestor and the query intent
• Tag the data extracted from the table
• Compare the data from the history of extracted data
• Allow or deny access in case of data leakage risk
Listing 18 Example of protection against data inference with data access for several purposes
1 @Pointcut("within(@PiiAccessClass *) && call(@Info * *(..))")
2 public void pointcutPiiPurpose(){}
3
4 @Before("pointcutPiiPurpose()")
5 public void setRequestorIdentity(JoinPoint joinpoint, ControlFlow flow ){
6
7 User user = (User) SecurityContextHolder.getContext().getAuthentication().getPrincipal();
8 Purpose purpose = getPurposeForCurrentJointPoint(joinpoint);
9 flow.addPrincipal(user, joinpoint);
10 flow.setTag(joinpoint, "Purpose", purpose);
11 }
12
13
14 @AfterReturning(pointcut="pointcutPiiPurpose()", returning="list")
15 public void setDataFlowInformation(JoinPoint joinpoint, ControlFlow flow, List<ShopHistory> histories){
16 flow.setTag(joinpoint, EntryPoint.REPOSITORY, histories);
17 }
18
19 @Pointcut("hastag(EntryPoint.REPOSITORY, purpose)")
20 public void pointcutTaggedData(){}
21
22 @Before("pointcutTaggedData()")
23 public void verifyInference(JoinPoint joinpoint, ControlFlow flow, History history){
24 Purpose purpose = flow.getTag("Purpose");
25 if (!history.containsPrincipal(flow.getPrincipal(data)))
26 return;
27
28 Purpose previousPurpose = history.getTags(flow.getPrincipal(data)).getTag("Purpose")
29 if (purpose != previousPurpose)
30 throw new DataLeakInformationException("Principal user already access some data with different purpose");
31
32 }
33 }
Although we haven’t implemented the solution presented above, it gives few indicators
and prerequisites to handle such problematic. The Listing 18 describes at line 1 a pointcut
to detect methods annotated with the @Info annotation and that are contained in a class with
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@PiiAccessClass annotation. The corresponding advice that get principal information is pre-
sented at line 5. In our snippet, we also tag the control flow context. The advice at line 14
indicates that a specific object has for origin a repository. At line 23, another advice is executed
when data is loaded from a repository and that there is a specific purpose associated.
8.2 Requirements
In the previous sections, we have presented several motivations towards new constructs for
pointcuts and for a complete aspect system that cross-cut layers. The requirements were first
discussed in [ISR+11].
The aspect model we envision is based on the pointcut-advice model for aspects, with some
important extensions to be applied. The pointcut-advice model is characterized by three main
abstractions: aspects, pointcuts and advice that together provide means for the concise definition
and efficient implementation of so-called cross-cutting functionalities of a base application, such
as security, that cannot typically be modularized with existing structuring and encapsulation
mechanisms, such as services or components. We address these requirements by the following
set of major characteristics that the aspect model has to fulfill. These characteristics are for
most of them general in the sense that they apply to all three basic aspect abstractions (aspects,
pointcuts and advice) - except if stated otherwise in the following:
• Basic abstractions and relations: The pointcut language should enable referencing all
relevant abstractions of the model and the concrete infrastructures; the advice language
allows to manipulate these entities. Relevant relationships between them include relations
between adjacent abstraction levels or the ability to protect some of them using certain
security mechanisms, such as access control, while others may not be modified by that
security mechanism.
• Composition model: The aspect model should provide a gray-box composition model,
i.e., aspects may access parts of application implementations. However, such access can
be restricted by explicit fine-grained conditions on the structure and behavior of the under-
lying base system. The aspect model will therefore provide strong control over invasive
composition. Corresponding conditions will be defined as part of evolution tasks through
the aspects that realize them. The conditions may then be integrated before execution in
the runtime representations of aspects or the underlying infrastructure, or enforced, possi-
bly at execution time, on implementations.
• Dynamic application: Aspects should be applicable dynamically even though static appli-
cation strategies may also be used, especially for the introduction of security mechanisms
that would suffer from an excessive overhead. Many current aspect models only support
a static or load-time application of aspects, which severely limits their applicability for
many composition tasks. Our model therefore significantly broadens the use of aspects
to many real-world scenarios that involve highly dynamic applications. Another general
characteristic of our model is that the model enables the aspect-based definition of service
evolutions whose (security) properties can be formally analyzed.
139
• Protocol support: The pointcut language should include direct support for matching (parts
of) protocols that govern the collaboration (choreography etc.) between entities of the
model. The advice language permits the manipulation of protocols.
• Local state: Aspects may contain local state that can be used to modify state of the base
application. Aspect definitions may, however, restrict the kind of state that can be defined
and used.
Even though our solution is not fully developed yet, we highlighted the need for a new
approach to ease cross-layer propagation of resource state. Aspect-based techniques meet our
requirements to express and apply concerns that are normally difficult to address as their impact
is scattered in a distributed environment.
8.3 Aspect System and Language
Despite the advances and the flexibility of the solutions we propose in this thesis, we lack of
a correct aspect support in some situations. For instance, the analysis of the different projects
we conducted lead us to a situation in which pointcuts were not expressive enough, and advices
were not carrying enough information to treat the problems. In situation of security issues, it is
important to work on a snapshot view of the application context. The aspect system give us tools
to quickly introduce some code tangled and scattered over the application.
We establish some foundations to new pointcut primitives with an underlying system to
monitor data flow, while integrating the solution in the existing aspect languages. The Figure 8.1
provides an overview of the interaction between the components of the solution.
Figure 8.1: Architecture of the solution
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The execution environment depends on the actual implementation. It is generally a JVM
for java applications, but it can also be an application server. The important notion is to have a
component with clear boundaries between the external domain and the internal domain. A first
adaptation is processed for all inputs that go from external domain to the internal domain. The
first point builds if necessary the state of the resource that is coming into the application, and
passes the created context to the execution environment. The execution environment launches
the application, which is itself under a constant monitoring. The monitoring component is able
to store information either in a static way, or per request (equivalent to ThreadLocal in java).
The monitoring component can behave like an aspect engine. The goal for this monitoring
component is to maintain an history of transformations and propagation of resources within
the application. When resource gets out of the application, the execution environment has the
possibility to attach meta-information to the resource. The information can be the result of an
analysis or taken from the monitor of the application.
An aspect system using these components would
1. detect inputs and classify input source
2. expose data state as a selector through new pointcut primitive. The primitive can be pa-
rameterized
3. expose application context and history of the dataflow at a specific joinpoint, when writing
an advice
Figure 8.2: Application layers
The Figure 8.2 presents the traditional layers of an application. The layers intensively use
data from external sources. Detecting all inputs to classify them is not necessarily trivial. We list
141
in Table 8.1 the different source of origins of the external inputs. We also associate the potential
actors that can provide these inputs. The trust level highly depends on the actor that provide
the input. For instance, an administrator has potentially more weight than a client. Although a
developer should verify all inputs, the most sensitive are the one from the clients.
Input Actor
program arguments developers or architects or system users
http parameters clients
property files developers
system properties architects or system users
databases developers or administrators
local and remote filesystem system users
command line input system users
inter process communication developers
Table 8.1: Extensive list of source origins with their potential actors
Each of the input source might introduce some data, that is defined out of the scope of the
application. From a security point of view, these data could not be trusted as they are issued by
a domain external to the application domain we are taking care of. A new construct would be
necessary, part of the aspect language, to support the simple tagging of data provenance.
We provide in Table 8.2 a list of constructs we would like to have in our system. These
constructs are there to allow aspect developers to write pointcuts that maintain a context with
several tags associated to resources within an application. The different components that we
have presented in 8.1 are there to gather data, data that is used by the aspect system to determine
if a pointcut matches or not.
The language would define two kinds of context. Request context is a context that is valid
for the execution of one request. For example, if the execution environment detects that an input
message contains a signature, it will attach a tag to the message. Then, in the application, one
aspect developer might create a pointcut that verifies that a resource contains a signature to match
only necessary joinpoints. Application context requests are tags that are valid for longer than a
request. They can be assimilated to static tags, that are valid for the lifetime of the application.
For example, in the case of the privacy use case we were describing in the previous section, to
protect against inference of data, one aspect developer can use global tags to maintain context
across requests.
8.4 Related work
Dynamic taint propagation in java is widely explained in [HCF05]. They present a solution
that goes from sources to sinks through propagation means. Like our approach, the sources
are identified in advance. The propagation mechanisms are the derivation of any tainted string
to a new string. And the sinks are methods that consumes input or derivative of a user input.
Although we adopt the same approach for the execution platform taint propagation, we approach
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settag(tagname, resource) request context associate a tag with name tagname to the ap-
plication flow. One can attach a resource to
the tag.
gettag(tagname) request context retrieve a resource associated to the tag with
name tagname
hastag(tagname, resource) request context determine if a tag is set for the current appli-
cation flow or attached to the given resource.
setglobaltag(tagname, resource) application context associate a tag with name tagname to the ap-
plication. One can attach a static resource to
the tag.
getglobaltag(tagname) application context retrieve a static resource associated to the tag
with name tagname
hasglobaltag(tagname, resource) application context determine if a tag is set for the application or
attached to the given static resource.
Table 8.2: Constructs for the language
the problem a bit differently. Our goal is not only to detect the problems, but to let aspect
developers introducing any advice on this points. The work from Haldar et al. restricts the
analysis to the execution environment. For our approach, we are in a distributed scenario in
which we need to propagate the information from and to external consumers.
Another approach that is close to ours is from Suh et al. [SLZD04]. The authors are in-
terested in secure program execution via dynamic information flow tracking. Their approach
involves the collaboration of several layers altogether: operating system tags potential malicious
data, that is then tracked in program execution. At the end, some restriction might be enforced to
mitigate specific attacks. Hiet et al. [HTMM08] tackle the problem to detect intrusion detection
rather than sensitive data, but the overall approach is similar. They combine several layers and
components. They use two monitors, at the operating system level (Blare) and at the application
level (JBLare) to track information flow. In top of these monitoring components, they allow
policy-based detection of the attacks. Hauser et al.[HTFM13] continue in the same direction
to provide intrusion detection based on taint marking. Our proposal approach would generalize
a step further the composition between the different layers. We intend to combine distributed
components to share automatically and transparently information about data. In addition, we are
interessted in giving enough tools to the developers to correct the problem, but we don’t want to
directly apply a policy. We prefer to build a solid intermediate layer (the aspect pointcuts) to let
any aspect developer the care to enforce security policies.
In [ABA+12], the authors aim to provide an end-to-end security auditing approach for ser-
vice oriented architecture. They use the concept of dynamic taint analysis by introducing anal-
ysis components in the flow of messages. From the messages, they can decide if there are
violations of security policies. Although they introduce aspect-oriented programming (JBoss
implementation) in their solution, they do not address the same problem as we are. They use
AOP to instrument communication methods and thus, intercept service invocation. Yet, they are
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able to extract audit information from the traffic, but they don’t connect the communication layer
with the application layer. In our approach, we are interested to give tools and means to both de-
velopers within the application, but also for external components (reference monitors, auditing
frameworks, etc.) that can access the security meta-data that we provide to further react.
8.5 Conclusion
We have presented in this chapter an approach to give new tools to aspect developers. We place
ourselves in a distributed environment, that is composed of external components and a local
execution environment. The application (running on the local execution environment) is com-
municating with several external parties, that all have potential security needs. In order to en-
hance trust in data that pass through all these intermediaries, and in order to facilitate verification
and transformation of security properties, we define new tools and means to intercept data with
aspects, extract security extra-information, and propose the extracted information to the aspect
developers. We therefore allow local aspect developers to react on application events (encrypted
data comes in, a locally modified data is about to gets out), as the system transparently attaches
security meta-data to resources. Our solution wraps the application to extract information from
the communication layer to the application layer when data comes in, and reverse the process
when data goes out. Such approach opens new automatic collaborations between actors that are
not always possible.
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La modularisation de la sécurité informatique
dans les systèmes distribués
Gabriel SERME
RESUME : Intégrer les problématiques de sécurité au cycle de développement logiciel représente en-
core un défi à l’heure actuelle, notamment dans les logiciels distribués. La sécurité informatique requiert des
connaissances et un savoir-faire particulier, ce qui implique une collaboration étroite entre les experts en
sécurité et les autres acteurs impliqués. La programmation à objets ou à base de composants est communé-
ment employée pour permettre de telles collaborations et améliorer la mise à l’échelle et la maintenance de
briques logicielles. Malheureusement, ces styles de programmation s’appliquent mal à la sécurité, qui est un
problème transverse brisant la modularité des objets ou des composants. Nous présentons dans cette thèse
plusieurs techniques de modularisation pour résoudre ce problème.
Nous proposons tout d’abord l’utilisation de la programmation par aspect pour appliquer de manière au-
tomatique et systématique des techniques de programmation sécurisée et ainsi réduire le nombre de vul-
nérabilités d’une application. Notre approche se focalise sur l’introduction de vérifications de sécurité dans le
code pour se protéger d’attaques comme les manipulations de données en entrée. Nous nous intéressons
ensuite à l’automatisation de la mise en application de politiques de sécurité par des techniques de program-
mation. Nous avons par exemple automatisé l’application de règles de contrôle d’accès fines et distribuées
dans des web services par l’instrumentation des mécanismes d’orchestration de la plate-forme. Nous avons
aussi proposé des mécanismes permettant l’introduction d’un filtrage des données à caractère privée par le
tissage d’aspects assisté par un expert en sécurité.
MOTS-CLEFS : securité, programmation orientée aspect, modularisation, architecture orientée service
ABSTRACT : Addressing security in the software development lifecycle still is an open issue
today, especially in distributed software. Addressing security concerns requires a specific know-
how, which means that security experts must collaborate with application programmers to de-
velop secure software. Object-oriented and component-based development is commonly used
to support collaborative development and to improve scalability and maintenance in software
engineering. Unfortunately, those programming styles do not lend well to support collaborative
development activities in this context, as security is a cross-cutting problem that breaks object
or component modules. We investigated in this thesis several modularization techniques that
address these issues.
We first introduce the use of aspect-oriented programming in order to support secure program-
ming in a more automated fashion and to minimize the number of vulnerabilities in applications
introduced at the development phase. Our approach especially focuses on the injection of se-
curity checks to protect from vulnerabilities like input manipulation. We then discuss how to au-
tomate the enforcement of security policies programmatically and modularly. We first focus on
access control policies in web services, whose enforcement is achieved through the instrumen-
tation of the orchestration mechanism. We then address the enforcement of privacy protection
policies through the expert-assisted weaving of privacy filters into software. We finally propose
a new type of aspect-oriented pointcut capturing the information flow in distributed software to
unify the implementation of our different security modularization techniques.
KEY-WORDS : security, aspect-oriented programming, modularization, service-oriented archi-
tecture
